6th Man Ventures Founder: Forget the 'Token vs. Equity' Debate, What Really Needs to Be Trusted?

marsbitОпубліковано о 2026-01-12Востаннє оновлено о 2026-01-12

Анотація

Mike Dudas, founder of The Block and 6th Man Ventures, argues that the debate between tokens and equity misses the point: the real question is what deserves trust. He suggests there is no one-size-fits-all answer to whether a "dual token + equity" structure works. Instead, the core principle is trusting a team that is not only exceptional but also long-term oriented, committed to building a founder-led, enduring business like Binance. Dudas notes that for application-layer projects requiring sustained leadership, tokens often underperform compared to equity. Many DeFi 1.0 founders have left their projects, which are now maintained by DAOs in "maintenance mode," struggling with slow and ineffective decision-making. Pure equity isn’t always superior either—tokens enable functions like fee discounts, staking for airdrops, and access rights, which equity can’t easily replicate. He proposes a hybrid model: an equity entity operates on a "cost-plus" basis to serve a token-driven protocol, aiming not to maximize its own profits but to maximize the token’s and ecosystem’s value. This requires high trust in the team, as token holders lack strong legal rights. Ultimately, success depends on the team’s capability, credibility, execution, vision, and action. The best tokens will thrive by 2026 if teams communicate well, conduct buybacks, enable substantive governance, and direct value to the token through utility.

Author: Mike Dudas, Founder of The Block and 6th Man Ventures

Compiled by: Ken, ChainCatcher

There is no simple or "one-size-fits-all" answer to whether a "dual token + equity" structure is feasible. But one core principle is that you must be confident that the team is not only absolutely excellent but also has a long-term mindset, committed to building a founder-led, enterprise-level business that can last for decades, like Changpeng Zhao.

I believe that for application-layer projects that require long-term leadership, in many cases, token mechanisms are actually inferior to equity structures. For example, you can see that many founders of DeFi 1.0 protocols have mostly left their projects, many of which are struggling and essentially being maintained by DAOs and other part-time contributors in "maintenance mode." It turns out that DAOs and token-weighted voting are not good mechanisms for making sound decisions for projects (especially at the application layer); they cannot make decisions quickly and lack the "founder-driven" level of knowledge and capability.

Of course, a pure equity model is not absolutely superior to tokens either. Binance is a strong example—tokens enabled them to offer transaction discounts, staking for airdrops, access rights, and other benefits related to the core business and blockchain, which equity ownership cannot clearly carry.

"Ownership tokens" also have their limitations and are currently difficult to apply directly within products or protocols. Decentralized applications and networks are fundamentally different from traditional companies (otherwise, what is the point of this industry?), and pure equity is clearly less flexible than tokens. Of course, "equity+" type token designs may emerge in the future, but this is not the current reality (and the lack of market structure legislation in the U.S. makes issuing pure equity-like tokens with direct value capture and legal rights still risky).

In short, you can envision a scenario (as Lighter describes): an equity entity operates on a "cost-plus" model, serving as an engine for a token-driven protocol. In this architecture, the goal of the equity entity is not profit maximization but rather maximizing the value of the protocol token and ecosystem. If this model works, it would be a huge benefit for token holders. Because you have a well-funded Labs entity (e.g., Lighter has a token treasury for long-term development), and the core team holds a significant amount of tokens, they have a strong incentive to drive token value (while maintaining the crypto-native and on-chain nature of the core token design, separating it from the structurally complex associated Labs entity).

In this model, you do need a high degree of trust in the team, because in most current cases, token holders do not have strong legal rights. Conversely, if you don't believe the team can execute and create value for the tokens they heavily invest in, why would you participate in the project in the first place?

Ultimately, it all comes down to the team's capability, credibility, execution, vision, and actions. The longer a great team stays in the market and delivers on their promises, the more their tokens will exhibit the "Lindy effect." As long as the team maintains good communication and clearly directs value to the token through buybacks, substantive governance, and utility in the underlying protocol, we will see the highest-quality tokens—even those with equity/Labs entities—explode in 2026.

Пов'язані питання

QAccording to Mike Dudas, what is the core principle for evaluating the 'dual token + equity' structure in crypto projects?

AThe core principle is that you must be confident the team is not only absolutely excellent but also long-term oriented, committed to building a founder-led, enterprise-grade business that can last for decades, similar to Changpeng Zhao's approach.

QWhy does the author believe that token mechanisms are inferior to equity structures for application-layer projects requiring long-term leadership?

AHe argues that many DeFi 1.0 protocol founders have left their projects, which are now struggling and maintained in 'maintenance mode' by DAOs and part-time contributors. DAOs and token-weighted voting are not good mechanisms for making swift, high-quality decisions at the application layer, as they lack founder-driven knowledge and capability.

QWhat advantage does the author highlight about tokens compared to pure equity, using Binance as an example?

AHe points out that tokens enabled Binance to offer transaction fee discounts, staking for airdrops, access rights, and other blockchain-related benefits that equity ownership cannot clearly provide.

QWhat is the 'cost-plus' model described in the article for a potential project structure?

AIt's a model where an equity entity operates as an engine serving a token-driven protocol on a 'cost-plus' basis. The goal of the equity entity is not to maximize its own profit but to maximize the value of the protocol's token and ecosystem.

QWhat does the author say is ultimately the most critical factor for a project's success, regardless of its token or equity structure?

AHe states that everything ultimately depends on the team's capability, credibility, execution, vision, and actions. A great team that delivers on its promises over time will see its token gain a 'Lindy effect,' and the highest quality tokens will thrive by 2026 if the team directs value to the token through buybacks, governance, and utility.

Пов'язані матеріали

OpenAI Goes Left, DeepSeek Goes Right

On April 24, 2026, DeepSeek released V4, a Chinese large language model offering a free "million-token context window," enabling it to process vast amounts of data like entire books or years of corporate documents in one go. In contrast, OpenAI’s GPT-5.5, released around the same time, is more powerful but significantly more expensive, charging up to $180 per million output tokens. DeepSeek’s strategy represents a shift from a pure AI research firm to a heavy-infrastructure player, building data centers in Inner Mongolia’s Ulanqab to bypass U.S. chip export restrictions. This move, supported by Huawei’s Ascend chips and China’s cheap green electricity, highlights a fundamental divergence in AI development models: U.S. firms focus on high-cost, high-margin services, while Chinese players like DeepSeek prioritize accessibility and affordability. Facing intense talent poaching from tech giants, DeepSeek is seeking a $44 billion valuation funding round to retain researchers and scale infrastructure. Meanwhile, Chinese manufacturers are compressing AI models to run on smartphones, making AI accessible offline and across the Global South. Through open-source models and localized solutions, Chinese AI is empowering non-English speakers and low-income users, driving a form of "digital equality." While Silicon Valley builds walled gardens, DeepSeek and others are turning AI into a public utility—like tap water—flowing freely to those previously left behind.

marsbit16 хв тому

OpenAI Goes Left, DeepSeek Goes Right

marsbit16 хв тому

$292 Million KelpDAO Cross-Chain Bridge Hack: Who Should Foot the Bill?

On April 18, 2026, an attacker stole 116,500 rsETH (worth ~$292M) from KelpDAO’s cross-chain bridge in 46 minutes—the largest DeFi exploit of 2026. The stolen assets were deposited into Aave V3 as collateral, causing $177–200M in bad debt and triggering a cascade of losses across nine DeFi protocols. Aave’s TVL dropped by ~$6B overnight. This legal analysis argues that KelpDAO and LayerZero Labs share concurrent liability, with fault apportioned 60%/40%. KelpDAO negligently configured its bridge with a 1-of-1 decentralized verifier network (DVN)—a single point of failure—despite LayerZero’s explicit recommendation of a 2-of-3 setup. LayerZero, which operated the compromised DVN, failed to secure its RPC infrastructure against a known poisoning attack vector. Both protocols’ terms of service cap liability at $200 (KelpDAO) or $50 (LayerZero), but these limits are likely unenforceable due to unconscionability, gross negligence exceptions, and potential securities law invalidation (if rsETH is deemed a security under the Howey test). Aave’s governance also faces fiduciary duty claims for raising rsETH’s loan-to-value ratio to 93%—far above competitors’ 72–75%—without adequately assessing bridge risks, amplifying the systemic fallout. Practical recovery targets include LayerZero Labs (a registered Canadian entity), KelpDAO’s founders, auditors, and identifiable Aave governance delegates. The incident underscores escalating legal risks for DeFi protocols, infrastructure providers, and governance participants.

marsbit1 год тому

$292 Million KelpDAO Cross-Chain Bridge Hack: Who Should Foot the Bill?

marsbit1 год тому

Insider Trading in War: 5 People Involved, the Highest Earner Was Arrested

On April 24, the U.S. Department of Justice arrested U.S. Army Special Forces Staff Sergeant Gannon Ken Van Dyke for insider trading related to the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on January 3. Van Dyke allegedly profited over $400,000 by placing bets on a prediction market, Polymarket, using insider knowledge of the covert operation. According to the indictment, Van Dyke registered an account (0x31a5) on December 26 and made a series of bets predicting Maduro’s capture and U.S. military involvement in Venezuela. He withdrew most of his funds on the day of the operation and attempted to obscure his tracks by transferring assets through crypto and brokerage accounts. This case marks the first time the DOJ has prosecuted insider trading on Polymarket. PolyBeats had previously identified five suspicious accounts, including Van Dyke’s—the highest earner—in January. The other accounts, with profits ranging from $34,000 to $145,000, remain under unofficial scrutiny but have not been charged. Their lower profits, indirect access to information, and unclear legal boundaries may complicate prosecution. Polymarket has since strengthened its market integrity rules, explicitly prohibiting trading based on confidential or insider information. Van Dyke’s arrest, nearly four months after his trades, signals increased regulatory attention and the persistent traceability of blockchain-based transactions.

marsbit1 год тому

Insider Trading in War: 5 People Involved, the Highest Earner Was Arrested

marsbit1 год тому

Торгівля

Спот
Ф'ючерси
活动图片