# Сопутствующие статьи по теме Incentives

Новостной центр HTX предлагает последние статьи и углубленный анализ по "Incentives", охватывающие рыночные тренды, новости проектов, развитие технологий и политику регулирования в криптоиндустрии.

IOSG: TAO is Elon Musk who invested in OpenAI, Subnet is Sam Altman

The article presents a critical analysis of Bittensor (TAO), a decentralized AI marketplace, comparing its economic model to Elon Musk's early investment in OpenAI, where funders have no guaranteed return. TAO acts as a funding layer, distributing tokens to subnet operators (akin to labs or researchers) based on their subnet token performance. However, subnets are under no obligation to return any value—such as AI models, data, or services—back to the TAO ecosystem. This creates a risk of value extraction, where developers may use TAO incentives for research and then commercialize成果 independently. The bear case highlights the lack of binding mechanisms, potential capital drain through token inflation, and competition from well-funded centralized AI giants. The optimistic view argues that continuous resource needs may naturally retain subnets within Bittensor, leveraging crypto’s ability to aggregate resources at scale, similar to Bitcoin’s success with computation. Ultimately, investing in TAO is a speculative bet on a coordination miracle—where incentives align to keep valuable AI projects within the ecosystem—rather than a traditional equity-like claim on output. The outcome distribution is highly skewed: most scenarios lead to niche use or value leakage, while a few could result in TAO becoming a foundational decentralized AI asset.

marsbit2 дня назад 10:45

IOSG: TAO is Elon Musk who invested in OpenAI, Subnet is Sam Altman

marsbit2 дня назад 10:45

The End of the Public Chain 'Money-Splashing' Era

The article argues that the traditional L1 blockchain grant model for ecosystem funding is fundamentally broken, not just in need of minor adjustments. It claims that over the past four years, billions of dollars have been poured into grants from major L1s like NEAR, Avalanche, and Aptos, yet this has failed to produce lasting, breakthrough projects or sustainable ecosystems. Instead, it has created a cycle where teams optimize for grant applications and short-term KPIs rather than building viable products for real users. The model is criticized for fostering a "hostage" situation: foundations are trapped by their own metrics and feel compelled to disburse funds to show growth, while teams become dependent on grant cycles, shaping their roadmaps around fundable proposals rather than market needs. This leads to a proliferation of "zombie" projects that survive on grants but lack organic growth. The author contrasts this with direct equity and token investments, like those made by Solana Ventures, which create long-term, aligned partnerships. The piece concludes that the era of grants for cold-starting ecosystems is over. The future winners will be L1s that compete by attracting truly great companies through strategic investments and by being the best place to build, not the most generous grant committee.

marsbit04/13 14:14

The End of the Public Chain 'Money-Splashing' Era

marsbit04/13 14:14

TAO is Elon Musk who invested in OpenAI, Subnet is Sam Altman

The article, titled "TAO is Elon Musk who invested in OpenAI, Subnet is Sam Altman," presents a critical analysis of the Bittensor (TAO) project. It argues that Bittensor functions as a decentralized AI marketplace where TAO tokens fund AI research via subnets. However, the author highlights a fundamental flaw: subnet operators have no obligation to return any value, such as AI models or profits, back to the TAO ecosystem or its token holders. This structure is likened to Elon Musk's early investment in the non-profit OpenAI, which later commercialized its technology without returning value to its initial benefactor. The bear case posits that Bittensor is essentially a wealth transfer from crypto speculators to AI researchers ("miners"). Subnets can use TAO incentives for development and then take their successful products elsewhere, leaving TAO holders with diluted tokens from inflation and no captured value. The lack of enforced equity or binding mechanisms means the project relies on a "hope" that subnet tokens maintain value. The optimistic perspective counters that two factors could create a successful, self-sustaining economy: 1) AI's perpetual and massive resource needs could incentivize subnets to stay for continued funding, and 2) crypto has a proven ability to aggregate resources through token incentives, as seen with Bitcoin and Ethereum. The conclusion states that investing in TAO is a bet on a博弈论 (game theory) miracle—that soft incentives alone will be enough to keep the best subnets within the ecosystem and create a flywheel effect. This outcome is possible but represents a highly skewed, low-probability success scenario amidst significant risks of failure.

marsbit04/13 14:01

Base's Growth Dilemma: Why Did Everything Go Right, But Users Still Leave?

Based on the Japanese philosophical concept of "basho" (a field or place that shapes its inhabitants), this analysis explores why Base blockchain, despite initial explosive growth, is now facing a significant user exodus. Launched by Coinbase in 2023, Base quickly became the fastest-growing Layer 2 (L2) solution, reaching a peak of 1.72 million daily active addresses and $5.6 billion in TVL by late 2025. Its immense distribution power from Coinbase's 100 million users created strong belief it would solve Ethereum's user adoption problem. However, after confirming a token launch in September 2025, active addresses plummeted by 73% to 458,000 by March 2026. The analysis attributes this to Base building a mere "location" for transactions rather than a "basho"—a meaningful context where users form identities and relationships. Its bet on a tokenized creator economy via Zora also failed; 99.7% of created tokens became inactive. The core issue is that financial incentives can attract users but cannot fabricate a genuine reason to stay. Unlike a "third place" (e.g., a community square), which people return to for non-transactional reasons, Base was designed for extraction, leading users to leave once incentives dried up. The piece contrasts Base with chains like Arbitrum and Hyperliquid, which, despite also seeing declines, retained users through unique community identity and experiences rather than mere speculation. The conclusion is that the entire L2 model is cooling, and sustainable growth requires building an irreplaceable ecosystem that shapes user identity—something that cannot be engineered through incentives alone. Base's pivot to a self-custody trading app is a rational retreat, admitting its original vision to create a social, habitable chain failed to materialize.

marsbit04/02 06:07

Base's Growth Dilemma: Why Did Everything Go Right, But Users Still Leave?

marsbit04/02 06:07

Interpreting Polymarket's Major Updates Last Night: Expanded Fees, Self-Regulation, and New Incentives

Polymarket, a prediction market platform, announced a series of major updates focused on self-regulation, fee expansion, and new incentive mechanisms. Key updates include enhanced market integrity rules explicitly prohibiting insider trading, market manipulation, and trading by entities capable of influencing event results. This aims to increase transparency and build regulatory trust. A new dynamic fee structure will be implemented starting March 30, 2026, expanding beyond Crypto and Sports to include Finance, Politics, Economics, Culture, and Weather. Fees peak when contract prices are near 50% probability. The platform also opened its referral program to all users with over $10k in trading volume, offering a 30% fee rebate for direct referrals and 10% for secondary ones. Additionally, a market maker rebate program was launched, redistributing a portion of taker fees to liquidity providers daily in USDC, with rebate rates varying by market. While the community anticipated a token airdrop, the announced updates are seen as long-term operational improvements, with overall positive sentiment.

Odaily星球日报03/24 02:07

Interpreting Polymarket's Major Updates Last Night: Expanded Fees, Self-Regulation, and New Incentives

Odaily星球日报03/24 02:07

The 4 Truths and Fee Traps Behind Polymarket's LP Market Making Incentives

Polymarket, a prediction market platform, has recently shifted its focus to incentivizing liquidity providers (LPs) to address its core issue of low liquidity. While most markets remain free, it now charges a taker fee on specific markets like crypto price movements and select sports events. This fee, highest near 50% probability, funds new LP reward programs. There are two primary reward systems: one pays LPs when their limit orders are executed (maker rewards), and another rewards simply for placing orders within a set spread to provide liquidity, even if they don't get filled. A third mechanism allows anyone to sponsor additional incentives for specific markets. A positive view argues this structure values genuine liquidity over mere trading volume, making fees earned and rewards received a potential key, anti-sybil metric for a future POLY token airdrop. It rewards users who improve market depth and stability. A contrasting, negative view claims the LP program is a "trap." Critics argue that professional market makers avoid it due to insider trading risks and that most LPs are actually losing money due to hidden "LP wear and tear" (impermanent loss), only participating based on speculation of a valuable airdrop. They warn that if Polymarket expands fees to fund these unsustainable rewards, it could lose its competitive edge of zero fees and better odds compared to traditional sportsbooks. Proposed solutions include a fixed fee only on profits, using a native POLY pool for liquidity, or charging for premium products like parlays instead of core markets.

marsbit03/22 04:10

The 4 Truths and Fee Traps Behind Polymarket's LP Market Making Incentives

marsbit03/22 04:10

The 4 Truths Behind Polymarket's LP Market-Making Incentives and the Fee Trap

Polymarket, a prediction market platform, has recently shifted its incentive structure towards rewarding Liquidity Providers (LPs) to solve its core problem of low market depth. While most markets remain free, it now charges a taker fee on specific markets (all Crypto markets, NCAAB basketball, and Serie A football) to fund new LP reward programs. The fee is calculated on a symmetric curve, highest near 50% probability. The platform has introduced two main incentive systems: one rewards LPs whose limit orders are executed (Maker Incentives), and another rewards LPs simply for providing resting liquidity, even if orders aren't filled (Liquidity Incentives). A third system allows anyone to sponsor additional rewards for specific markets. A key argument is that the fees paid and rewards earned could be a strong anti-sybil metric for a potential POLY token airdrop, valuing genuine liquidity provision over mere trading volume. However, a counter viewpoint argues the LP program is a potential trap. Critics claim that the displayed ROI for LPs is misleading as it doesn't account for "LP wear and tear"—losses from filled orders that can't be easily exited. They state professional market makers avoid it due to insider trading risks and that the model of subsidizing liquidity with massive daily rewards is unsustainable. The concern is that widespread fee implementation could erase Polymarket's competitive edge over traditional betting platforms. Proposed solutions include a fixed fee on profits only, using a POLY token for native liquidity, and charging for premium products like parlays instead of core markets.

Odaily星球日报03/22 04:08

The 4 Truths Behind Polymarket's LP Market-Making Incentives and the Fee Trap

Odaily星球日报03/22 04:08

What Is the Web3 Workplace Really Like? A Sample Observation from a Leading Exchange

Based on interviews and data from leading crypto exchange Gate, this article explores the realities of working in Web3, countering common stereotypes of instability and high pressure. A key feature is remote work, embraced by over 66% of Web3 companies. While offering flexibility, it can create isolation and make vetting companies difficult, driving talent toward established firms like Gate, which has a 13-year history and global regulatory licenses. This provides a sense of security absent in newer projects. The workforce is highly educated (89% hold bachelor's degrees or higher) and global. Talent is attracted by growth potential, learning opportunities, and the ability to have a global impact. Compensation, while not always exceeding top tech firms, offers geographic arbitrage—earning a competitive salary while living in a lower-cost region. Performance-based incentives are central. At Gate, year-end bonuses range from 2-6 months' salary, with top performers receiving up to 20 months' pay. The culture emphasizes "high effort, high reward," not just long hours. Work intensity is high due to the 24/7 nature of crypto, but the flexibility of remote work and a results-oriented model prevent a pure "996" culture. The article concludes that while Web3 has its challenges, it offers unique opportunities for growth and flexibility. It advises against relying on polarized external narratives and encourages firsthand experience to understand the real Web3 workplace.

Odaily星球日报03/02 11:08

What Is the Web3 Workplace Really Like? A Sample Observation from a Leading Exchange