Where Did the $362 Million Go? Hyperliquid Counters FUD, A Decentralization Route Debate Behind the Reconciliation

marsbitPublicado em 2025-12-24Última atualização em 2025-12-24

Resumo

A technical report published on December 20, 2025, accused Hyperliquid, a decentralized exchange, of multiple severe issues—including insolvency and a "God mode backdoor"—claiming it was a centralized platform disguised as a blockchain. Hyperliquid issued a detailed response refuting the claims. The most serious allegation—a $362M shortfall in user funds—was debunked. The discrepancy arose because the accuser overlooked native USDC on HyperEVM during Hyperliquid’s transition from an L2 to an independent L1. Total reserves across Arbitrum and HyperEVM matched user balances. Other accusations were partially addressed: some code was testnet-related, limited broadcast nodes were an anti-MEV measure, and chain freezes were part of upgrade procedures. However, Hyperliquid did not fully respond to claims about unqueryable governance proposals and a lack of a cross-chain "escape hatch" for withdrawals. The exchange also compared itself to competitors like Lighter and Aster, criticizing their reliance on centralized sequencers and lack of transparency, while highlighting its own fully on-chain state verification. Additionally, Hyperliquid addressed community concerns about insider trading, attributing significant short selling to a former employee. The incident underscores broader challenges in DeFi transparency as protocols grow more complex, emphasizing the crypto mantra: "Don’t trust, verify."

On December 20, 2025, a technical article titled "Reverse Engineering Hyperliquid," published on blog.can.ac, directly deconstructed Hyperliquid's binary files through reverse engineering, accusing it of nine serious issues ranging from "insolvency" to a "God Mode backdoor." The article bluntly stated:

"Hyperliquid is a centralized trading platform disguised as a blockchain."

In response to the FUD, the official Hyperliquid team issued a lengthy reply. Perhaps this was not merely a simple refutation of rumors but also a declaration of war regarding "who truly possesses decentralized trading infrastructure." While the official response successfully clarified the fund security issues, it left intriguing "gaps" in some sensitive areas of decentralization.

Where Did the $362 Million Go? The Audit Blind Spot Under the "Dual Ledger" System

The most damaging accusation was that user assets within the Hyperliquid system were $362 million short compared to the on-chain reserves. If true, this would mean it was a "chain-based FTX" operating on fractional reserves.

However, upon verification, this was a misinterpretation due to information asymmetry caused by an "architecture upgrade." The auditor's logic was: Hyperliquid reserves = USDC balance on the Arbitrum cross-chain bridge. Based on this logic, they checked the cross-chain bridge address and found the balance was indeed less than the total user deposits.

Hyperliquid responded that it is undergoing a complete evolution from an "L2 AppChain" to an "independent L1." During this process, asset reserves have become a two-track system:

The accuser completely ignored the native USDC on HyperEVM. According to on-chain data (as of the time of writing):

· Arbitrum cross-chain balance: 3.989 billion USDC (verifiable on Arbiscan)

· HyperEVM native balance: 362 million USDC (verifiable on Hyperevmscan)

· HyperEVM contract balance: 59 million USDC

Total solvency = 3.989B + 0.362B + 0.059B ≈ 4.351B USDC

This figure completely matches the Total User Balances on HyperCore. The alleged "$362 million gap" is precisely the native assets that have already migrated to HyperEVM. This is not a disappearance of funds but a transfer of funds between different ledgers.

Checklist of 9 Accusations: What Was Clarified? What Was Avoided?

Clarified Accusations

Accusation: "CoreWriter" God Mode: Accused of being able to print money out of thin air and misappropriate funds.

Response: Officially explained that this is an interface for L1 to interact with HyperEVM (e.g., staking), with restricted permissions and no ability to misappropriate funds.

Accusation: $362 million funding gap.

Response: As described above, it was due to not accounting for Native USDC.

Accusation: Undisclosed lending protocol.

Response: Official pointed out that the spot/lending function (HIP-1) documentation is publicly available and in a pre-release stage, not secretly operating.

Acknowledged Accusations with Reasonable Explanations

Accusation: Binary file contains code to "modify trading volume" (TestnetSetYesterdayUserVlm).

Response: Acknowledged existence. Explained as testnet (Testnet) residual code used to simulate fee logic; the mainnet nodes have physically isolated this path, making execution impossible.

Accusation: Only 8 broadcast addresses can submit transactions.

Response: Acknowledged. Explained as an anti-MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) measure to prevent user transactions from being front-run. Committed to implementing a "multi-proposer" mechanism in the future.

Accusation: The chain can be "plannedly frozen" with no revocation function.

Response: Acknowledged. Explained as a standard process for network upgrades (Upgrade), requiring a full network pause to switch versions.

Accusation: Oracle price can be instantly overwritten.

Response: Explained as a system security design. To liquidate bad debt promptly during extreme volatility (like 10x), the validator oracle indeed does not have a time lock.

Missing / Vague Responses

In our review, two accusations were not directly addressed or fully resolved in the official response:

Accusation: Governance proposals are unqueryable. Users can only see that voting occurred, but the on-chain data does not contain the specific text content of the proposals.

Response: The official did not address this point in the long post. This means Hyperliquid's governance remains a "black box" for ordinary users—you can only see the results, not the process.

Accusation: Cross-chain bridge has no "escape hatch." Withdrawals could be censored indefinitely, and users cannot force withdrawals back to L1.

Response: Although the official explained that locking the bridge during the POPCAT incident was for safety, it did not refute the architectural fact of "no escape hatch." This indicates that at the current stage, the inflow and outflow of user assets highly depend on the permission of the validator set, lacking the anti-censorship forced withdrawal capability of L2 Rollups.

"Throwing Shade" at Competitors

The most interesting aspect of this incident is that it forced Hyperliquid to show its cards, giving us an opportunity to re-examine the landscape of the Perp (Perpetuals)赛道. The official response unusually "threw shade" at competitors, targeting Lighter, Aster, and even industry giant Binance.

It stated, "Lighter uses a single centralized sequencer, and its execution logic and zero-knowledge (ZK) circuits are not public. Aster uses centralized matching and even offers dark pool trading, which can only be achieved with a single centralized sequencer and an unverifiable execution process. Other protocols that include open-source contracts lack a verifiable sequencer."

Hyperliquid unabashedly categorized these competitors as relying on a "Centralized Sequencer." The official emphasized: on these platforms, no one except the sequencer operator can see the complete state snapshot (including order book history, position details). In contrast, Hyperliquid attempts to eliminate this "privilege" by having all validators execute the same state machine.

This wave of "throwing shade" might also stem from Hyperliquid's concerns about its current market share. According to DefiLlama's trading volume data for the past 30 days, the market has shown a tripartite balance of power:

· Lighter: Trading volume $232.3 billion, temporarily leading,约占 26.6%.

· Aster: Trading volume $195.5 billion,位居第二,约占 22.3%.

· Hyperliquid: Trading volume $182.0 billion,位居第三,约占 20.8%.

Facing the trading volume of latercomers Lighter and Aster surpassing its own, Hyperliquid attempts to play the "transparency" card—meaning "although I have 8 centralized broadcast addresses, my entire state is on-chain and verifiable; while you can't even check yours." However, it is worth noting that although Hyperliquid's trading volume is slightly lower than the top two, it呈现碾压态势 in terms of Open Interest (OI).

Public Sentiment Response: Who is Shorting HYPE?

Beyond technical and fund issues, the community is also highly concerned about recent rumors that HYPE tokens were allegedly shorted and dumped by "insiders." In response, a Hyperliquid team member gave a定性回应 on Discord for the first time: "The shorting address starting with 0x7ae4 belongs to a former employee." This individual was once a team member but was fired in early 2024. The personal trading behavior of this former employee is unrelated to the current Hyperliquid team. The platform emphasized that it currently implements extremely strict HYPE trading restrictions and compliance reviews for all在职 employees and contractors, strictly prohibiting insider trading using their positions.

This response attempts to downgrade the accusation of "team misconduct" to "personal behavior of a former employee." However, regarding the transparency of token distribution and unlocking mechanisms, the community might still expect more detailed disclosure.

Don't Trust, Verify

Hyperliquid's clarification tweet can be considered a textbook example of crisis PR—relying not on emotional output but on data, code links, and architectural logic. It did not stop at proving its innocence but instead went on the offensive, strengthening its brand and advantage of "full state on-chain" by comparing competitor architectures.

Although the FUD was disproven, the profound thought left for the industry by this incident is far-reaching. As DeFi protocols evolve towards independent application chains (AppChain), architectures become increasingly complex, and asset distribution becomes more fragmented (Bridge + Native). The traditional method of checking balances by "looking at the contract balance" has become ineffective.

For Hyperliquid, proving "the money is there" is only the first step. How to gradually transfer the permissions of those 8 submission addresses while maintaining the advantages of high performance and anti-MEV, truly achieving the transition from "transparent centralization" to "transparent decentralization," is the necessary path to becoming the "ultimate DEX."

For users, this incident once again confirms the iron law of the crypto world: don't trust any narrative, verify every byte.

Perguntas relacionadas

QWhat was the core accusation made in the 'Reverse Engineering Hyperliquid' blog post regarding user funds?

AThe blog post accused Hyperliquid of having a 362 million USDC shortfall, suggesting it was operating as a fractional-reserve exchange with user assets not fully backed by on-chain reserves.

QHow did Hyperliquid explain the alleged 362 million USDC discrepancy in its reserves?

AHyperliquid clarified that the 'missing' 362 million USDC was not a shortfall but was part of the native USDC balance on its new HyperEVM chain, which the accuser had failed to account for in their audit. The total reserves across Arbitrum and HyperEVM matched user balances.

QWhich two specific accusations did the article note were not fully addressed or resolved in Hyperliquid's official response?

AThe two accusations were: 1) Governance proposals are unqueryable (users cannot see the proposal text, only the voting result), and 2) The cross-chain bridge has no 'escape hatch' (users cannot force a withdrawal to L1, making withdrawals reliant on validator approval).

QWhat key competitive advantage did Hyperliquid claim over its rivals Lighter and Aster in its response?

AHyperliquid claimed its key advantage is transparency through 'full state on-chain,' arguing that while it uses 8 broadcast addresses, its entire state (like order book history) is publicly verifiable, unlike competitors it accused of relying on opaque, centralized sequencers.

QAccording to the article, what was Hyperliquid's explanation for the address that was shorting its HYPE token?

AHyperliquid stated that the address shorting HYPE belonged to a former employee who had been fired in early 2024 and that this was a personal trading action unrelated to the current team, which operates under strict trading restrictions.

Leituras Relacionadas

U.S. Government Bans Foreign Nationals from Using Fable 5, Anthropic Issues Rebuttal

U.S. Government Bans Foreign Access to Fable 5, Anthropic Issues Rebuttal On June 12th, the U.S. government ordered AI company Anthropic to immediately suspend all foreign access—including foreign nationals within the U.S. and Anthropic's own foreign employees—to its newly released Fable 5 and Mythos 5 AI models, citing national security concerns. This forced Anthropic to temporarily disable access to both models for all users globally, as it cannot technically differentiate user nationality at scale. The models, released just three days prior, represent Anthropic's highest public capability tier. Fable 5 is the first publicly available model from the advanced "Mythos" family, while Mythos 5 is a less-restricted version for approved cybersecurity and critical infrastructure partners. The government's directive was reportedly triggered by claims from another company that it could "jailbreak" Mythos 5, raising alarm within the Trump administration. Anthropic, in a detailed public statement, strongly challenged this rationale. The company argues the demonstrated "jailbreak" is a narrow, non-generalized technique that merely involves identifying minor, known software vulnerabilities—a capability common to other publicly available models like OpenAI's GPT-5.5 and routinely used by cybersecurity defenders. Anthropic stated it has complied with the order but disagrees with the government's standard, warning that applying it industry-wide would halt all new frontier model deployments. The company criticized the lack of a transparent, fact-based legal process and expressed confidence the situation stems from a misunderstanding. It is working to restore access and will release more technical details within 24 hours. Other Anthropic models remain unaffected.

链捕手Há 17m

U.S. Government Bans Foreign Nationals from Using Fable 5, Anthropic Issues Rebuttal

链捕手Há 17m

The Revelation from the Raydium Theft Incident: New DeFi Vulnerabilities Lurking in Forgotten Old Contracts

**Raydium Exploit Reveals DeFi's Hidden Risk: Forgotten "Zombie" Contracts** A recent attack on Raydium's deprecated V3 AMM pools resulted in a loss of approximately $1.34 million. The hacker exploited pools that were no longer supported by Raydium's current UI or SDK but remained fully functional and accessible on-chain. This incident highlights a critical, often overlooked category of risk in DeFi: inactive or legacy smart contracts that projects fail to properly decommission. Since March 2025, there have been at least 8 publicly reported attacks targeting such abandoned contracts, with total losses around $10.8 million. Including older pools and deprecated features, the count rises to 10 incidents with roughly $22.5 million in losses. These "zombie contracts" represent a lifecycle management failure rather than a code vulnerability, yet they are typically misclassified under general "code bug" categories in security reports, masking the true scale of the problem. The root cause is that projects often merely document a contract as "deprecated" without taking essential technical steps to secure it: withdrawing remaining assets, disabling external call functions, and implementing ongoing monitoring. These forgotten, under-monitored components become prime targets for attackers. To address this, the industry needs to recognize "zombie contracts" as a distinct risk category and establish standardized decommissioning protocols. Essential steps should include: 1) a formal retirement announcement, 2) removal of all front-end integrations, 3) withdrawal of locked assets, 4) disabling key contract functions, 5) ongoing security monitoring, 6) clear user communication, and 7) a post-mortem analysis. The value of a DeFi project lies not only in its current TVL but also in the security of its historical codebase, which has now become a new attack surface.

Foresight NewsHá 2h

The Revelation from the Raydium Theft Incident: New DeFi Vulnerabilities Lurking in Forgotten Old Contracts

Foresight NewsHá 2h

Robots Begin to 'Consume Data': The Hidden Production Chain from Indian Data Factories to Billion-Dollar Humanoid Robots

Robots have started to 'consume data,' driving the formation of a new industrial supply chain focused on producing training data for embodied AI. Unlike large language models, which are trained on vast internet text corpora, embodied AI models face a 'data desert' in the physical world. This has created a massive demand for first-person perspective video data (Ego Data), captured by workers wearing cameras in places like Indian garment factories. Companies like Neocambrian AI are establishing 'data factories' where workers perform standardized tasks (e.g., sorting clothes, kitchen organization) to generate thousands of hours of video. Research, such as NVIDIA's EgoScale, demonstrates that scaling this human demonstration data predictably improves robot performance, particularly for dexterous manipulation. This has validated a training path combining large-scale human data for pre-training with smaller amounts of robot-specific data for fine-tuning. The value of different data types varies significantly, forming a 'data pyramid.' The base consists of low-cost, large-scale internet and Ego Data. Higher layers include more expensive motion-capture data (e.g., from data gloves), simulation/synthetic data, and the most costly and scarce layer: real robot teleoperation data. This demand has spawned a layered ecosystem of data suppliers: low-cost data factories, motion capture and alignment specialists, robot-native teleoperation service providers, simulation data companies, and platforms aiming for data standardization. Robot companies themselves are adopting a 'layered procurement' strategy: outsourcing generic Ego Data while building in-house capabilities for robot-specific adaptation data and the critical deployment/failure data generated in real-world applications. The industry is shifting focus from hardware and basic mobility to the data pipelines required for general-purpose capability. While parallels exist to data labeling companies like Scale AI in the LLM boom, the physical complexity of robot data—involving action success ambiguity and sim-to-real gaps—requires more integrated solutions for data collection, annotation, and a continuous feedback loop. The race is on to build the data engines that will teach robots to operate reliably in the unstructured real world.

marsbitHá 4h

Robots Begin to 'Consume Data': The Hidden Production Chain from Indian Data Factories to Billion-Dollar Humanoid Robots

marsbitHá 4h

Trading

Spot
Futuros

Artigos em Destaque

Como comprar BILL

Bem-vindo à HTX.com!Tornámos a compra de Billions Network (BILL) simples e conveniente.Segue o nosso guia passo a passo para iniciar a tua jornada no mundo das criptos.Passo 1: cria a tua conta HTXUtiliza o teu e-mail ou número de telefone para te inscreveres numa conta gratuita na HTX.Desfruta de um processo de inscrição sem complicações e desbloqueia todas as funcionalidades.Obter a minha contaPasso 2: vai para Comprar Cripto e escolhe o teu método de pagamentoCartão de crédito/débito: usa o teu visa ou mastercard para comprar Billions Network (BILL) instantaneamente.Saldo: usa os fundos da tua conta HTX para transacionar sem problemas.Terceiros: adicionamos métodos de pagamento populares, como Google Pay e Apple Pay, para aumentar a conveniência.P2P: transaciona diretamente com outros utilizadores na HTX.Mercado de balcão (OTC): oferecemos serviços personalizados e taxas de câmbio competitivas para os traders.Passo 3: armazena teu Billions Network (BILL)Depois de comprar o teu Billions Network (BILL), armazena-o na tua conta HTX.Alternativamente, podes enviá-lo para outro lugar através de transferência blockchain ou usá-lo para transacionar outras criptomoedas.Passo 4: transaciona Billions Network (BILL)Transaciona facilmente Billions Network (BILL) no mercado à vista da HTX.Acede simplesmente à tua conta, seleciona o teu par de trading, executa as tuas transações e monitoriza em tempo real.Oferecemos uma experiência de fácil utilização tanto para principiantes como para traders experientes.

285 Visualizações TotaisPublicado em {updateTime}Atualizado em 2026.06.02

Como comprar BILL

O que é ATWO

I. Introdução ao ProjetoArena Two é uma plataforma interativa descentralizada que permite aos fãs desempenhar um papel ativo e tokenizado nos resultados de eventos em tempo real. Ao contrário dos modelos tradicionais de transmissão que reduzem os fãs a espectadores passivos, a Arena Two utiliza a tecnologia blockchain para permitir que os fãs votem diretamente em tempo real e influenciem os resultados em campo.II. Informação sobre o TokenNome do token: ATWO(Arena Two)III. Links RelacionadosWebsite:https://arenatwo.com/Exploradores:https://basescan.org/token/0x499D35eBE6cEe9B2Ac35Fd003fcBbeeB9CFc7B32Twitter:https://x.com/arenatwoXNota: A introdução ao projeto provém dos materiais publicados ou fornecidos pela equipa oficial do projeto, que é apenas para referência e não constitui aconselhamento de investimento. A HTX não se responsabiliza por quaisquer perdas diretas ou indiretas resultantes.

240 Visualizações TotaisPublicado em {updateTime}Atualizado em 2026.06.02

O que é ATWO

Como comprar ATWO

Bem-vindo à HTX.com!Tornámos a compra de Arena Two (ATWO) simples e conveniente.Segue o nosso guia passo a passo para iniciar a tua jornada no mundo das criptos.Passo 1: cria a tua conta HTXUtiliza o teu e-mail ou número de telefone para te inscreveres numa conta gratuita na HTX.Desfruta de um processo de inscrição sem complicações e desbloqueia todas as funcionalidades.Obter a minha contaPasso 2: vai para Comprar Cripto e escolhe o teu método de pagamentoCartão de crédito/débito: usa o teu visa ou mastercard para comprar Arena Two (ATWO) instantaneamente.Saldo: usa os fundos da tua conta HTX para transacionar sem problemas.Terceiros: adicionamos métodos de pagamento populares, como Google Pay e Apple Pay, para aumentar a conveniência.P2P: transaciona diretamente com outros utilizadores na HTX.Mercado de balcão (OTC): oferecemos serviços personalizados e taxas de câmbio competitivas para os traders.Passo 3: armazena teu Arena Two (ATWO)Depois de comprar o teu Arena Two (ATWO), armazena-o na tua conta HTX.Alternativamente, podes enviá-lo para outro lugar através de transferência blockchain ou usá-lo para transacionar outras criptomoedas.Passo 4: transaciona Arena Two (ATWO)Transaciona facilmente Arena Two (ATWO) no mercado à vista da HTX.Acede simplesmente à tua conta, seleciona o teu par de trading, executa as tuas transações e monitoriza em tempo real.Oferecemos uma experiência de fácil utilização tanto para principiantes como para traders experientes.

134 Visualizações TotaisPublicado em {updateTime}Atualizado em 2026.06.02

Como comprar ATWO

Discussões

Bem-vindo à Comunidade HTX. Aqui, pode manter-se informado sobre os mais recentes desenvolvimentos da plataforma e obter acesso a análises profissionais de mercado. As opiniões dos utilizadores sobre o preço de A (A) são apresentadas abaixo.

活动图片