Editor's Note: Ceasefire, blockade, and tariff threats—the conflict surrounding Iran has not subsided but continues to spill over. From the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea, from energy corridors to trade秩序, the core of the situation is no longer a local military confrontation but a systemic博弈 around "who controls the flow."
Using the "Rimland" strategy as a线索, this article points out that the United States is attempting to turn the conflict from a regional issue into a global one by海上封锁 and restructuring energy routes, drawing China into it. As sanctions and interception measures escalate, the confrontation originally centered on the Middle East is transforming into a structural冲击 affecting global energy, supply chains, and the financial system.
More critically, the market has not fully digested this "chain reaction." The immediate fluctuations in oil prices are only the first step; their transmission to liquidity, tech investments, consumer spending, and even agricultural supply is just beginning to show. After the revaluation of energy prices, the real test is how the global economy will withstand the second-round冲击 triggered by this.
This means that the current issue is no longer whether the conflict will escalate, but along which paths its impact will扩散, and when the market will start to pay for these尚未定价 risks.
Below is the original text:
Alright, the situation is now clear.
The tensions we highlighted last Wednesday have proven to be irreconcilable.
Iran wants nuclear weapons and control over the strait; and Trump cannot accept either of these. How far apart are these two "target circles"? So much so that even Israel's war with Lebanon hasn't been included in the discussion agenda.
I won't claim my judgment was precise, but we may indeed have entered the "mid-game." This is not a conflict that can be called off in an afternoon. The core issue is very simple: Who will control the world's most important水道? And, is Iran willing to threaten its neighbors to gain bargaining chips for nuclear negotiations?
That is the key.
What is now becoming clear is a整套策略路径. Readers who have followed along, from "Fighting for the Dollar" to "Don't Take the Bait," to "Awakening the Hegemon" and "Fragile Peace," should already see the pattern.
Trump is executing a "Rimland" strategy.
Intercept shipping. Threaten to impose 50% tariffs on all countries providing weapons to Iran. Instead of attacking the内陆(heartland), control the maritime channels of energy transport to draw China into this博弈. For every mine Iran lays, for every oil tanker it attacks, retaliate tenfold—seize their vessels, control oil tankers, directly sell their crude oil.
Settle in U.S. dollars.
Then there's the "Abraham Accords." Saudi oil is transported via Jordan to the port of Haifa; the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) is being reactivated. A corridor of physical infrastructure is connecting coastal countries into an energy network, completely bypassing the "heartland." This is a "Rimland alliance" built with pipelines and steel.
In my view, we have reached this point largely due to this process itself—Iran (and China) ignited Israel through Hamas' actions on October 7, thereby interrupting this normalization process; had this process advanced, it could have formed an alternative trade route bypassing the Strait of Hormuz and even the "Belt and Road."
This also explains the divergence between Washington and Brussels. The U.S. feels the weight of responsibility; Europe似乎 believes it can secure energy access through private negotiations while letting the "older brother" bear the cost of conflict. France, on one hand, blocked relevant UN Security Council resolution, while on the other, negotiated bilateral transit arrangements through the strait with various parties and called for the formation of an "alliance of independent nations." This is a typical "heartland" mindset: making deals with inland powers, avoiding direct conflict, as if maritime routes will maintain themselves.
Trump has just堵上了 this漏洞—and thus turned America's problem into the world's problem.
As of writing, crude oil prices have risen over 6%, stocks have fallen about 1%, and last week's gains due to the ceasefire look highly likely to be quickly erased. I bought some VIX call options over the weekend, so you could say I have a bit of a立场.
How the situation develops next depends on a series of more fundamental questions:
· Can the ceasefire hold for another week, or will it collapse in "reverse deduction"?·
Trump has stated he will intercept ships that have paid "tolls" to Iran—does this include Chinese ships? What will happen when they try to load crude from Kharg Island?
· He has also reiterated the threat of imposing 50% tariffs on any country providing weapons to Iran—does this mean a trade war is back on the agenda?
Then there's Iran's countermeasures: it could activate the Houthis, who still have the capability to make the Bab el-Mandeb strait difficult to pass. Notably, most oil tankers transporting crude via Saudi Arabia's "East-West Pipeline" are VLCCs (Very Large Crude Carriers) that cannot pass through the Suez Canal. If the Houthis escalate, it would affect not only Red Sea shipping but force these giant tankers carrying the most critical crude to take much longer routes.
The main thread is: this conflict continues to expand in scale and spillover scope.
By escalating actions to全面拦截 all ships paying "tolls" to Iran and reiterating tariff threats, Trump has explicitly drawn China into this博弈. Beijing has been hoarding crude for years precisely for scenarios like this. But against the backdrop of an economy dragged down by real estate, how long can the Chinese market remain "calm"? How likely is it to escalate confrontation to ensure energy supply?
From Venezuela to Iran, the sequence of these actions looks increasingly like a deliberately designed strategy.
The "Rimland" is returning.
Next, are the chain reaction questions at the market level:
· How bad will Monday's open be? The first round of selling came mainly from short-term funds and retail buying of put options. When will long-term funds start to see volatility as uncontrollable, forcing them to sell or hit risk limits?
· Last week, hedge funds quickly covered their "long AI hardware, short software" positions. But with oil prices, falling bonds, tightening liquidity,再加上 Gulf helium supply chain risks (a key input for chip manufacturing), is it enough to reprice expectations for the AI acceleration cycle?
· Before the conflict, the U.S. Q1 economy grew almost zero. As energy prices surge, household disposable income is eaten up by gasoline, heating, and jet fuel—will families cut spending or lever up further?
· Fed meeting minutes show policymakers are already discussing tightening policy to counter energy-driven inflationary pressures. A new round of debate on "how to handle negative supply shocks" is unfolding. Faced with an energy shock of this magnitude, can the Fed still "choose to look away"?
Ultimately, these questions point to a larger "chain reaction."
The "Rimland" strategy addresses energy and the dollar, but it does not solve the entire system supported by energy. The market is currently only pricing the "first node," it hasn't transmitted to the "second node" yet. Oil prices can revalue quickly on news, but agricultural production cycles don't. Urea prices are still at $700, and the USDA's projected wheat planting area will be the lowest since 1919—this won't reverse just because two diplomats shake hands. Farmers who couldn't afford fertilizer in March can't "replant" in April.
