# Exploit Related Articles

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50 Million USDT for 35,000 USD worth of AAVE: How Did the Disaster Happen? And Who Should We Blame?

In a catastrophic DeFi transaction, a user swapped 50.43 million aEthUSDT (Aave interest-bearing USDT) for only 327.24 aEthAAVE (worth ~$35,900), resulting in a near-total loss of value. The transaction was a collateral swap executed via CoW Protocol’s settlement system and Aave’s interface. The failure occurred due to a deeply flawed routing path: after redeeming USDT from Aave, the funds were routed through a highly liquid Uniswap V3 USDT/WETH pool (correctly executing the first swap). However, the entire amount of ~17,958 WETH was then sent to a tiny SushiSwap V2 AAVE/WETH pool with only ~331 AAVE and ~17.65 WETH in reserves. The massive trade drained 99.9% of the pool's AAVE, resulting in an effective execution price of ~$154,114 per AAVE—over 1000x worse than market price. Critical systemic failures were identified: 1. Aave’s interface requested a CoW quote without including critical hook metadata, leading to an inaccurate quote. 2. CoW’s solver competition logic deemed any quote with non-zero output and positive gas cost as "valid," with no sanity checks against market price or liquidity depth. 3. The routing algorithm modeled the tiny SushiSwap pool as a valid execution venue purely based on its constant-product formula, ignoring the economic absurdity. 4. Aave’s UI only provided a soft warning (a checkbox) for high price impact instead of a hard stop. The lost value was instantly arbitraged in the next block, benefiting MEV searchers and block builders. The core protocols (Aave, CoW Settlement, Uniswap, SushiSwap) functioned as coded. The primary blame lies with CoW’s inadequate routing quality controls and Aave’s flawed interface quote generation and weak risk safeguards.

Odaily星球日报03/13 12:47

50 Million USDT for 35,000 USD worth of AAVE: How Did the Disaster Happen? And Who Should We Blame?

Odaily星球日报03/13 12:47

When Depth Becomes an Illusion: Polymarket Faces 'Order Attack' Stress Test

A sophisticated "order attack" is exploiting a critical vulnerability in Polymarket's hybrid off-chain matching/on-chain settlement system. For less than $0.10 in gas fees on Polygon, an attacker can initiate a trade and then, in the brief window before on-chain execution, drain their wallet via a high-gas transfer. This causes the initial trade to fail on-chain due to insufficient funds. However, Polymarket's off-chain system responds by forcibly removing all the legitimate market maker orders that were matched with the failed transaction. This attack has two primary profit methods. First, attackers clear the order book of competitors, create a liquidity vacuum, and then place their own orders with artificially wide spreads to monopolize trading. Second, they "hunt" automated trading bots: after a trade is matched off-chain, a bot hedges its new position, but the attacker then forces the original trade to fail on-chain. This leaves the bot with an unhedged, risky position, which the attacker exploits for profit. One identified attacker address, created in February 2026, reportedly profited over $16,000 in a single day by targeting just 7 markets. The attack severely undermines market maker confidence, threatens the platform's liquidity, and exposes a fundamental design flaw. While the community has developed monitoring tools, Polymarket team has not yet issued an official fix.

比推02/26 04:52

When Depth Becomes an Illusion: Polymarket Faces 'Order Attack' Stress Test

比推02/26 04:52

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