# Пов'язані статті щодо FlashLoan

Центр новин HTX надає останні статті та поглиблений аналіз на тему "FlashLoan", що охоплює ринкові тренди, оновлення проєктів, технологічні розробки та регуляторну політику в криптоіндустрії.

Allbridge exploit: Flash loans still haunt DeFi – $1.65M drained via USDC/USDT pool

Allbridge, a decentralized cross-chain bridge, suffered a $1.65 million exploit after an attacker used a $1.12 million USDC flash loan to manipulate its USDC/USDT liquidity pool. By performing repeated swaps, the attacker distorted the pool's price ratio, allowing them to withdraw nearly $950,000 in USDT at a favorable rate. The stolen funds were then bridged from Solana to Ethereum. In response, Allbridge suspended its Core service and urged users to withdraw liquidity, causing its Total Value Locked (TVL) to drop sharply from $21.61 million to $12.78 million. The attack highlights ongoing vulnerabilities in DeFi pricing mechanisms and the need for enhanced security in cross-chain protocols as they attract significant capital.

ambcrypto07/20 08:32

Allbridge exploit: Flash loans still haunt DeFi – $1.65M drained via USDC/USDT pool

ambcrypto07/20 08:32

Summer.fi reveals months-long preparation behind $6M DeFi exploit

Summer.fi has detailed a $6.04 million exploit against its Lazy Summer Protocol USDC vaults, concluding it was a planned attack executed on July 6 after roughly three months of preparation. The root cause was an operational issue during the offboarding of an old strategy, not a smart contract bug. The attacker manipulated the net asset value (NAV) of two USDC vaults by donating stale-valued Silo vault tokens into an Ark that, despite being capped during offboarding, was still included in NAV calculations. This artificially inflated the vaults' share prices, allowing the attacker to redeem shares and withdraw $6.04 million. Losses were split between the Lower Risk Vault (~$5.64M) and the Higher Risk Vault (~$400k). Summer.fi emphasized the exploit did not involve compromised keys or a coding flaw. It also clarified the attack was not a simple flash loan exploit; flash loans only provided final transaction liquidity, while the attacker had accumulated the necessary assets months in advance. All protocol vaults are currently paused. Governance must now decide on compensation for affected users and when unaffected vaults can safely resume operations.

ambcrypto07/07 17:34

Summer.fi reveals months-long preparation behind $6M DeFi exploit

ambcrypto07/07 17:34

Edel Finance loses $403K as flash-loan oracle exploit hits xStock lending reserves

Edel Finance, a programmable market layer for tokenized equities, suffered a $403,000 exploit. An attacker manipulated the wrapped xStocks (wGOOGLx) exchange rate via a flash loan, briefly inflating the collateral's value 78-fold to borrow far beyond its true worth. Although the protocol acted promptly to limit losses, the attack revealed critical oracle and collateral pricing vulnerabilities in tokenized lending markets. The exploit severely impacted liquidity, causing total value locked (TVL) to plummet from around $630,000 to roughly $947 as users withdrew funds. A net outflow of approximately $630,000 followed. Recovery hinges on restoring user confidence through deposit growth, stabilized TVL, and stronger oracle protections and risk management practices.

ambcrypto07/01 08:32

Edel Finance loses $403K as flash-loan oracle exploit hits xStock lending reserves

ambcrypto07/01 08:32

Legacy Polygon Royalties Contract Exploit Drains $261K Through Reward Logic Flaw

A hacker exploited a legacy Polygon royalties contract, stealing approximately $261,200 in cryptocurrency. Security firm TenArmorAlert identified the attack on June 23. The exploit was made possible by a flaw in the contract's reward calculation logic within the Royal1155LD.beforeLdaTransfer() function. By executing several zero-value transactions, the attacker manipulated reward accounting and token ownership data, artificially inflating balances to enable excessive withdrawals. The attacker also utilized a flash loan to amplify the exploit's profit after repayment. This incident highlights ongoing security risks associated with older, inactive smart contracts that still hold funds, following similar recent exploits. Developers are urged to audit, update, or decommission such legacy deployments to prevent future attacks. The Polygon blockchain's core infrastructure was not compromised.

TheNewsCrypto06/24 12:59

Legacy Polygon Royalties Contract Exploit Drains $261K Through Reward Logic Flaw

TheNewsCrypto06/24 12:59

Inside the $3.6mln Venus Protocol exploit on BNB Chain

Venus Protocol on BNB Chain suffered a $3.6 million exploit after an attacker manipulated THE token liquidity using flash loans. Over several months, the attacker accumulated 14.5 million THE (84% of its circulating supply) and deposited it into Venus, artificially inflating its collateral value. By repeatedly borrowing against the inflated collateral and buying more THE, the attacker drove up the oracle price, eventually borrowing $3.6 million in various assets. In response, Venus suspended the THE market and tightened collateral requirements for several high-risk tokens. This is not the first security issue for Venus, which lost $27 million in a 2025 phishing attack.

ambcrypto03/16 09:22

Inside the $3.6mln Venus Protocol exploit on BNB Chain

ambcrypto03/16 09:22

A Well-Designed "Self-Detonation": Analysis of the PGNLZ Attack Incident

On January 27, 2026, an attacker executed a well-orchestrated exploit against the PGNLZ token on BNB Smart Chain, resulting in approximately $100k in losses. The attacker initiated a flash loan of 1,059 BTCB from Moolah Protocol, used it as collateral on Venus Protocol to borrow 30 million USDT, and then exchanged 23,337,952 USDT for 982,506 PGNLZ on PancakeSwap. These PGNLZ tokens were intentionally burned (sent to a dead address), drastically reducing the liquidity pool supply. This manipulation caused the price of PGNLZ to surge from approximately $0.10 to over $5,528 per token. The attacker then invoked a fee-on-transfer function, triggering a built-in burn mechanism (_executeBurnFromLP) that further depleted the pool, leaving only a minuscule amount of PGNLZ and artificially inflating the price to an extreme 40 billion times its original value. Finally, the attacker drained the liquidity pool, repaid the flash loan, and netted a significant profit. The root cause was identified as a flawed deflationary economic model with insufficient validation during fee processing and LP burns, allowing price manipulation. The incident underscores the importance of rigorous economic model design and multi-audit practices before contract deployment.

marsbit01/28 12:14

A Well-Designed "Self-Detonation": Analysis of the PGNLZ Attack Incident

marsbit01/28 12:14

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