Author: Anita @anitahityou
If you only read tech news in 2025, the world seems rosy: AI investment continues, North American data center construction accelerates, and crypto miners have finally "exited the cycle," successfully transforming their highly volatile mining operations into stable AI computing power services.
But in the credit departments of Wall Street, the atmosphere is completely different.
Credit investors aren't discussing model performance or which generation of GPU is stronger. They stare at the core assumptions in their Excel spreadsheets and begin to feel a chill: we seem to be using a 10-year real estate financing model to purchase a perishable product with a shelf life of only 18 months.
Back-to-back reports from Reuters and Bloomberg in December revealed the tip of the iceberg: AI infrastructure is rapidly becoming a "debt-intensive industry." But this is just the surface; the real crisis lies in a deep financial structure mismatch—when high-depreciation computing assets, highly volatile miner collateral, and rigid infrastructure debt are forcibly bundled together, a hidden chain of default transmission has already formed.
I. Deflation on the Asset Side: The Brutal Revenge of "Moore's Law"
The core logic of credit is Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR). Over the past 18 months, the market assumed AI compute租金 (rent) would be as stable as real estate rent, or even as inflation-resistant as oil.
Data is mercilessly shattering this assumption.
According to Q4 2025 tracking data from SemiAnalysis and Epoch AI, the unit cost of AI inference has decreased by 20–40% year-over-year in the past year.
- The adoption of model quantization, distillation techniques, and efficiency improvements in dedicated inference chips (ASICs) have led to an exponential increase in the efficiency of computing power supply.
- This means so-called "compute租金" has a natural deflationary attribute.
This creates the first duration mismatch: the issuing entities purchased GPUs at 2024 peak prices (CapEx), locking in a rental income curve destined to plummet post-2025.
If you are an equity investor, this is called technological progress; if you are a creditor, this is called collateral depreciation.
II. The Distortion on the Financing Side: Packaging Venture Risk as Infrastructure Returns
If returns on the asset side are thinning, the liability side should rationally become more conservative.
But reality is恰恰相反 (precisely the opposite).
According to the latest statistics from The Economic Times and Reuters, the total debt financing for AI data centers and related infrastructure surged 112% in 2025, reaching a scale of $25 billion. The main drivers of this surge are "Neo-Cloud" vendors like CoreWeave and Crusoe, as well as transitioning mining companies, which are大规模采用 (large-scale adoption of) Asset-Backed Lending (ABL) and Project Finance.
The本质变化 (essential change) in this financing structure is extremely dangerous:
- Past: AI was a game for tech VCs; failure meant equity goes to zero.
- Present: AI has become an infrastructure game; failure means debt default.
The market is mistakenly placing high-risk, high-depreciation tech assets (Venture-grade Assets) into a low-risk financing model (Utility-grade Leverage) meant for highways and hydropower plants.
III. Miners' "Fake Transformation" and "Real Leverage"
The most fragile link appears among crypto miners. The media loves to praise miner转型 (transformation) to AI as "de-risking," but from a balance sheet perspective, this is risk叠加 (stacking).
Consulting data from VanEck and TheMinerMag reveals a counterintuitive fact: the net debt ratios of leading listed mining companies in 2025 have not substantially decreased compared to the 2021 peak.甚至 (Even), the debt scale of some aggressive mining firms has surged by 500%.
How did they achieve this?
- Left hand (Asset side): Still holds highly volatile BTC/ETH, or uses future computing income as implicit collateral.
- Right hand (Liability side): Issues convertible notes or high-yield bonds, borrows USD to purchase H100s/H200s.
This is not deleveraging; this is a Rollover (debt extension).
This means miners are playing a "double leverage" game: using Crypto's volatility as collateral to bet on GPU cash flow. During顺风期 (favorable periods) this means double profits, but once the macro environment tightens, "coin price decline" and "compute租金 decline" will occur simultaneously**. In credit models, this is called correlation convergence, the nightmare of all structured products.
IV. The Non-Existent "Repo Market" (The Missing Repo Market)
What keeps credit managers awake at night is not the default itself, but the清算 (liquidation) after default.
In the real estate subprime crisis, banks could at least foreclose and auction houses. But in AI compute financing, if a miner defaults, who can the creditor sell those ten thousand H100 GPUs to?
This is a secondary market whose liquidity is严重高估 (severely overestimated):
- Physical Dependence: High-end GPUs aren't something you can just plug into a home computer; they heavily depend on specific liquid-cooled racks and power density (30-50kW/rack).
- Technical Obsolescence (Hardware Obsolescence): With the release of NVIDIA's Blackwell and even Rubin architectures, older cards face non-linear depreciation.
- Buy-Side Vacuum: When systemic selling occurs, there is no "lender of last resort" willing to take on obsolete electronic waste.
We must be wary of this "collateral illusion"—the LTV on the books looks safe, but that secondary repo market capable of absorbing tens of billions of dollars in selling pressure simply doesn't exist in reality.
This Isn't Just an AI Bubble; It's a Failure of Credit
It needs to be clarified that this article does not否定 (deny) AI's technological prospects, nor does it deny the real demand for computing power. What we question is the wrong financial structure.
When deflationary assets (GPUs) driven by Moore's Law are priced like inflation-resistant real estate; when miners who haven't truly deleveraged are financed like premium infrastructure operators—the market is actually conducting a credit experiment that has not been sufficiently priced in.
Historical experience repeatedly proves: credit cycles often peak earlier than technology cycles. For macro strategists and credit traders, the primary task before 2026 might not be predicting which large model will win, but重新审视 (re-examining) the true credit spreads of those "AI Infra + Crypto Miners" combinations.
<1>https://epoch.ai/data-insights/llm-inference-price-trends
<2>https://epochai.substack.com/p/the-epoch-ai-brief-april-2025
<3>https://semianalysis.com/2025/
<4>https://www.reuters.com/commentary/breakingviews/shaky-data-centre-tenants-could-choke-off-ai-boom-2025-12-10/
<5>https://longbridge.com/en/news/269179463
<6>https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/data-center-capacity
<7>https://www.webpronews.com/ais-debt-fueled-data-center-frenzy-risks-mounting-in-2025-boom/
<8>https://www.alpha-matica.com/post/assessing-risks-in-ai-infrastructure-finance
<9>https://www.blackstone.com/news/press/coreweave-secures-7-5-billion-debt-financing-facility-led-by-blackstone-and-magnetar/
<10>https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/coreweave-secures-7-5-billion-debt-financing-facility-led-by-blackstone-and-magnetar-301848093.html
<11>https://www.cnbc.com/2024/05/17/ai-startup-coreweave-raises-7point5-billion-in-debt-blackstone-leads.html
<12>https://happycoin.club/en/vaneck-za-god-dolgi-bitkoin-majnerov-vyrosli-na-500-do-127-mlrd/
<13>https://www.binance.bh/en-BH/square/post/10-23-2025-crypto-news-bitcoin-miner-debt-surges-500-as-industry-gears-up-for-hashrate-
<14>https://www.aicerts.ai/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Publications-Certification-Impact-Report-1.pdf
<15>https://www.webpronews.com/ais-debt-fueled-data-center-frenzy-risks-mounting-in-2025-boom/
<16>https://www.alpha-matica.com/post/assessing-risks-in-ai-infrastructure-finance
