Knaken Company Purchased Cryptocurrency in Its Own Name, So Clients Are Entitled to Claims in Euros, Not the Coins Themselves

cryptonews.ru2026-08-17 tarihinde yayınlandı2026-08-17 tarihinde güncellendi

Özet

Dutch crypto platform Knaken, declared bankrupt, has left customers facing substantial losses. The court-appointed trustee, Karl Hamm, revealed that Dutch prosecutors sold seized cryptocurrency for €2.2 million. However, an estimated €10-12 million was invested by customers, indicating a multi-million euro shortfall. The firm, which was unlicensed, operated by purchasing crypto in its own name on behalf of clients, who saw balances in the app but legally held a euro claim, not the coins themselves. Hamm stated Knaken likely did not hold crypto matching user balances and mixed trading and operational funds while losing money. The owner, Ronald J., transferred €2.3 million to a company he controlled, deemed a conflict of interest. He disputes the estimated customer investment figure and the trustee's characterization of the business model. A separate criminal investigation by the Dutch fraud agency FIOD is ongoing.

According to court-appointed administrator Karl Hamm, the Dutch Public Prosecution Service sold cryptocurrency seized from the bankrupt platform Knaken for 2.2 million euros, or about 2.5 million dollars.

Thousands of clients who invested between 10 and 12 million euros into the bank may face significant losses.

This is the only money currently in the estate

Hamm, the administrator from Rotterdam overseeing the liquidation process, stated that he is still trying to ascertain if there are other sources of cash, if anyone owes Knaken money, and whether other assets can be sold.

He said that apart from the clients, there are virtually no other creditors, with the possible exception of some unpaid payroll taxes.

Hamm sent letters to approximately 6,300 people who recently held positions at the firm. He warned them not to expect significant returns from the company.

He estimates that Knaken's revenue from clients was between 10 and 12 million euros, which exceeds the profit from the sale, indicating a deficit of several million euros.

In July, Cryptopolitan reported that the prosecution estimated the missing amount to be around 7 million euros, with a customer base of about 30,000 users.

The app allowed residents of the Netherlands to buy, trade, and store cryptocurrency. It never had the license required by the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets.

On July 16, the Rotterdam court declared Knaken Cryptohandel BV and its associated company Stichting Knaken Payments bankrupt.

Hamm explains how the service was structured. He said that if 100 euros were invested in Bitcoin, 1 euro went to Knaken as a fee, and the remaining 99 euros were used by the firm to open a position on an exchange.

This position was held in Knaken's name. Clients saw their cryptocurrency balance increase in the app, but they did not actually own the coins; they owned their value in euros. Many assumed the tokens belonged to them.

Hamm stated that Knaken apparently did not hold cryptocurrency in amounts matching the balances displayed to users, and that trading and operational expenses had long been merged, while the company was losing money.

2.3 million euros were transferred to the owner's own company

Owner Ronald J. transferred 2.3 million euros from the company account to an account of a company he controlled. The court called this transfer a conflict of interest.

These records trace Knaken's problems back to 2020 when 23 bitcoin were stolen in a hack. J. blamed multi-million euro losses on the theft. The value of the stolen coins at 2020 prices was estimated at about 140,000 euros.

In subsequent years, the company became a sponsor for football clubs including Feyenoord, Sparta, Heracles, and Heerenveen, and briefly, Ajax.

It continued to sell certificates and provide loans to clients. It did not report its financial troubles to the central banking supervisor De Nederlandsche Bank.

A lawyer for one of the clients challenged the law enforcement officials' right to liquidate the assets. "Whose cryptocurrency was it?" he asked, comparing the situation to a bankrupt car repair shop selling a car parked there, with the owner "getting nothing from it."

The prosecution claims there were strong reasons for the sale and declines to go into detail. They likely referred to Article 117 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows for the sale of seized goods subject to depreciation.

Hamm noted that cryptocurrency prices are volatile, and if the coins had not been sold off and their value had subsequently fallen, the deficit would only have increased.

Ronald J. stated he does not acknowledge the figure of 10-12 million euros and cannot explain how it was derived.

Knaken, he said, operated as a broker. A client placed an order to buy, it was executed at the current price, and the corresponding position ended up in that client's account.

He called Hamm's assumption that the money was never actually invested in cryptocurrency "unfounded and unfair" and damaging.

He added that every order went through the company's liquidity provider and had an order ID, execution price, and timestamp that could be matched with the client's instructions.

J. also stated that he continues to work on a settlement with creditors, which, he said, could expedite the wind-down process.

A separate criminal investigation by the Dutch Fraud Investigation Service (FIOD), involving a search of the premises on June 29 where devices and assets were seized but no arrests were made, remains open.

end-content

İlgili Sorular

QWhat was the amount for which the Dutch Public Prosecution Service sold the cryptocurrency seized from the bankrupt Knaken platform, and in what currency?

AThe Dutch Public Prosecution Service sold the seized cryptocurrency for 2.2 million euros (approximately 2.5 million US dollars).

QAccording to the court-appointed administrator Karl Hamm, what key structural flaw did the Knaken service have regarding client ownership of crypto assets?

AThe key structural flaw was that when a client invested money (e.g., 100 euros for Bitcoin), the position was opened in Knaken's name, not the client's. Clients saw their crypto balance increase in the app, but they actually owned a claim in euros for its value, not the cryptocurrency tokens themselves.

QWhat significant action did the owner, Ronald J., take that was later identified by the court as a conflict of interest?

AOwner Ronald J. transferred 2.3 million euros from Knaken's company account to an account of a company he controlled. The court identified this transfer as a conflict of interest.

QWhat was a major regulatory issue with the Knaken platform mentioned in the article?

AThe Knaken platform never had the license required by the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) to operate.

QWhat is the status of the separate criminal investigation related to Knaken as mentioned at the end of the article?

AA separate criminal investigation led by the Dutch anti-fraud agency FIOD remains open. It involved a raid on June 29 where devices and assets were seized, but no arrests were made.

İlgili Okumalar

Crypto Funding Halves in Q1, Why Is Stablecoin Payment Still Attracting Money Against the Trend?

Crypto venture capital funding fell roughly 50% quarter-over-quarter in Q1 2026, yet the stablecoin payments sector was a notable exception, continuing to secure significant funding rounds. This shift signals that capital is moving away from speculative "token narratives" toward companies generating real revenue, as stablecoins evolve from a trading tool into payment infrastructure. Despite the overall funding slowdown, companies like Rain, OpenFX, and RedotPay completed major raises, focusing on areas such as card issuance, cross-border payments, and banking connectivity. Investors are attracted to the sector's potential to address long-standing inefficiencies in traditional cross-border payments through 24/7 settlement and clearer revenue models like transaction fees and FX spreads. However, the momentum may be overstated. On-chain stablecoin transaction volume does not equate to real-world payments for goods and services, and funding is concentrated in a few leading firms with reported volumes and customers. Key challenges remain, including compliance, fiat on/off-ramps, local banking relationships, and the risk of core services becoming commoditized. Looking ahead, capital is likely to flow into areas like cross-border B2B payments, bank-to-stablecoin connectivity, stablecoin-linked cards, multi-chain payment orchestration, and payments for AI agents. Ultimately, the investor interest reflects a bet on the necessary infrastructure to integrate stablecoins into the traditional financial system, with future valuations hinging on demonstrable payment volume, real revenue, and profitable market expansion.

marsbit5 dk önce

Crypto Funding Halves in Q1, Why Is Stablecoin Payment Still Attracting Money Against the Trend?

marsbit5 dk önce

South Korean Retail Investors 'Move from Seoul to Wall Street': Buying SK Hynix ADR, Betting on Triple-Leverage ETF

A surge of Korean retail investors is shifting funds from the volatile Seoul market to Wall Street, intensifying their bets on the AI theme through unconventional and high-risk instruments. Data shows Korean investors were net buyers of about $4.5 billion in US stocks in July, nearing a yearly peak. A notable trend is their purchase of approximately $840 million worth of SK Hynix American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), despite a significant 10% premium over the company's domestic shares, leading analysts to label the move as speculative and irrational. Simultaneously, Korean traders are heavily favoring leveraged ETFs. The triple-leveraged semiconductor ETF SOXL was the most-bought US product in July, with leveraged products occupying four of the top ten spots. Experts note that this shift in geography does not represent a diversification of risk; instead, investors are merely expressing the same concentrated bet on AI hardware through different, often riskier, US-listed vehicles. Analysts warn that while this capital inflow is unlikely to systemically impact the vast US institutional market, it risks creating localized distortions and amplifying volatility, particularly in the targeted sectors and instruments. The move follows a sharp correction in the Korean market, where high leverage in semiconductor stocks and related ETFs had previously led to significant losses, prompting this search for alternative avenues to chase the AI narrative.

marsbit1 saat önce

South Korean Retail Investors 'Move from Seoul to Wall Street': Buying SK Hynix ADR, Betting on Triple-Leverage ETF

marsbit1 saat önce

Bithumb's First Half Report: Net Loss Exceeds $76 Million, Where Did the Profits Go?

**Title: Bithumb H1 2026 Report: Net Loss Exceeds $76M – Where Did the Profits Go?** Despite a headline net loss of approximately 108.7 billion KRW (~$76.44 million) for the first half of 2026, a detailed breakdown reveals Bithumb's core exchange business remained profitable. The significant loss was primarily driven by two major non-operating items: substantial losses on the disposal and valuation of the company's own cryptocurrency holdings (net loss ~$48.21 million) and a sharp increase in litigation provisions (~$25.93 million), largely linked to a regulatory fine. Operating revenue fell 48.7% year-on-year to ~$119 million, almost entirely from transaction fees, as market activity cooled. While the company drastically cut marketing and subsidy expenses by ~70% to protect margins, more rigid costs like payment processing and salaries declined only modestly. This highlights the vulnerability of its highly fee-dependent revenue model in a down market. Total assets decreased by ~$584 million, but this was largely attributable to an ~86% drop in client KRW deposits. The market value of client crypto assets under custody also fell (~32.7%), partly influenced by declining cryptocurrency prices rather than solely client withdrawals. In summary, the report indicates underlying exchange profitability was eroded by significant crypto asset losses and mounting regulatory/legal costs, against a backdrop of declining trading revenue. Future focus should be on revenue recovery, managing crypto-related损益, and the ongoing impact of regulatory challenges.

marsbit1 saat önce

Bithumb's First Half Report: Net Loss Exceeds $76 Million, Where Did the Profits Go?

marsbit1 saat önce

BitMart's Final 9 Days: A True Exchange Crisis Is Never About Shutting Down

BitMart's Final 9 Days: A True Exchange Crisis Is Not About Shutting Down On August 17, 2026, with just 9 days until BitMart's scheduled cessation of trading, the focus shifted from the platform's orderly closure to serious questions about user withdrawals, platform solvency, employee payments, and reserve transparency. Stakeholders, claiming to represent users and staff, publicly demanded asset/liability disclosures, explanations for withdrawal delays, a user repayment plan, and an independent audit, setting an August 19 deadline. While BitMart CEO Sheldon Lee denied allegations of insolvency or wrongdoing, the controversy highlighted a core vulnerability of centralized exchanges (CEXs). When an exchange announces its shutdown, normal user behavior changes dramatically, triggering a mass withdrawal event—the ultimate stress test for its liquidity and custodial integrity. The key question becomes not whether the platform has assets, but whether it holds sufficient *liquid* assets to cover all user liabilities on demand. The article argues that the trust placed in CEXs is based on the convenience they provide, abstracting users from direct control of their private keys. This trust is rarely questioned during normal operations but becomes critically exposed during a wind-down. The situation underscores the limitations of simple Proof of Reserves, which shows "what we have" but not the crucial "what we owe." True financial credibility requires transparent, auditable data on assets, liabilities, and segregated user funds. BitMart's situation reflects a broader, often overlooked issue in the crypto industry: while there is extensive focus on growth mechanisms for exchanges, there is little discussion or established protocol for a safe and transparent "exit mechanism." The final measure of an exchange's integrity, the article concludes, is not its user count or trading volume during a bull market, but its ability to ensure every last user can successfully withdraw their assets when the doors are closing. The outcome will be determined not by statements, but by whether the final user's funds securely leave the platform.

marsbit2 saat önce

BitMart's Final 9 Days: A True Exchange Crisis Is Never About Shutting Down

marsbit2 saat önce

Don't Speculate on 100x Coins, Just Bet on 'Cash Cows': Which Projects Are Worth Dollar-Cost Averaging in the Bear Market?

In a bearish crypto market, finding sustainable investments is more prudent than chasing speculative meme coins. This article analyzes projects generating consistent revenue, highlighting them as potential "cash cows" for long-term dollar-cost averaging (DCA). The top performers are "picks-and-shovels" plays. **Pump.fun**, a Solana-based meme coin launchpad, leads with $415.3M in monthly revenue, profiting from a 1.25% fee on token transactions. Despite market volatility, it has averaged tens of millions in monthly income in 2024. Perpetual DEX **Hyperliquid** stands out as a "bear market star," accumulating ~$352M in revenue over seven months. Its model funnels ~99% of fees into buying back and permanently burning its HYPE token. Established giants are also adapting. **Uniswap**, after enabling its fee switch, now earns protocol revenue (e.g., $5.6M recently), which is used to buy back and burn UNI, giving the token direct value accrual. Similarly, oracle provider **Chainlink** generates stable monthly revenue (~$4.57M recently) from its essential data, cross-chain, and automation services. Its new Payment Abstraction feature automatically converts service fees into LINK, accruing value in its treasury. The core thesis is clear: in a downturn, focus on projects with proven, resilient business models—those acting as essential infrastructure or capturing consistent transaction fees—rather than speculative narratives.

marsbit2 saat önce

Don't Speculate on 100x Coins, Just Bet on 'Cash Cows': Which Projects Are Worth Dollar-Cost Averaging in the Bear Market?

marsbit2 saat önce

İşlemler

Spot
活动图片