Trust Wallet Reveals Number of Victims from the Hack and the Compensation Problem

RBK-cryptoОпубликовано 2025-12-29Обновлено 2025-12-29

Введение

Trust Wallet CEO Eowyn Chen revealed that last week's hack affected over 2,500 user accounts. However, the service has received approximately 5,000 compensation claims, indicating a significant number of fraudulent or duplicate requests, which is slowing down the payout process. The hack occurred on the night of December 26 due to a vulnerability in the browser extension version 2.68. An update (v2.69) was released, and the company promised to cover the estimated $7 million in losses. The verification of claims is being conducted alongside the technical investigation, prioritizing accuracy over speed. Trust Wallet is working with Google to obtain Chrome audit logs and is conducting a detailed security check on remote devices. In a related context, a recent Chainalysis report noted that 2025 has seen over 158,000 personal wallet compromises, resulting in $713 million in losses.

Trust Wallet head Eowyn Chen reported that last week's crypto wallet hack affected over 2,500 accounts. However, she stated that the service received twice as many compensation claims, which is slowing down payouts as it takes time to weed out fraudulent requests.

The Trust Wallet hack occurred on the night of December 26. Developers had previously acknowledged a vulnerability in the browser wallet version 2.68, released an update to version 2.69, and promised to compensate for the damage, which they estimated at $7 million.

"To date, we have identified 2,596 addresses affected by the hack. From this group, we have received about 5,000 claims, indicating a significant number of false or duplicate attempts to access victim compensation," wrote Chen.

The verification of claims is being conducted in parallel with the technical investigation of the incident. Chen noted that this has proven to be a complex task, so processing the requests is taking longer than affected users expected. The priority remains the accurate verification of wallet owners, not speed.

The day before, Chen reported that Google is assisting in the investigation—the crypto wallet team hopes to obtain audit logs (access request logs) from the Chrome browser. Also, the Trust Wallet security service will conduct a detailed check of the devices of employees working remotely.

A week earlier, Chainalysis estimated that the total damage from hackers' actions in 2025 exceeded $3.4 billion. This year, 158,000 cases of personal wallet compromises were recorded with a total damage of $713 million (compared to $1.5 billion the previous year), affecting over 80,000 users.

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Связанные с этим вопросы

QHow many user accounts were affected by the Trust Wallet hack according to CEO Eowyn Chen?

AOver 2,500 accounts were affected by the Trust Wallet hack.

QWhat was the estimated financial damage from the Trust Wallet security breach?

AThe estimated financial damage from the hack was $7 million.

QWhy is the compensation process taking longer than expected for Trust Wallet users?

AThe process is taking longer because the service received about 5,000 claims for 2,596 affected addresses, indicating a significant number of fraudulent or duplicate claims that require time to filter out.

QWhich specific version of the Trust Wallet browser extension contained the vulnerability that was exploited?

AThe vulnerability was in the browser wallet version 2.68.

QWhat is the total estimated damage from hacker activities in 2025, as reported by Chainalysis?

AAccording to Chainalysis, the cumulative damage from hacker activities in 2025 exceeded $3.4 billion.

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