Editor's Note: In the dramatic developments of the past few weeks, the market initially tried to understand it all through a familiar framework—airstrikes, blockades, oil price shocks—it all seemed like another typical Middle East crisis. But as time progressed, a more unavoidable question gradually emerged: if the decades-old "implicit bargain" has already broken, then along what path will the world rebuild a new equilibrium?

This article uses the "bargain" as a thread to trace the formation, fissures, and collapse logic of the Middle East order, and points out that the key to the current situation lies not in the outcome of any single military operation, but in the simultaneous failure of a pair of underlying rules: "the US does not touch the foundation of the Iranian regime" and "Iran does not touch the Strait of Hormuz." When this set of mutually constraining boundaries is broken, the evolution of the conflict is no longer bound by the old logic.

Looking ahead, the article makes predictions: in the short term, the situation may oscillate between "ground war" and "deterrence and de-escalation"; but in the medium to long term, more definitive changes have already begun to appear: selective passage is reshaping alliance relationships, energy transport routes are being forcibly reconfigured, and the binding relationship between the dollar and security is loosening. These changes will not be undone by any single ceasefire or negotiation, but will gradually solidify into a new structure.

The original text follows:

March 24, 2026. A warship with a displacement of 45,000 tons is speeding from Japan towards the Persian Gulf.

The USS Tripoli, also referred to by the US military as a "Lightning Carrier." Its flight deck is equipped with 14 F-35B stealth fighter jets—currently the only fifth-generation aircraft capable of vertical landing. In 2022, the US Navy completed a key test on this ship: simultaneously carrying 20 F-35Bs, the first full validation of the "Lightning Carrier" combat concept. As the commander of the Seventh Fleet stated: "Just the 14 fifth-gen fighters on the deck alone constitute a highly deterrent sensor and strike system." In different mission configurations, it can act as a light stealth aircraft carrier, or be reconfigured with V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft and CH-53 Super Stallion helicopters to deploy 2,200 Marines for an amphibious assault in one go. Estimated time of arrival: March 27.

Meanwhile, another amphibious ready group has set sail from San Diego—centered around the USS Boxer, carrying approximately 2,500 Marines, with a voyage of about three weeks. At Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the rapid reaction brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division is also on standby. This force of about 3,000 troops is the US military's fastest-deploying ground force, capable of deploying to any region globally within 18 hours.

The Pentagon already has a set of operational plans on its desk: the coordinated launch of an amphibious assault and an airborne seizure. The core objective is Iran's largest oil export hub—Kharg Island. The island is only 25 km from the Iranian mainland and handles about 90% of the country's oil exports. Additionally, Qeshm Island and Kish Island, which control the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, are also listed as potential strike targets. However, retired Vice Admiral John Miller warned: even if these islands are occupied, it would be difficult to maintain long-term control—Iran could still use its mainland to persistently harass shipping. Once the operation is launched, it would become the largest US amphibious operation since the Vietnam War. After all forces are assembled, the US military deployment in the Middle East will reach 50,000 troops.

Just one month ago, all of this was still hard to imagine.

Four weeks ago, the US and Israel launched airstrikes against Iran; three weeks ago, Iran blockaded the Strait of Hormuz—this global energy chokepoint that carries 21 million barrels of crude oil daily; two weeks ago, international oil prices broke through $110; one week ago, senior US military officials signaled to allies: they "may have no choice" but to initiate a ground offensive.

Looking at the timeline, this is a path of rapid escalation. But if we extend the perspective to fifty years, we find: every step today has its clear historical starting point. Those seemingly "out-of-control" decisions, in their context at the time, almost all stemmed from rational calculation.

To understand how all this happened, we need to turn the clock back half a century.

That "Bargain"

In the 1970s, Middle Eastern monarchies fell one after another.

1952: Nasser overthrows King Farouk of Egypt; 1958: The Hashemite monarchy of Iraq falls in a military coup; 1969: Gaddafi overthrows King Idris of Libya; 1979: Khomeini overthrows the Pahlavi dynasty of Iran. Every revolution flew the same banner: Pan-Arabism—"Arabs unite against the West and Israel." The outcome of every revolution was also the same: a strongman comes to power, US embassies are burned, oil is nationalized.

The remaining monarchies—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar—seeing their neighbors fall one by one, were deeply anxious about their survival.

Thus, an unwritten "bargain" naturally formed: The US provides security guarantees; the Gulf monarchies sell oil priced in dollars and recycle petrodollars into US Treasury bonds.

No contract, no signing ceremony, no expiration date. A common misconception is that "the US and Saudi Arabia signed a petrodollar agreement in 1974." In fact, the declassified memo of Nixon's talks with King Fahd at the White House is only four pages long, discussing Middle East politics throughout, without a single mention of oil pricing or dollar settlement. This was not an agreement, but a "bargain"—a pattern of behavior that naturally forms when the interests of both parties are highly aligned.

Remember this term. Because what collapsed in 2026 was another "bargain" that had lasted forty years. And the reason a bargain is fragile is precisely because it lacks an enforcement mechanism—once one party recalculates gains and losses, the equilibrium irreversibly collapses.

To understand why Gulf states still cannot openly embrace Israel—even though their royals might be willing in private—one must see a structural reality: the Arab world is, in a sense, a mirror image of Europe. Europe is "small nations forming a large state," while the Arab world is "one large nation carved into multiple states." From Morocco to Iraq, people speak the same language,信奉 the same religion, but are divided into dozens of countries by colonial-era borders. The narrative of "uniting against Israel" naturally has a broad popular base.

The strongmen who once championed this banner—Nasser, Saddam, Gaddafi—were eventually eliminated. But the countries they left behind did not become better; instead, they fragmented: Iraq became an arena for Shia militias, Libya descended into warlordism, Yemen fell into the hands of the Houthis. More crucially, the public actually feels nostalgia for these strongmen—they symbolized the narrative of "Arabs standing up." This is precisely the dilemma of the Gulf monarchies: they host US military bases, but cannot allow these bases to be used to attack Iran. Opening the bases would mean "siding with the US and Israel against Muslim brothers," and the domestic political cost could be far higher than enduring missile strikes themselves.

Within this格局, Iran developed an extremely sophisticated nuclear strategy. Khamenei's principle is simple:永远停留在门槛之下—always possess the capability to cross, but never actually cross. In game theory, this is called "opaque deterrence": it gains the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons without suffering the comprehensive sanctions and isolation like North Korea. Enrich uranium to 60%—weapons-grade is 90%, but you can never be sure how far I am from 90%. This equilibrium could have continued indefinitely.

And in the Strait of Hormuz, another, older "bargain" also operated stably for forty years: The US does not overthrow the Iranian regime, Iran does not touch the Strait of Hormuz.

It withstood extreme tests. During the "Tanker War" of the Iran-Iraq War from 1984 to 1988, when Iraq and Iran bombed each other's tankers and the US Navy even directly engaged Iran (Operation Praying Mantis), Iran still did not blockade the Strait. During the "Twelve-Day War" of 2025, when the US and Israel jointly struck Iranian nuclear facilities—almost touching its survival red line—Iran still did not blockade the Strait.

Why? Not because Iran was "weak," but because rational calculation by both sides led to the same conclusion: Iran itself depends on this strait for 90% of its oil exports; a full blockade would be economic suicide. And the US also knew that once the strait was truly closed, there was almost no military means to restore navigation quickly. Both sides had a very strong incentive to maintain the status quo—never touch the other's survival red line.

This equilibrium seemed like it could last forever.

The Fissure

The fissure began with an agreement originally intended to修复 relations.

The 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), pushed by the Obama administration, contained "sunset clauses": key restrictions would gradually expire after 10 to 15 years, at which point Iran could legally resume high-level uranium enrichment. This was effectively a promise—"endure another ten years, and you will regain legitimacy." Israel and Saudi Arabia were extremely unhappy with this: it was like telling Iran that time was on its side.

In 2018, Trump announced the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. Looking at this decision alone, its logic wasn't entirely baseless—the "sunset clauses" did look like a time bomb. But the problem was, there was no替代方案. The new equilibrium became: continuous US sanctions, slow Iranian advancement. US intelligence agencies assessed that Iran was not substantively advancing its nuclear weaponization process. It was an ugly, but basically stable, state.

Trump's real strategic focus was actually in another direction: the Abraham Accords.

This design was quite精巧: The US needed to shift its strategic focus to China, so Middle East security had to be "outsourced"; and to achieve this, a common enemy (Iran) was needed to bind the Gulf states and Israel together. Israel provides security capabilities, the Gulf states provide economic resources, and the US acts as the coordinator and platform. Logically almost flawless.

But it got stuck on one precondition: public opinion in the Gulf region had to be able to accept Israel.

The only way to fundamentally resolve this issue was for Israel to withdraw to the 1967 "Green Line." This was also the底线 repeatedly hinted at by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Once Israel withdrew, not only would舆论阻力 in the Gulf decrease significantly, but even Iran would lose the core pillar for mobilizing its narrative. The banner you've been holding high is "Israel occupies our land"; if the land is returned, what will you use to mobilize? In this scenario, Iran's occasional rocket launches would反而强化 the Gulf states' security dependence on Israel. The US only needed to hold one line: Iran cannot possess nuclear weapons. Because once nuclear proliferation starts (if Iran gets nukes, Saudi必然跟进; after Saudi, Turkey也难以置身事外), the situation would spiral completely out of control.

But Netanyahu would not retreat. The Israeli far-right views the settlements as a "biblical promise"; returning to the Green Line is almost politically impossible domestically. Precisely because of this, Saudi Arabia never joined the Abraham Accords.

Then, 2025 arrived.

The US and Israel launched the "Twelve-Day War," directly striking Iranian nuclear facilities. From Iran's perspective, this crossed a fundamental red line. Bombing its nuclear capability equated to剥夺 its final "insurance mechanism"—that implicit promise maintained for forty years, "the US will not overthrow the Iranian regime," was至此不复存在. You tore up the rules first.

What随之崩塌 was the entire logic of the bargain. In the past, Iran did not blockade the strait because "you don't touch my foundation, I don't touch your lifeline." Now the foundation has been touched, what can "not blockading the strait" still换来? Nothing.

The premise of the bargain had disappeared. But anger alone was not enough. Iran also needed capability and timing. And in 2025-2026, these three conditions matured simultaneously.

First, a qualitative change in military capability. In the past, "blockading the strait = suicide" because Iran could not achieve selective blockade. But today, Iran possesses low-cost drone swarms, precision anti-ship missiles, and sufficient信息化 capability to "only block your ships, not mine"—allowing passage for Chinese and Russian ships, intercepting ships from US allies. Selective blockade transformed the original "suicidal act" into a "sustainable strategic tool."

Second, moral justification. "You bombed our nuclear facilities first"—this point has sufficient persuasive power in international舆论.

Third, the acquiescence of China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow need not offer公开支持, just maintain "plausible deniability"—we are not involved, but we also do not condemn. This provides Iran with diplomatic space.

On the day its nuclear facilities were bombed in 2025, these three conditions aligned. From a game theory perspective, the blockade of Hormuz in 2026 was not an "impulsive act," but a card that should have been played—it just lacked the right timing, capability, and justification before.

The core of the problem is: The US撕毁了 the first half of the bargain (not overthrowing the regime → bombing nuclear facilities), yet expected Iran to continue遵守 the second half (not blockading the strait). From a game theory perspective, this显然无法成立—you unilaterally break the contract, yet demand the other party continues to履行.

The equilibrium thus irreversibly瓦解.

The Collapse

Back to March 2026. The scene depicted at the beginning—the "Lightning Carrier," the Airborne Division, 50,000 troops—is now easy to understand. Four weeks of airstrikes did not open the Strait of Hormuz. Because what you are facing is not a physical obstacle that can be "cleared" with bombs, but a political equilibrium broken by your own actions.

Bombs cannot solve politics. But the changes in the fourth week extend far beyond military buildup. The entire power structure of the Middle East is being reshaped.

Iran: From Defense to Offense

March 22: Iranian Armed Forces Central Command commander Abdollahi publicly announced: Iran's military posture has shifted from defense to offense, introducing more advanced weapon systems and tactics. The next day, the Iranian military claimed it had achieved "effective control" over the Strait of Hormuz, adding a意味深长的话: "At the current level of control, there is no need to lay mines in the Persian Gulf."

The subtext is clear: We don't need minefields, we already control this waterway in fact.

The same day, in response to Trump's "48-hour ultimatum" (either open the strait or face轰炸 of power facilities), the Iranian military issued a counter-statement: The Strait of Hormuz will be completely closed until the damaged facilities are restored; US and Israeli energy, information technology, and desalination facilities in the Middle East will become legitimate targets; Israel's power and communication systems will also suffer大规模攻击.

This is Iran's clearest escalation signal to date: if the US strikes power systems, Iran will not only blockade the strait but also expand the war to energy infrastructure across the Gulf.

Simultaneously, Iran also deployed a more隐蔽, and more lethal, tool.

Foreign Minister Araghchi publicly stated that Iran is willing to allow Japanese-related ships to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. South Korea subsequently indicated similar negotiations were underway. The logic is very clear: Countries participating in strikes against Iran—blockade; countries remaining neutral—can negotiate; countries showing cracks in their alliance stance—forced to choose sides.

Iran is using "passage rights" to reshape the international alliance structure. This is no longer a simple military blockade; it is transforming "who can pass" into a form of diplomatic currency.

Trump: Ultimatum → Backdown → New Ultimatum

Reviewing the past week, a pattern becomes clear: Thursday—"close to achieving objectives," considering de-escalation; Friday—sudden reversal, issue 48-hour ultimatum; Saturday—Iran强硬回应, launches 75th round of "True Promise-4" operation; Sunday—ultimatum expires, US suddenly announces "constructive dialogue with Iran," postpones strikes for five days.

Iran directly denied this claim, Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf calling it "disinformation to manipulate financial and oil markets." Israeli sources suggested talks between the US and Iran might be held in Islamabad, Pakistan, with US Vice President Vance possibly acting as envoy.

Creating tension, setting deadlines, then offering an "off-ramp"—but the market's trust in this套路 is rapidly declining. On March 24, influenced by the "dialogue" news, oil prices一度暴跌 over 10%, falling below $100, but the rebound did not change any structural facts: Hormuz remains closed, US troops are still增兵, and Israel has clearly stated strikes will continue for "weeks."

Saudi Arabia: Forced Off the "Balancing Act" Tightrope

One of the most critical variables this week was the shift in Saudi Arabia's stance.

March 24,据《华尔街日报》报道, Saudi Arabia has opened King Fahd Air Base to US forces—previously, Riyadh had clearly stated its bases would not be used to strike Iran. Meanwhile, the UAE closed Iranian hospitals and clubs locally, cutting off its social networks; missiles used to strike Iran were confirmed to have come from Bahrain; Saudi Arabia privately told the US: if Iran attacks its power and water resource facilities, it is prepared to retaliate directly. A senior UAE adviser更公开表示: Iran's bombing "pushed them towards Israel and the US."

Remember the "tightrope" mentioned in Part One? The Gulf states' balancing act—hosting US troops, but not letting them be used to fight Iran, because the domestic political cost is too high. Iran's missiles directly炸断了 this tightrope. When power plants and desalination facilities are hit, "staying neutral" is no longer an option.

But at the same time, Saudi Arabia also displayed another aspect:极强的战略韧性.

It activated the 1,200 km long East-West Pipeline, running from the Abqaiq oil field in the east to the Yanbu port on the Red Sea. This pipeline, built in the 1980s in response to the Iran-Iraq War, has now become a lifeline for global energy. Exports from Yanbu jumped from less than 800,000 bpd pre-war to 3.66 million bpd, peaking over 4 million bpd; at least 25 VLCCs are heading to load; pipeline capacity has been expanded to about 7 million bpd. Saudi Aramco CEO Nasser直言: "This is the biggest crisis ever for the oil and gas industry in this region."

But the Yanbu route also carries risks: Iran has already struck the local Samref refinery (a Saudi Aramco-ExxonMobil joint venture), briefly interrupting loadings; tankers heading to Asia still need to pass through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, where Houthi attacks are only "paused," not stopped; Saudi domestic capacity is also damaged, the Ras Tanura refinery was temporarily closed, reducing total capacity by about 2.5 million bpd.

Two Pillars

Putting all this together, one sees a structural change more important than any single news item: the two pillars supporting the petrodollar system are being simultaneously weakened.

The first is the monetary narrative. Iran proposed "RMB for passage rights." Short-term, the scale is limited—over 90% of global oil trade is still settled in dollars, China's capital account is not fully open, and Iran is excluded from SWIFT. But the damage is small, the insult is great—it pulls "de-dollarization" from think-tank discussions directly onto the battlefield. China doesn't even need to出面: Iran creates the narrative on the front lines, China maintains ambiguity in the background. What's truly key is the "seed effect": once Japanese and Korean shipowners are forced to open RMB accounts for passage, this infrastructure won't easily disappear.

The second is the security guarantee. Since 1974, the other pillar of the petrodollar has been the "security exchange"—the US protects Gulf shipping lanes, Gulf states settle oil in dollars. Now, this premise is动摇: the US cannot guarantee safe navigation through Hormuz. Japan and South Korea are beginning to negotiate directly with Iran—bypassing the US as the "security intermediary," facing the "toll collector" directly. Once this model solidifies, Iran becomes the de facto controller of the strait, and the US's "protector" role is hollowed out—you collect protection money but can't provide protection, so why should I keep paying?

Weakening the dollar settlement system on one side, weakening the US security monopoly on the other—the two legs of the petrodollar are being chopped away simultaneously.

This is also why the US "must act": it's not purely a military issue, but every day that passes, the erosion of the two pillars becomes harder to reverse. But as shown earlier: airstrikes won't open it (four weeks with no result), occupation won't open it (controlling islands can't solve the triple封锁 of insurance, distributed strikes, and mines), inaction is impossible (both pillars collapse).

This is the real strategic deadlock.

IEA Executive Director Birol described the current shock as "the叠加 of the two 1970s oil crises and the 2022 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis." After deploying a record 400 million barrels from strategic reserves, he直言: the only real solution is the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

But currently, no viable path is visible.

What Happens Next

March 27: The "Lightning Carrier"—USS Tripoli—enters the US Central Command area of responsibility. March 28: Trump's five-day "pause" period expires.

Two paths lie ahead.

Path One: Ground war begins.
If there is no substantial progress in negotiations within five days, the既定作战方案 may be activated. The "Lightning Carrier" provides stealth air strikes, the 82nd Airborne executes parachute drops, amphibious forces同步登陆—maritime advance, airborne seizure, a classic "three-dimensional island capture" operation. US airstrikes have already destroyed the runway on Kharg Island; Marine engineering units can quickly repair it, followed by continuous C-130 transport aircraft delivering troops and equipment; the entire operational chain is打通. Meanwhile, the threshold for Saudi and UAE participation has明显下降, and Iran initiates its "punitive countermeasures." The war would escalate from an "airstrike war of attrition" to a "multinational ground war," its duration stretching from weeks to months, and the global energy crisis would shift from a "supply shock" to "structural disruption."

Path Two: Ends with deterrence, not war.
The "Lightning Carrier" with 14 F-35Bs transits the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran chooses not to open fire. This scenario has a low probability, but cannot be ruled out. Its logic is consistent with Iran's current "selective blockade" strategy: the optimal strategy is not "comprehensive blockade" (which would cut off its own economic lifeline and provoke a unified global response), but "controlled deterrence + selective passage." If the US carrier passes and Iran does not intercept, both sides might achieve a "grey exit": no formal ceasefire, just a de facto cooling down. The US could宣称 "strait security restored," Iran could强调 "strategic restraint" domestically, while retaining the ability to blockade again in the future. But in the current atmosphere, Iran has publicly announced a shift "from defense to offense"; "allowing passage without firing" is almost politically unbearable domestically—unless some kind of默契 has been reached behind the scenes. The Islamabad talks disclosed by Israeli sources likely point in this direction.

Regardless of which path is ultimately taken, several things will not change: the selective passage mechanism is reshaping alliance structures; expectations of a ground war are lengthening the conflict cycle; high oil prices are "locking" the Fed, making it difficult to counter a recession with rate cuts; the trend of central bank "de-dollarization" will not reverse due to a single event; and Saudi Arabia's activation of the East-West pipeline has already substantially reconfigured the global oil logistics system.

The duration of this war will far exceed market expectations from three weeks ago.

Key Indicators to Watch

Whether the Islamabad talks materialize (Does Vance go to Pakistan?)
If it happens, this would be the highest-level direct contact between the US and Iran since relations were severed in 1979, implying a "backroom deal" might already be in the framework stage.

Secret diplomatic movements of Saudi Arabia / Oman / Turkey
Oman has historically been the intermediary between the US and Iran (secret JCPOA negotiations began in Muscat). If its activities increase noticeably, it suggests both sides are creating "pre-negotiation space" for formal talks.

Whether Iran expands the scope of "selective passage"
After Japan and South Korea, if India or EU countries gain passage arrangements, it means Iran is systematically "picking off" members from the US alliance; the political objective of the blockade begins to surpass its military significance.

The actual course of the USS Tripoli after March 27
If it heads towards Kharg Island, the probability of ground action rises significantly; if it heads towards the Strait of Hormuz, it aligns more with the "deterrence display" path.

Whether non-China/Russia merchant ships begin attempting passage (trackable via AIS data)
The first non-China/Russia merchant ship to successfully pass will become the starting point for the reinsurance market's repricing and would mean the blockade is beginning to loosen in fact.