В Австралии в 16 раз выросло число криптоматов

investing.ru2024-08-30 tarihinde yayınlandı2024-08-30 tarihinde güncellendi

Этот прирост вывел Австралию на третье место в мире по количеству криптоматов после США и Канады: в этих странах на начало года было установлено 31 861 и 3004 устройства соответственно. Аналитики Coin ATM Radar отметили, что с февраля 2022 года рост числа криптоматов в Соединенных Штатах замедлился, тогда как за этот период в Канаде появилось 780 устройств.

Количество криптоматов в Австралии растет даже несмотря на неопределенность с регулированием криптовалют. В 2019 году рост рынка цифровых активов побудил Австралийский центр по учету и анализу финансовых сделок (AUSTRAC) ввести более строгие правила для криптоматов в связи с опасениями, что устройства могут использоваться в преступных целях.

Это привело к приостановке лицензии компании Auscoin, обслуживавшей криптоматы по всей Австралии. В 2019 году гендиректор Auscoin Сэм Карагиозис (Sam Karagiozis) был арестован за торговлю наркотиками в даркнете.

Несмотря на этот инцидент, криптоматы могут легально работать в Австралии при условии, если у оператора есть лицензия.

Согласно апрельским данным Coin ATM Radar, Австралия обогнала по количеству криптоматов азиатские страны: Китай, Японию, Сингапур и Индию. Европейские, наоборот, сокращали число устройств, помогающих конвертации фиатных денег в криптовалюту.

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