Editor's Note: From escalating threats to a swift ceasefire, and then by continued conflicts after the ceasefire, the situation surrounding Iran appears to be cooling down, but in reality, it is not over. Instead, it has entered a more complex phase: a coexistence of ceasefire and strategic maneuvering.
This article focuses on a key shift—the negotiation structure is undergoing a reversal. As author Trita Parsi points out, military action did not force Iran to concede; instead, it has passively drawn the U.S. into a negotiation framework based on Iran's "Ten-Point Proposal." Although Washington has not formally accepted all the conditions, its practical concessions on the Strait of Hormuz issue already constitute a critical strategic retreat, allowing Tehran to regain diplomatic and economic leverage.
As a result, the outcome of the war has taken a counterintuitive turn: far from weakening Iran, it has, to some extent, restored its deterrence capabilities. At the same time, the failure of U.S. military means to alter the outcome of the game has undermined the credibility of its own threats, forcing subsequent negotiations to be built on genuine compromises.
However, the ceasefire itself is extremely fragile. Local conflicts continue, and Israel's actions further increase uncertainty, keeping the entire situation on the brink of potential escalation at any moment. Its stability is highly dependent on external variables.
On a deeper level, this conflict, originally intended to pressure or even trigger regime change, may instead consolidate Iran's internal ruling structure. The U.S. has shifted from a dominant party to a negotiating party, while Iran has moved from a pressured party to a strategic player. The conflict has thus entered a longer-term and more complex stage.
Below is the original text:
Yesterday began with Donald Trump issuing a genocidal threat against Iran on social media; yet, just ten hours later, the situation took a sharp turn—a 14-day ceasefire agreement based on Iran's conditions was announced.
Even by the standards of the Trump administration's characteristic volatility, such a reversal is exceptionally dramatic. So, what consensus did the two sides reach? And what does it mean?
In a subsequent post, Trump stated that Iran had agreed to keep the Strait of Hormuz open during the two-week ceasefire. He also mentioned that negotiations would take place during this period, advancing on the basis of Iran's "Ten-Point Proposal," which he called a "viable" framework for talks.
The ten points include:
1. The U.S. must fundamentally commit to refraining from aggressive actions against Iran.
2. Continue to recognize Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz.
3. Accept Iran's uranium enrichment for its nuclear program.
4. Lift all primary sanctions against Iran.
5. Lift all secondary sanctions against foreign entities conducting business with Iranian institutions.
6. Terminate all United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran.
7. Terminate all International Atomic Energy Agency resolutions related to Iran's nuclear program.
8. Compensate Iran for war losses.
9. Withdraw U.S. combat forces from the region.
10. Achieve a ceasefire on all fronts, including the conflict between Israel and Lebanon's Hezbollah.
Of course, the U.S. has not agreed to all ten points. But the mere fact of using Iran's proposed framework as the basis for negotiations itself constitutes a significant diplomatic victory for Tehran. More notably, according to the Associated Press, during the ceasefire, Iran will continue to control the Strait of Hormuz and, together with Oman, levy transit fees on passing vessels.
In other words, Washington has de facto acknowledged that reopening this critical waterway requires, to some extent, recognizing Iran's practical control over it.
The geopolitical implications could be profound. As Mohammad Eslami and Zeynab Malakouti pointed out in Responsible Statecraft, Tehran is likely to seize this opportunity to rebuild economic ties with Asian and European partners—countries that had maintained close trade relations with Iran but were forced out of its market over the past 15 years due to U.S. sanctions.
Iran's strategic considerations are not solely driven by solidarity with the Palestinians and Lebanon but also by clear pragmatic motives. Israel's ongoing military strikes risk reigniting direct conflict between Iran and Israel—a confrontation that has already erupted twice since October 7. From Tehran's perspective, achieving long-term de-escalation of the conflict with Israel requires simultaneously concluding Israel's wars in Gaza and Lebanon. This is not a secondary political demand but a precondition.
The upcoming talks between Washington and Tehran in Islamabad may still end without results. But the fundamental dynamics have shifted. Trump's use of force failed to achieve its objectives, undermining the credibility of U.S. military deterrence and introducing a new variable into U.S.-Iran diplomacy.
Washington can still bluff and wave the threat of force, but after a war that did not succeed, such threats are no longer convincing. The U.S. is no longer in a position to unilaterally set conditions; any agreement must be built on genuine mutual concessions. And this requires real diplomacy—patience, restraint, and a tolerance for uncertainty—traits not commonly associated with Donald Trump. At the same time, this process may also require the involvement of other major powers, particularly China, to help stabilize the situation and reduce the risk of renewed escalation.
Most critically, the sustainability of this ceasefire largely depends on whether Trump can restrain Israel from undermining the diplomatic process. There should be no illusions on this point. Senior Israeli officials have already denounced the agreement as "the greatest disaster in the nation's history," which itself indicates that this fragile moment could shatter at any time.
Even if the negotiations ultimately fail, or if Israel resumes strikes against Iran, it does not necessarily mean the U.S. will re-enter the war. There is no compelling reason to believe that a second round of conflict would yield different results or that Iran would not again possess the ability to "hold the global economy hostage." In this sense, Tehran has, at least for now, reestablished a degree of deterrence.
One final point is particularly worth emphasizing: this "war of choice" is not just a strategic miscalculation. Far from facilitating regime change, it may instead prolong the life of Iran's theocratic system—much like Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in 1980, which ultimately helped Ayatollah Khomeini consolidate power domestically.
The depth of this miscalculation may haunt historians for decades to come.
