# Сопутствующие статьи по теме Regulation

Новостной центр HTX предлагает последние статьи и углубленный анализ по "Regulation", охватывающие рыночные тренды, новости проектов, развитие технологий и политику регулирования в криптоиндустрии.

Why Must Banks Ban Stablecoin Yields?

The article "Why Banks Are Determined to Ban Yield-Bearing Stablecoins?" explores the ongoing debate around the U.S. cryptocurrency market structure bill (CLARITY), particularly the fierce opposition from large banks against interest-bearing stablecoins. Banks argue that such stablecoins could cause deposit outflows, but the author refutes this, explaining that funds used to purchase stablecoins like USDC ultimately flow back into the banking system as reserves held by issuers like Circle. The real concern for banks is not the total volume of deposits but a shift in deposit structure. U.S. major banks (e.g., Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase) rely heavily on "low-interest banking," where transaction deposits (used for payments, transfers) pay near-zero interest, creating a significant spread between deposit rates and the Fed’s benchmark rate. This model generates massive profits—over $360 billion annually from interest differentials and transaction fees. Stablecoins directly compete with transaction deposits by offering similar utility (payments, settlements). If stablecoins can generate yield, users may shift funds from bank transaction accounts to stablecoins to earn higher returns. While the money remains in the banking system (as stablecoin reserves), it moves from low-cost transaction deposits to higher-yield instruments, squeezing bank profit margins and reducing fee income. Thus, banks oppose yield-bearing stablecoins to protect their lucrative low-cost deposit base and maintain control over profit distribution, making it a central issue in the CLARITY legislative battle.

marsbit01/19 09:43

Why Must Banks Ban Stablecoin Yields?

marsbit01/19 09:43

Why Must Banks Ban Stablecoin Yields?

The article explores why U.S. banks are strongly opposing interest-bearing stablecoins, despite claims that such assets could cause bank deposit outflows. It argues that funds flowing into stablecoins like USDC do not leave the banking system—instead, they are held as reserves in highly liquid assets like cash or Treasury bills, which eventually return to banks. The real concern for large banks is not the total volume of deposits, but a shift in deposit structure. U.S. megabanks rely heavily on low-cost transactional deposits (used for payments and transfers), which pay near-zero interest. These deposits allow banks to profit from the spread between the Fed funds rate and what they pay depositors, as well as from transaction fees. Interest-bearing stablecoins threaten this model. They offer similar transactional utility but also provide yield, incentivizing users to move funds out of traditional bank transactional accounts. While the money may return to the banking system, it would likely be placed in higher-yielding deposit accounts, increasing banks’ funding costs. Additionally, stablecoins could disrupt banks’ fee income from payment services. The core issue is profit redistribution: stablecoins—especially those offering yield—could reduce banks’ low-cost funding advantage and erode their transaction revenue, explaining the fierce opposition to interest-bearing models in proposed legislation like the CLARITY Act.

Odaily星球日报01/19 09:26

Why Must Banks Ban Stablecoin Yields?

Odaily星球日报01/19 09:26

2025 Crypto Buyback Revelation: When a $138 Million Buy Order Can't Save an 80% Plunge

"2025 Crypto Buyback Report: A $1.38B Buyback Fails to Prevent an 80% Crash" The year 2025 witnessed an "industrial revolution" in crypto fiscal discipline, with on-chain protocols spending over $1.4 billion on token buybacks. This strategy, driven by mature DeFi business models and favorable US regulatory shifts, aimed to reshape tokenomics. However, the outcomes were starkly polarized. Hyperliquid emerged as the dominant success story, allocating over $640 million (nearly 46% of the total market) to buybacks, which fueled a 4x price surge. Its key was a high "Net Flow Efficiency Ratio" (NFER > 3.0), where buyback volume drastically exceeded token unlock sell pressure, creating net deflation. In contrast, major failures demonstrated that buyback size alone is meaningless against structural inflation. Despite a massive $138 million buyback, Pump.fun's token price crashed 80% as the mechanism served as exit liquidity for concentrated whales without lock-ups. Jupiter spent $70 million but faced an overwhelming $1.2 billion in annual unlocks (NFER of 0.06), making its efforts futile. The analysis introduces NFER as the critical metric: Buybacks only positively impact price when the annualized buyback volume surpasses the value of annual unlocks and emissions (NFER > 1.0). Otherwise, they are ineffective or even counterproductive. By early 2026, a strategic pivot occurred. Projects like Helium and Jupiter halted buybacks, recognizing that capital was better spent on user acquisition, subsidies, and building network effects—akin to "growth stocks." Mature protocols with established cash flows, like Optimism, began adopting buybacks to transition from speculation to value. The conclusion is clear: Financial engineering cannot overcome structural inflation. The new paradigm rewards protocols that use cash flow to build real economic moats and achieve genuine net deflation. Investors must now scrutinize NFER, holder structure, and the source of buyback funds.

marsbit01/19 08:37

2025 Crypto Buyback Revelation: When a $138 Million Buy Order Can't Save an 80% Plunge

marsbit01/19 08:37

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