# Spread İlgili Makaleler

HTX Haber Merkezi, kripto endüstrisindeki piyasa trendleri, proje güncellemeleri, teknoloji gelişmeleri ve düzenleyici politikaları kapsayan "Spread" hakkında en son makaleleri ve derinlemesine analizleri sunmaktadır.

Two Survival Structures of Market Makers and Arbitrageurs

Market makers and arbitrageurs represent two distinct survival structures in high-frequency trading. Market makers primarily use limit orders (makers) to profit from the bid-ask spread, enjoying high capital efficiency (nominally 100%) but bearing inventory risk. This "inventory risk" arises from passive, fragmented, and discontinuous order fills in the limit order book (LOB). This risk, while a potential cost, can also contribute to excess profit if managed within control boundaries, allowing for mean reversion. Market makers essentially sell "time" (uncertainty over execution timing) to the market for price control and low fees. In contrast, cross-exchange arbitrageurs typically use market orders (takers) to exploit price differences or funding rates, resulting in lower nominal capital efficiency (requiring capital on both exchanges) and higher transaction costs. Their risk exposure stems from asymmetries in exchange rules (e.g., minimum order sizes), execution latency, and infrastructure risks (e.g., ADL, oracle drift). These exposures are active, exogenous gaps that primarily erode profits rather than contribute to them. Arbitrageurs essentially sell "space" (capital sunk across venues) for localized, immediate certainty. Both strategies engage in a trade-off between execution friction and residual risk. Optimal systems allow for temporary, controlled risk exposure rather than enforcing zero exposure at all costs. Their evolution converges towards hybrid models: arbitrageurs may use maker orders to reduce costs, while market makers may use taker orders or hedges for risk management. Ultimately, both use different forms of risk exposure—market makers exposing inventory, arbitrageurs immobilizing capital—to extract marginal, hard-won certainty from the market.

链捕手05/16 07:09

Two Survival Structures of Market Makers and Arbitrageurs

链捕手05/16 07:09

Wall Street 'Withdraws' from Bitcoin Basis Arbitrage: CME Falls Out of Favor, the Golden Age of Arbitrage Comes to an End

Wall Street is retreating from the once-lucrative Bitcoin basis trade, as narrowing spreads between spot and futures prices have made the strategy barely profitable. The cash-and-carry trade, which involved buying Bitcoin spot (often via ETFs) and selling futures to capture the premium, has seen annualized returns drop to around 5%, down from nearly 17% a year ago, barely covering funding and execution costs. This compression has led to a significant shift in market structure: CME's Bitcoin futures open interest has fallen below Binance's for the first time since 2023, indicating a withdrawal of hedge funds and large US accounts from this specific arbitrage strategy. While CME was the preferred venue for this institutional trade, Binance's dominance in perpetual futures has remained steady. The approval of spot Bitcoin ETFs initially fueled the trade's popularity but also accelerated its decline by attracting capital that quickly eroded the arbitrage opportunity. The market is now maturing, with participants shifting from simple leveraged directional bets to using options, hedges, and expressing views through diverse instruments like ETFs. This increased efficiency has naturally narrowed price disparities between venues. As the era of easy, high returns from basis trading ends, participants are expected to seek more complex strategies in decentralized markets and other crypto assets.

marsbit01/22 11:34

Wall Street 'Withdraws' from Bitcoin Basis Arbitrage: CME Falls Out of Favor, the Golden Age of Arbitrage Comes to an End

marsbit01/22 11:34

Advancing MM 1: Market Maker Inventory Quoting System

"Attack of the MM 1: Market Maker Inventory Quoting System" by Dave explores why altcoin prices often move against retail traders immediately after their purchases, debunking the myth of intentional manipulation by "market manipulators." The article explains that this phenomenon is not due to malicious intent but is a result of automated market maker (MM) systems using the Avellaneda-Stoikov model for inventory-based pricing and protection against toxic order flow. When retail traders execute large buy orders, MMs sell, leading to a short inventory exposure. To mitigate risk, MMs adjust their strategies in two ways: 1. **Quote Skew**: They lower prices to attract sellers and discourage further buys, aiming to replenish inventory and protect their short position. 2. **Spread Widening**: They widen bid-ask spreads to reduce transaction probability and earn more spread profit to offset potential losses. The core mechanism involves the "Reservation Price," calculated as Mid Price − γ⋅q (where q is inventory and γ is risk aversion). Large retail orders disrupt inventory balance, causing MMs to adjust prices dynamically. Retail traders often face this due to their concentrated, unconcealed, and unhedged orders, especially in low-liquidity altcoins where their trades significantly impact pricing. The article concludes with a practical tip: instead of executing large orders at once, retail traders can break them into smaller, staggered orders to exploit MM pricing adjustments, achieving better average entry prices. A follow-up will discuss toxic order flow and order book dynamics.

深潮12/28 04:12

Advancing MM 1: Market Maker Inventory Quoting System

深潮12/28 04:12

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