Did 'Unlimited Minting' Actually Happen? Zcash Founder Responds to Four Major Market Concerns

marsbit2026-06-15 tarihinde yayınlandı2026-06-15 tarihinde güncellendi

Özet

The Orchard shielding pool in the privacy cryptocurrency Zcash was recently found to have contained a critical counterfeiting vulnerability that existed for four years. This discovery caused significant market panic and a sharp drop in the price of ZEC, though it has since recovered partially. Zcash founder Zooko Wilcox addressed four key questions raised by the vulnerability. First, while it's unknown if the bug was exploited, he believes it likely was not, citing advanced, targeted discovery methods, a rapid response to freeze the pool, and the typical "smash-and-grab" nature of past crypto exploits. Second, he states that if no exploitation occurred, all legitimate user funds in Orchard are recoverable. However, cautious users moving funds should be aware of privacy trade-offs and other risks involved in transferring to transparent or Sapling pools. Third, users currently cannot independently verify that the total ZEC supply hasn't been inflated due to this bug. However, the proposed "Ironwood" network upgrade will restore this ability by permanently sealing the Orchard pool. This will prevent any counterfeit funds from circulating and allow anyone running a node to cryptographically verify that the supply cap has not been breached. Finally, regarding other undiscovered vulnerabilities, Wilcox notes that intensive ongoing audits by multiple teams, including using advanced AI-assisted tools, have so far found no other counterfeiting bugs. This provides increased, though ...

Editor's Note: On June 5th Beijing time, privacy project Zcash was exposed to have had a critical forgery vulnerability in its new-generation privacy pool Orchard. The price of Zcash's token ZEC plunged, at one point halving to a low near $250.

After about 10 days of development, market panic has somewhat subsided, and the price of ZEC has also recovered somewhat, climbing back to $500 today. (Recommended reading: "'Unlimited Money Printing' Vulnerability Lay Dormant for Four Years, Privacy Coin ZEC Halved in a Day")

This morning, Zcash founder Zooko Wilcox released another lengthy article in response to the market's key concerns.

He stated that it is likely the Orchard vulnerability was not previously exploited, and legitimate Orchard funds can be recovered. Currently, users cannot independently verify whether the Zcash supply exceeds the limit, but the Ironwood upgrade will seal the Orchard pool, restoring this verification capability. Ongoing audits have not revealed other forgery vulnerabilities, but complete certainty requires more work.

The recent Orchard vulnerability has raised important questions about Zcash's supply and user fund security. The discussion has mixed several different issues, making it difficult to understand the actual impact of this vulnerability on users. This article attempts to separate these issues and explain what they each mean for users.

The Orchard vulnerability raises four important questions:

1. Was the Orchard vulnerability ever exploited?

2. Can legitimate Orchard funds be recovered?

3. Can users verify that the Zcash supply has not been inflated?

4. How do we know there are no other forgery vulnerabilities?

Was the Orchard Vulnerability Ever Exploited?

Unknown. We believe it's unlikely to have been exploited previously, though it cannot be completely ruled out. We think the vulnerability likely remained unexploited for three reasons:

Despite continuous review over the years by many of the world's top cryptographers and security researchers, this vulnerability was not previously discovered. Its final discovery was not accidental; it was found by Taylor Hornby of Shielded Labs, whose goal was to proactively identify such security vulnerabilities before malicious attackers could.

Taylor used advanced AI-assisted security research techniques and custom-built tools specifically designed to find subtle flaws others missed. Doing this would be more difficult for someone not deeply familiar with the Zcash codebase.

Once discovered, Zcash developers (led by the Zcash Open Development Labs team) quickly coordinated with mining pools to temporarily freeze the Orchard pool and deploy a fix, thereby limiting any attacker's window of opportunity.

Cryptocurrency exploits are common, and attackers typically try to cash out as quickly as possible, especially after a vulnerability is made public. To profit from this vulnerability, an attacker would need to exchange forged ZEC for valuable assets, which typically requires the ZEC to leave the Orchard pool via the turnstile mechanism.

If the vulnerability had been exploited before the fix, we would expect evidence to have surfaced by now. Historically, cryptocurrency exploits are typically "smash-and-grab" operations, not strategies like "4D chess" hidden for months or even years.

Can Legitimate Orchard Funds Be Recovered?

We believe so, because we believe the vulnerability was never exploited. If this assessment is correct, all legitimate Orchard funds remain fully recoverable.

On the other hand, if forgery did occur in Orchard, the existing turnstile mechanism would limit the total migrated amount to the number of ZEC that legitimately entered the pool.

Therefore, if forged funds were migrated ahead of legitimate funds, users would be unable to recover some or all of their legitimate Orchard funds.

We consider this scenario unlikely. However, for more cautious users, it is still recommended to move their ZEC out of Orchard.

But before doing this, they should understand the following:

· Moving funds to a transparent pool (i.e., to a t-address) will reveal both the transfer amount and time, and these funds will also become publicly linked to that t-address.

· Moving funds from the Orchard pool to the Sapling pool reveals the transfer amount and time, but unlike moving to a t-address, it does not link these funds to a specific address or transaction history.

· The Sapling pool relies on a trusted setup ceremony performed in 2018. Relying on the security of that trusted setup is an additional risk users should be aware of.

· To our knowledge, YWallet and Zkool are currently the only widely used self-custody Zcash wallets that support the Sapling pool.

· Moving funds to a new wallet or custodian service introduces additional risks, including user error, software bugs, custodian risk, or other unforeseen problems.

Overall, we consider the above risks moderate.

If your funds are currently in a shielded self-custody wallet, leaving them there is a reasonable choice, given our assessment that previous forgery is unlikely. If you have a safe way to move them elsewhere, that might also be reasonable. Users may reach different conclusions based on their own circumstances.

Can Users Verify That the Zcash Supply Has Not Been Inflated?

Currently, no. The previous existence of this vulnerability meant that users cannot independently verify whether the ZEC currently circulating in the shielded pools does not exceed the correct amount.

However, as we noted in a previous post, the Ironwood upgrade restores this ability. The following diagram illustrates why.

The proposed network upgrade addresses this by adding the guarantee that "no more unknown forgery vulnerabilities exist" and by sealing the Orchard pool. New funds cannot enter, and funds within the pool can no longer circulate.

The only remaining path out is via the existing turnstile mechanism, which ensures that no more ZEC can leave the Orchard pool than legitimately entered it.

This change restores the ability to verify the soundness of the Zcash supply.

Currently, if forged funds exist in the Orchard pool, they can continue circulating within it. After the upgrade, this is no longer possible. Regardless of whether forgery occurred, anyone running a node can verify that the circulating ZEC does not exceed the correct amount.

Users do not need to wait for funds to migrate out of Orchard or infer the behavior of attackers or other users. The protocol itself provides a verifiable guarantee: excess ZEC cannot continue circulating within Orchard and inflating the supply.

This is important because Zcash's long-term credibility depends on users' ability to verify the soundness of its supply themselves. Ironwood restores users' ability to independently verify that the protocol's supply limits are being enforced.

How Do We Know There Are No Other Forgery Vulnerabilities?

We cannot be completely certain yet, but we have reasons to believe there are none. Shielded Labs and several other teams have been carefully reviewing the Zcash protocol for other forgery vulnerabilities.

This includes using a not-yet-released Mythos AI model, with help from Anthropic, to search for additional vulnerabilities shortly before Mythos was paused. We plan to share more details about this review and its findings in a follow-up blog post.

So far, no other forgery vulnerabilities have been found. The high level of expertise, effort, and advanced AI-assisted analysis involved in this search gives us greater confidence that no similar vulnerabilities remain undiscovered.

Furthermore, we are working with projects like the Tachyon Project to provide additional assurances that no more forgery vulnerabilities exist in Zcash. We will elaborate on this further in future blog posts as well.

Conclusion

The Orchard vulnerability presents four important questions: Was the vulnerability exploited? Can legitimate Orchard funds be recovered? Can users verify the Zcash supply hasn't been inflated? And are there other undiscovered forgery vulnerabilities?

We believe it's unlikely to have been exploited, so legitimate Orchard funds are recoverable, and the current Zcash supply is safe. Based on ongoing reviews by multiple independent researchers and teams, we are also growing more confident that no other undiscovered forgery vulnerabilities exist.

However, users currently cannot verify the security of the Zcash supply, and they should not have to rely on our assessment—or anyone else's.

The proposed network upgrade solves this problem. By sealing the Orchard pool, it restores users' ability to independently verify the security of the Zcash supply. Users no longer need to judge whether forgery occurred to verify that the protocol's supply limits are being honored.

İlgili Okumalar

Robinhood, the First Stock in the Predictive Market Concept

The online brokerage Robinhood, which previously partnered with prediction market platform Kalshi to offer event contract trading to its users, is now becoming a direct competitor. This shift began after Robinhood, through a joint venture, acquired and rebranded a CFTC-regulated exchange (now Rothera Exchange). Robinhood's motivation stems from the rapid growth of prediction markets on its platform, which significantly boosted its "other transaction revenue." Recognizing that its vast retail user base is the most critical asset, Robinhood aims to capture more value by routing orders to its own exchange instead of sharing fees with Kalshi. It strategically launched its Rothera platform during the high-traffic 2026 FIFA World Cup, successfully processing tens of millions of contracts in its initial days. This move signals a pivotal power shift in the prediction market industry: control over user distribution and access is emerging as a more decisive advantage than the underlying market infrastructure itself. The future competition may increasingly revolve around which platforms control the major user gateways.

marsbit4 dk önce

Robinhood, the First Stock in the Predictive Market Concept

marsbit4 dk önce

After Tokenization of Assets, How to Exit?

Title: How to Exit After Asset Tokenization? Author: Symbiotic Compiled by: Hu Tao, ChainCatcher Summary: Tokenization addresses how assets go on-chain but largely leaves the redemption question unresolved. While tokenized assets can settle instantly, the underlying redemption for assets like treasuries, private credit, or real estate can take from T+1 to 180 days. This gap hinders DeFi adoption of Real World Assets (RWAs). Three emerging models aim to provide instant exit liquidity, differing primarily in their capital structure and efficiency: 1. **Balance Sheet Model (e.g., Grove Basin):** A single entity (like Sky) provides immediate liquidity from its balance sheet, acting as a bridge during the settlement period. It offers simplicity and deep initial liquidity but is constrained by a single entity's capacity and risk appetite. 2. **Asset-Specific Vault Model (e.g., Upshift Clear):** Independent liquidity providers fund dedicated vaults for each supported asset, earning fees. It decentralizes capital sources but isolates liquidity and capital per asset, leading to potential fragmentation. 3. **Shared Liquidity Layer Model (e.g., Symbiotic Liquid Lane):** A shared capital pool supports multiple RWA types simultaneously. Funds remain productive between redemptions (e.g., earning yield in lending markets). Exits are settled via a competitive RFQ market. This model aims for higher capital efficiency, scalability across assets, and serves longer-duration assets like private credit. Key differentiators are: 1) Source of capital and risk bearer, 2) Redemption pricing mechanism, 3) Capital efficiency, 4) Scalability to new asset types, and 5) Composability. The shared liquidity layer model represents a move from piecemeal solutions toward scalable infrastructure, enabling T+0 exits by pooling capital, maintaining yield, and using competitive pricing, thus enhancing RWA utility in DeFi.

marsbit12 dk önce

After Tokenization of Assets, How to Exit?

marsbit12 dk önce

After Tokenizing Assets, How to Exit?

After tokenization, a key unresolved issue is providing holders with a reliable exit mechanism, as underlying asset settlement (taking days to months) lags far behind on-chain token settlement. Three primary models for instant liquidity have emerged, differing in their capital structure and efficiency: 1. **Balance Sheet Model (e.g., Grove Basin):** A single, well-capitalized entity (like Sky) provides immediate liquidity from its own reserves. This offers simplicity and deep initial liquidity but is constrained by that single balance sheet's capacity and risk appetite, limiting scalability. 2. **Dedicated Vault Model (e.g., Upshift Clear):** Independent liquidity providers (LPs) fund separate vaults for each supported asset. This decentralizes capital sources but isolates liquidity and capital, which becomes inefficient as the number of tokenized assets grows. 3. **Shared Liquidity Layer Model (Symbiotic Liquid Lane):** Independent capital providers fund shared vaults that can support multiple tokenized assets simultaneously. Capital remains productive between redemptions (e.g., earning yield in DeFi markets). Exits are settled via a competitive RFQ market where market makers bid. The article argues that the shared layer model offers superior capital efficiency and scalability. It transforms exit liquidity from an asset-specific patch into shared market infrastructure, allowing liquidity capacity to grow with overall market participation rather than being fragmented per asset. This is particularly valuable for longer-duration assets like private credit, where reliable T+0 exits can significantly enhance their utility in DeFi.

链捕手26 dk önce

链捕手26 dk önce

Anthropic's Triple Moment: Code Leak, Government Confrontation, and Weaponization

This article analyzes Anthropic's recent conflicts and strategic moves following the U.S. government's emergency halt of its new Fable model, citing national security concerns over potential "jailbreaks." The author argues this incident reveals deeper tensions between AI labs, governments, and the software industry. While critics view Anthropic's safety-focused rhetoric as marketing fear, the author suggests it serves as a commercial moat masking the company's core economic imperative: moving closer to end-users and their valuable data to avoid being commoditized. The piece outlines a coming clash between frontier AI labs like Anthropic and established software companies. Labs need real-world usage data for model improvement via reinforcement learning, creating a cycle where better products attract more users and more data. This threatens software firms who, as Microsoft's Satya Nadella warns, risk having their value captured by a few dominant models. Anthropic's controversial policy changes—initially secretly degrading Fable's performance for LLM development and expanding data retention—are framed as assertions of control, justified by its safety narrative. The company's foundational belief that it alone is sufficiently concerned about superintelligent AI dangers legitimizes its actions, from resisting government demands to shaping usage policies. The author concludes that this alignment of mission, talent, and business strategy is powerful but concerning, as it concentrates immense potential power in the hands of those convinced of their own righteous understanding.

marsbit36 dk önce

Anthropic's Triple Moment: Code Leak, Government Confrontation, and Weaponization

marsbit36 dk önce

SPCX to Surge to $400? Can Options Propel SpaceX to Become the World's Most Valuable Company?

Summary: ZeroHedge posits that SPCX (SpaceX) options trading could trigger a gamma squeeze, potentially driving the share price to an extreme $400. This scenario is based on SPCX's unique post-IPO market structure: a low float, concentrated retail buying, and the imminent introduction of options. While the $400 price is speculative, the analysis highlights the potential for outsized volatility. The core mechanism involves heavy retail buying of out-of-the-money call options, forcing market makers to hedge by purchasing the stock, creating a potential feedback loop that accelerates price gains. Vanda data shows intense retail focus on SPCX specifically, not a broad market risk-on shift. Crucially, this potential volatility stems from short-term trading dynamics and structural factors, distinct from fundamental valuation drivers like those seen in NVDA. Whether the extreme $400 scenario materializes depends on actual options market data post-launch, including open interest in call options, implied volatility, and continued buying support in the underlying stock. The article cautions that while the conditions for heightened volatility are present, the predicted gamma squeeze is not guaranteed.

marsbit48 dk önce

SPCX to Surge to $400? Can Options Propel SpaceX to Become the World's Most Valuable Company?

marsbit48 dk önce

İşlemler

Spot

Futures