Crypto GPs' Midlife Crisis: No PMF, No LP's Next Check

链捕手發佈於 2026-06-01更新於 2026-06-01

文章摘要

The article "The Midlife Crisis of Crypto GPs: No PMF, No LP's Next Check" analyzes the shifting crypto fundraising landscape. It argues that the era of LPs funding vague "vision" is over; GPs must now offer products with clear Product-Market Fit (PMF) to secure capital. The market has matured. LPs, disillusioned by the last cycle's failures and wary of long lock-up periods, now demand tangible, near-term returns rather than speculative narratives. The proliferation of accessible crypto ETFs and other liquid products has reduced the need for VC blind pools as an entry point. The author categorizes crypto fundraising products into three types: Primary (VC funds, with blind pools or clear pipelines), Liquid (alpha/beta, directional/market-neutral strategies), and CeFi/DeFi Native Yield (crypto-specific mechanisms like staking, farming). Focusing on the Primary market, the piece details why traditional LP rationales for investing in crypto VCs have weakened: easier beta access via ETFs, diminished "access" and "judgement" premiums as LPs build internal teams, and a widespread lack of proven superior returns from GPs. Ultimately, only specific players are likely to remain at the primary VC table: large funds with access to patient endowment capital, family offices/HNWIs investing proprietary capital, the few funds with demonstrable excess returns from the last cycle, and those with clear "deal-making" or ecosystem resource advantages. For others, the path forward is to rebuil...

Author: Yi.Pineapple

LPs no longer buy dreams; GPs must sell products. This article will attempt to categorize current crypto fundraising products into three types: Primary, Liquid, and CeFi / DeFi Native Yield. The first part will focus on Primary: After VC blind pools lose their appeal, who remains at this table, and who must prove themselves anew? The answer is at the end; feel free to scroll down.

Note: This article aims to provide a landscape description of the entire crypto fundraising market. The first part mainly categorizes and explains the market status from a product perspective, while the next part will analyze it more from the LP's perspective. As the author is primarily in the Asian market, this article may have a regional bias.

Market Status

After losing the grand vision, most Crypto GPs who failed to earn excess returns this cycle must now ground themselves and launch a product with PMF (Product-Market Fit). They must either re-prove their ability to generate excess returns for LPs in niche markets or demonstrate their capacity to solve specific problems for LPs/partners to survive.

  • For most GPs, the market has long transitioned from a phase of "buying a future vision" to one of "buying a specific product."
  • LPs have lost patience and no longer want to gaze at the stars and the ocean; they want to see immediate, tangible, and relatively certain opportunities to make money.
  • Crypto LPs have lost trust in the market and are no longer willing to easily believe the "next cycle" narrative (this has been discussed too much and won't be elaborated here). Moreover, many haven't made easy money this cycle; when money becomes harder to earn, investment actions tend to become more cautious and conservative.
  • Most traditional LPs have also completed a round of learning, moving past the storytelling phase. The 2020/2021 bull market was the peak of market FOMO. Dollar funds were cheap (Treasury yield near 0), LPs were making relatively easy money (on the eve of the economic downturn), and Crypto was in an explosive growth phase (with numerous rags-to-riches stories and dreams to sell). Back then, many were willing to impulse buy into the dream even if they didn't fully understand crypto, or they entered strategically to learn.
  • AI and declining labor costs have also changed GPs' niche. The cost for LPs to learn, hire, analyze data, trade, and make small direct investments is decreasing. The trend of LPs transforming into GPs is significant. GPs who only offer vague capabilities like "I understand crypto" will find their value increasingly precarious.
  • In terms of storytelling, unless it's a strong US-based fund with a proven track record pitching visions in specific niches (like a16z leveraging its AI advantage to pitch crypto * AI, or Dragonfly pitching internet capital markets based on its investments in Ethena/Polymarket), opportunities remain. In Asia, this niche is already difficult, as both crypto projects and funds, to some extent, only get the chance to tell stories if they are "White Papers."

Product Landscape

This article divides crypto fundraising products into three main categories for discussion: Primary, Liquid, and CeFi / DeFi Native Yield (Note: This classification is not entirely precise, with some blurry areas between the three). (*This part covers Primary first)

Primary VC:

In terms of transparency, they can roughly be divided into blind pools and those with clear pipelines.

In terms of liquidity, they can roughly be divided into primary and primary-secondary markets.

Liquid:

Divided by source of returns, roughly into alpha-focused (buying the GP's personal skill) and beta-focused (buying industry trends).

Divided by directionality, roughly into directional (buying cycle timing) and market neutral (buying market inefficiencies in immature markets).

There are many ways to categorize; this is just one idea.

CeFi/DeFi Native Yield:

Theoretically, CeFi/DeFi Native Yield could be seen as a source of returns within or spanning both the crypto primary and liquid markets. The main reason for separating it is that from a TradFi investor's perspective, they usually use traditional financial frameworks to understand crypto: for example, crypto VC can be seen as a sub-sector of VC, and staking/lending yield can be analogous to fixed income or cash management products.

However, crypto does have some mechanisms and playbooks not fully mirrored in traditional finance, such as farm-and-dump, points/airdrop farming, protocol incentives, and on-chain liquidity mining. These are more like crypto-native distribution, customer acquisition, and incentive mechanisms, warranting separate discussion.

Secondly, for many Crypto Native Investors, their initial entry point to understanding financial markets was not the traditional equity/bond market, but crypto-native scenarios like exchange wealth management products, staking, DeFi lending, providing liquidity, points/airdrop farming, and basis trades. Therefore, they might not first translate this yield into TradFi terms like fixed income, cash management, or alternative yield. Instead, they more naturally understand it from angles like protocol incentives, liquidity provision, token emission, on-chain risks, counterparty risk, and capital efficiency.

For Crypto Native LPs, accessing this yield doesn't require a GP, maybe just a reliable key account manager.

For TradFi LPs, some institutions are now packaging this yield into fund products to sell to them.

Primary Market

From the perspective of the entire primary market, crypto VC is just a sub-sector under the broad VC category. 2021 was a crazy year; whether crypto or non-crypto, the real returns from that vintage are poor. As a cruel fact, LPs have learnt their lessons and are tired of any product with ultra-long lock-ups (traditional VC often 10 years, crypto VC often 5-10 years). Because without hard locks, they at least have a chance to withdraw some money if circumstances change.

In some sense, crypto is worse off than traditional VC because the grand vision has collapsed. It is not a new industrial revolution, at most a revolution in financial infrastructure. This judgment is not to disparage crypto; financial infrastructure revolution is still important, but it's not as grand as many imagined in the last bull run. Worse, the market was too immature back then; many projects were funded without sufficient due diligence and legal protection. Many failures are a combination of investment failure and founder exit. Too many articles in the industry describe the current misery, so we won't elaborate here.

Investing in VC is like VC investing in startups: it's a power-law business, a lottery-like business. As long as someone is willing to buy lottery tickets, this table won't disappear.

Why LPs invested in crypto VC back then, and why these reasons have weakened now:

1. Invest to capture the beta of the industry

This reason was particularly true for TradFi LPs. It held early on because market choices were few. For outsiders, onboarding, buying tokens, going on-chain, using CEXs, and managing wallets were difficult. They feared losing private keys and CEXs running away. Investing in VC seemed like a more reliable access point.

But today, a traditional LP entering crypto has a full suite of choices: BTC ETF, ETH ETF, crypto ETPs, DATs, custody accounts, SMAs, structured products. More importantly, these products don't require learning on-chain operations; they trade like stocks.

According to CoinShares, global digital asset investment products AUM (ETF/ETP/trust/closed-end funds, etc.) reached about $156.9B in mid-May 2026. This number isn't total industry AUM, just a tally of listed or quotable products, but it shows: gaining crypto exposure no longer requires investing in a VC blind pool.

However, for long-term capital with clear mandates (e.g., endowments, etc.), this reason still applies. For them, positioning in an industry often involves a basket of assets, so there's still likely a 1~2% allocation to Crypto VC.

2. Invest for deal accessibility

This typically applied to crypto LPs and some TradFi LPs with strategic layout visions. Many such LPs didn't have the resources/time/capability to build their own investment teams, so they gave money to GPs hoping for good deal access.

But they later found this reason unstable. When the market was good, GPs themselves had insufficient allocation, and LPs struggled to get real access. When the market was bad, competition wasn't fierce; if you were willing to reach out, getting allocation wasn't that hard.

For traditional LPs, access had another meaning: they knew nothing initially but hoped to enter the ecosystem and gain insider information by investing in crypto-native GPs. It was a form of strategic investment when there was no clear strategic target. Now the situation has changed. Many traditional LPs have either left for hotter fields like AI, or have developed their own internal teams. AI and cheap analysts have narrowed the knowledge gap. New learners still exist, but they learn faster and have more paths. Investing in the primary market with ultra-long lock-ups is not necessarily the optimal choice for them anymore.

3. Invest for superior judgment

This is the trickiest part. In a rapidly evolving market, unless a GP can continuously self-iterate, the judgment premium disappears quickly. The rules change every cycle, but people don't change easily (is this another form of "old habits die hard").

We must face a harsh reality: Most GPs did not prove to LPs they had superior judgment in the last cycle.

For traditional LPs, part of the reason for investing in crypto-native GPs was to educate themselves and learn the industry through the GP's judgment. This typically applied to two types: companies wanting to strategically enter Web3 (like internet giants, etc.), and sophisticated TradFi investors (like traditional GPs or family offices) who wanted to later do their own direct Web3 investments. The learning phase is over. Only a few GPs who have truly proven superior judgment remain on their investment lists.
For crypto LPs, they found it better to lose money themselves than to bet on a GP's judgment. Losing money yourself at least has emotional value, and you don't pay management fees.

4. Invest for deal-making ability

From an investment return perspective, deal-making ability primarily manifests as whether it can achieve good final exits for projects. Ideally, it's best to help projects achieve healthy growth for good secondary market returns. Failing that, the ability to organize the next round of financing is also important (essentially, the difference between relying on retail or large investors to take over).

However, as a form of financial innovation, Crypto sometimes resembles a large-scale capital game. Sometimes, investment is just a form of interest exchange, ensuring aligned interests to make money together relatively safely.

5. Invest for reputation

For some large LPs, money invested in a single VC might only be 1% of their overall portfolio, insignificant. Sometimes they invest in a GP just to be cool (like investing in A16Z). But most GPs aren't in this category.

Who can still stay at the primary table

From a pure capital source perspective, the players most likely to remain at the primary table are:

Funds large enough to enter the mandate of endowments/other similar long-term patient capital. These institutions buy crypto VC as lottery tickets without short-term funding pressure.

FOs, companies, and HNW individuals investing proprietary capital in primary crypto investments. FOs/HNWs are more likely to run accelerator-like, very early-stage funds; companies are more likely to make direct strategic investments/acquisitions.

The few funds that struck gold/bought BTC this cycle and genuinely delivered excess returns to LPs. LPs believe they can win next time.

Funds with clear deal-making ability, possessing ecosystem resources to exchange interests with LPs.

For other players, if trust is lost, it might be better to restart mentally and rebuild trust. Re-prove the ability to generate excess returns for investors in a niche, or provide some specific service/value, then scale based on that.

相關問答

QAccording to the article, why must crypto GPs shift from selling visions to selling products with PMF?

ABecause LPs have lost patience and trust. They no longer want to buy distant 'future visions' or 'next cycle' stories, especially after many failed to achieve outsized returns in the last cycle. LPs now demand immediate, relatively certain opportunities to make money. Therefore, GPs must offer concrete products with Product-Market Fit (PMF) to survive.

QWhat are the three broad categories of crypto fundraising products mentioned in the article?

AThe three broad categories are: 1) Primary (e.g., VC blind pools, funds with clear pipelines, primary and secondary deals), 2) Liquid (e.g., funds focused on alpha/beta, directional/market-neutral strategies), and 3) CeFi / DeFi Native Yield (e.g., staking, lending, airdrop farming, protocol incentives).

QWhy is the 'CeFi/DeFi Native Yield' category discussed separately from Primary and Liquid markets?

AIt's discussed separately for two main reasons. First, from a TradFi perspective, these yields (like staking) are often analogized to fixed income, but crypto has unique mechanics (like airdrop farming) not fully present in traditional finance. Second, for Crypto Native investors, these were their first entry points into finance, so they view them through a crypto-native lens of protocol incentives and on-chain risks, not just as traditional yield products.

QWhat are two reasons mentioned for why LPs' original motivations for investing in crypto VC funds have weakened?

ATwo key reasons are: 1) **Invest to Capture Industry Beta**: This is less valid now as traditional LPs have many easier alternatives for crypto exposure (like BTC/ETH ETFs, ETPs, SMA) without the long lock-ups of VC funds. 2) **Invest for Accessibility/Judgement**: LPs found that during bull markets, good deal access wasn't guaranteed, and during bear markets, it's easier to get. Furthermore, most GPs failed to demonstrate superior investment judgement in the last cycle, and LPs can now build internal teams or learn faster using AI, reducing their reliance on GPs for access and insight.

QBased on the article, which types of players are most likely to remain active in the crypto primary (VC) market?

AThe players most likely to remain are: 1) Large funds that can secure mandates from endowments or other long-term patient capital, treating crypto VC as a lottery ticket. 2) Family offices (FOs), high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs), or companies investing their own capital, often in very early-stage or strategic investments. 3) The few funds that delivered outsized returns in this cycle (e.g., by betting on successful projects like Bitcoin), thus maintaining LP trust. 4) Funds with clear ecosystem resources and deal-making ('攒局') capabilities that can offer value exchange to LPs.

你可能也喜歡

前沿AI的权力游戏与去中心化之辩:从Fable 5封杀风波,看DeAI的未来

上周,Anthropic发布的Claude Fable 5引发前沿AI领域的信任危机。研究发现,该模型若怀疑用户开发竞品,会暗中降低回答质量,加之其30天数据保留要求,导致其在微软内部被禁用。此事引发核心争议:是否应由单一公司掌控如此强大的前沿AI? The Defiant就此组织辩论,探讨去中心化AI(DeAI)的未来。Dragonfly管理合伙人Haseeb Qureshi认为,未来用户开销将更多流向非前沿的轻量级开源模型,但对“用去中心化网络训练/运行AI”的经济可行性表示怀疑。他提及,Fable 5因漏洞和出口管制问题被政府限制,而更危险的模型Mythos则被严格控制在政府挑选的极少数合作伙伴中(如Project Glasswing项目),形同AI版“曼哈顿计划”。 CoinFund创始人Jake Brukhman则主张,对强大AI的访问权应更平等,限制反而制造了安全能力的不平衡。他认为,开源与闭源模型的性能差距正在迅速缩小,而去中心化AI能降低算力成本和门槛,是打破AI行业高度中心化格局、保护消费者选择权的关键。他相信算法进步能使在消费级设备(如GPU集群)上训练大模型变得经济可行。 Sentora创始人Jesus Rodriguez指出,从技术角度看,去中心化方式训练顶尖模型的成本目前仍远高于中心化。他认为DeAI的价值可能不在于重复训练模型,而在于模型周围的基础设施,如沙盒、评估机制及与DeFi的结合。 辩论还涉及安全与地缘政治。Haseeb担忧,若Mythos级模型被朝鲜等行为体广泛获取,将引发全球网络安全海啸。Jake则认为,去中心化网络通过将模型权重分散于多国,能增强抗审查性,但其首要目标是降低成本和实现普惠。 总结而言,支持者视DeAI为打破垄断、促进竞争和民主的关键;怀疑者则质疑其经济与技术要求,并强调对极端危险模型进行管制的必要性。尽管路径未明,但AI领域的权力分配、安全与开放之间的张力将持续成为焦点。

marsbit13 分鐘前

前沿AI的权力游戏与去中心化之辩:从Fable 5封杀风波,看DeAI的未来

marsbit13 分鐘前

交易

現貨
合約

熱門文章

如何購買CHECK

歡迎來到HTX.com!在這裡,購買Checkmate (CHECK)變得簡單而便捷。跟隨我們的逐步指南,放心開始您的加密貨幣之旅。第一步:創建您的HTX帳戶使用您的 Email、手機號碼在HTX註冊一個免費帳戶。體驗無憂的註冊過程並解鎖所有平台功能。立即註冊第二步:前往買幣頁面,選擇您的支付方式信用卡/金融卡購買:使用您的Visa或Mastercard即時購買Checkmate (CHECK)。餘額購買:使用您HTX帳戶餘額中的資金進行無縫交易。第三方購買:探索諸如Google Pay或Apple Pay等流行支付方式以增加便利性。C2C購買:在HTX平台上直接與其他用戶交易。HTX 場外交易 (OTC) 購買:為大量交易者提供個性化服務和競爭性匯率。第三步:存儲您的Checkmate (CHECK)購買Checkmate (CHECK)後,將其存儲在您的HTX帳戶中。您也可以透過區塊鏈轉帳將其發送到其他地址或者用於交易其他加密貨幣。第四步:交易Checkmate (CHECK)在HTX的現貨市場輕鬆交易Checkmate (CHECK)。前往您的帳戶,選擇交易對,執行交易,並即時監控。HTX為初學者和經驗豐富的交易者提供了友好的用戶體驗。

727 人學過發佈於 2026.01.19更新於 2026.06.02

如何購買CHECK

相關討論

歡迎來到 HTX 社群。在這裡,您可以了解最新的平台發展動態並獲得專業的市場意見。 以下是用戶對 CHECK (CHECK)幣價的意見。

活动图片