Author: Zen, PANews
If the "GENIUS Act" of 2025 was the "constitutional moment" for US stablecoins, then this draft new regulation released by the FDIC in April 2026 officially kicked off the "enforcement era."
This week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) published a proposed rule in the Federal Register, setting a comment period of nearly two months, ending on June 9th. It provides clear constraints and guidelines for banks and fintech subsidiaries issuing stablecoins.
Simply put, the FDIC is translating the "Guidance and Establishment of National Innovation for United States Stablecoins Act" (GENIUS Act), which was signed into law in 2025, into a more specific and actionable operational checklist and regulatory framework.
What gives the FDIC the right to speak? The "legitimacy" of regulatory power
To understand the weight of this draft, one must first understand the FDIC's background.
FDIC stands for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Its core responsibilities include providing insurance for bank deposits, examining and supervising the safety and soundness of financial institutions, and handling bank failures.
The FDIC directly supervises a category of state-chartered banks and savings institutions that are part of the Federal Reserve System. Therefore, it inherently has the authority to set rules regarding the safety, soundness, capital, liquidity, consumer protection, and deposit insurance applicability for the entities it regulates. Domestically, this is akin to the functions of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC).
Thus, the FDIC itself has certain regulatory authority to issue draft guidelines for stablecoins. If a bank or its subsidiary intends to issue a new type of liability instrument related to the US dollar payment system, the FDIC would naturally be concerned about risks such as capital, liquidity, redemption, custody, disclosure, and misleading sales.
This draft guideline primarily targets stablecoin issuers within the banking system regulated by the FDIC, especially "Qualified Payment Stablecoin Issuers" (PPSI) established by FDIC-supervised depository institutions through subsidiaries. It also covers certain custody and safekeeping related activities.
More crucially, the authority comes directly from the GENIUS Act. This law was signed by President Trump on July 18, 2025, and explicitly requires the FDIC, OCC, Federal Reserve, NCUA, and Treasury Department to formulate implementation rules for payment stablecoin issuers within their respective jurisdictions. For the FDIC, it is the primary regulator for stablecoin subsidiaries of state non-member banks and state savings associations under its supervision.
This also clarifies its relationship with existing stablecoin legislation: This draft is not new legislation but one of the implementation rules of the GENIUS Act. The GENIUS Act is already the first comprehensive federal legal framework for stablecoins in the US. It stipulates that only "licensed payment stablecoin issuers" can legally issue such stablecoins in the US, and specifies that bank subsidiaries are regulated by their primary bank regulator, while federally licensed non-bank issuers are primarily regulated by the OCC.
The FDIC actually released its first配套 draft in December 2025, detailing "how bank subsidiaries can apply for approval to issue stablecoins." This April 2026 draft further supplements the substantive requirements to be complied with after approval, such as reserves, redemption, capital, liquidity, risk control, custody, and information disclosure. It sends a signal to the regulated banking industry: Don't try to exploit gray areas regarding deposit insurance and tokenized deposits.
Six Key Aspects of the New Rules: From "1:1 Reserves" to "Prohibition on Interest"
Looking specifically at this FDIC draft, the most important parts consist of six sections that define the rules of the game for bank-system stablecoins.
First is Reserve Assets. The draft requires issuers to always maintain identifiable reserves covering all outstanding stablecoins at a ratio of at least 1:1. Furthermore, the value of these reserve assets must not fall below the total face value of the unredeemed stablecoins at any time. Issuers must also maintain records that can link a specific batch of reserves to a specific stablecoin brand.
The FDIC also proposes that if the same subsidiary issues multiple different brands of stablecoins, in principle, each brand should have segregated, traceable, and separately recorded reserve pools, which cannot be arbitrarily commingled, to reduce the contagion risk of "one failure affecting the entire pool."
Second is the Quality, Liquidity, and Realizability of Reserves. The draft not only requires issuers to hold identifiable reserve assets at a ratio of at least 1:1 but also emphasizes that these reserves must possess strong realizability to be promptly converted into available funds during redemption pressure. Regarding the use of reserve assets, the FDIC intends to explicitly restrict arrangements such as re-pledging or re-utilization of reserve assets.
For repurchase arrangements based on short-term US Treasury securities, the draft proposes a conditionally permitted framework. For reverse repurchase arrangements, consultations are still ongoing regarding "how excess collateral should be defined and whether more specific constraints are needed," and a fully defined set of restrictions has not yet been formed.
Third is the Redemption "T+2" Mandate. The FDIC requires issuers to publicly disclose their redemption policies, including how long redemptions take, the process, minimum redemption amounts, etc. The draft defines "timely redemption" as being completed no later than two business days after the request is made.
Moreover, any discretionary restrictions on timely redemption must, in principle, be approved by the FDIC, not decided by the issuer themselves. The minimum redemption threshold cannot be higher than 1 stablecoin, ensuring equality for retail investors.
Fourth is the "Positive and Negative List" of Activities. The FDIC limits the "core activities" of payment stablecoin issuers to issuance, redemption, managing reserves, and limited custody/safekeeping services. Other activities can only be direct support for these core activities, and whether something qualifies as "direct support" is subject to regulatory interpretation.
The draft also explicitly proposes several important restrictions:
- Must not imply that its stablecoin is guaranteed by the US government's credit
- Must not imply that it is covered by federal deposit insurance
- Must not pay interest or returns to users solely for holding or using the stablecoin.
- Prohibits issuers from lending to customers to buy their own stablecoins, as that would introduce leverage behind the "1:1 reserve."
Fifth is Capital, Liquidity, and Resilient Risk Management. The FDIC did not simply copy standard bank capital ratios but proposed a more flexible framework. PPSIs must at least use CET1 and AT1 capital instruments as the basis for regulatory capital, while also establishing processes for self-assessment and meeting capital requirements. If the business is more complex or carries higher risk, the FDIC can impose additional capital or set extra backup requirements. The FDIC believes that if an issuer only engages in the narrowest issuance and redemption business, capital requirements might be lower. But as soon as more附加 activities are undertaken, the importance of capital increases.
Sixth is the Weekly and Monthly Disclosure System. The draft requires issuers to disclose the composition of reserve assets monthly on their official website, simultaneously publicizing redemption policies and related fee information. Issuers must also submit confidential weekly reports to the FDIC. More importantly, the monthly reserve disclosure is not solely released by the issuer; the draft also requires a certified public accounting firm to examine this monthly report and issue a written report. Additionally, the issuer's Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer must submit certifications to the FDIC regarding the accuracy of the monthly report. By binding public disclosure, third-party examination, and executive responsibility together, the requirements for ongoing compliance and information authenticity are significantly heightened.
A more sensitive point is that the FDIC explicitly states that deposits held in banks as stablecoin reserves should not be claimed by stablecoin holders under "pass-through deposit insurance." It also clarifies that if a certain "tokenized deposit" essentially meets the definition of a "deposit," it will not be treated differently under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act simply because it is on-chain or tokenized. In other words, stablecoins are not deposit insurance products, but genuine "tokenized deposits" may still be deposits, protected by insurance.
What is the Impact of the "New Rules"?
Currently, this draft is still only a proposed rule, not a final生效 rule. Its scope of application is not all stablecoin projects but is limited to banks/subsidiaries and related custody activities within the system regulated by the FDIC. The FDIC itself estimates in its economic analysis that in the initial years, perhaps only 5 to 30 institutions regulated by the FDIC will apply and be approved to issue coins through subsidiaries. The number of institutions providing related custody services is also estimated to be in the dozens.
However, in terms of systemic impact, this proposed new rule is very important. Firstly, it is a genuine step towards implementing the GENIUS Act, turning abstract legislation into enforceable regulation. Furthermore, together with the parallel implementation rules proposed by the OCC in February and the AML/sanctions rules proposed by the Treasury in April, it is piecing together a complete federal stablecoin regulatory framework. Finally, it will significantly affect the future market landscape. Institutions with stronger compliance capabilities, capital strength, and banking infrastructure will have an advantage over the "asset-light, marketing and yield-subsidy reliant" crypto-native models.
In particular, this draft's prohibitions on paying interest/returns to holders, its restraint on the reuse of reserves, and its strict limits on FDIC insurance representations are likely to enhance the relative advantage of bank-affiliated and highly compliant issuers.
Therefore, this draft should not be broadly interpreted as a major crypto positive, but rather as a key step for the US in refining stablecoin regulation into specific regulatory text. From a legislative hierarchy perspective, it is below the GENIUS Act, but from an operational perspective, it is far more important than the slogans of politicians.
Traditional banking giants holding licenses, with strong capital and the ability to endure low profits and strict audits, are about to enter their主场 for compliant stablecoins. The US stablecoin landscape is set to experience new waves.
