UK Regulator FCA Plans to Deliver a Market Abuse Regime for Crypto This Year

CoinDeskPolicyPublished on 2024-03-18Last updated on 2024-03-19

Abstract

The U.K. has been refining it approach to regulating the crypto sector.

  • The FCA plans to help deliver a market abuse regime for crypto this year.
  • The regime would apply to anyone committing market abuse on a crypto asset that is trading on a U.K. exchange, regardless of where they are based.

The U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) intends to deliver a market abuse regime for crypto this year, according to its business strategy on Tuesday.

The business plan set out an agenda to protect consumers, ensure market integrity and facilitate international competitiveness. Last year, the government issued a consultation that included plans for a market abuse regime for crypto assets.

“The market abuse offenses would apply to all persons committing market abuse on a crypto asset that is admitted (or requested to be admitted) to trading on a U.K. crypto asset trading venue," the government said in its crypto consultation response in October. "This would apply regardless of where the person is based or where the trading takes place."

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The proposed regime would, for example, require crypto exchanges to detect and disrupt market abuse behaviors.

The FCA is the main crypto regulator in the country. So far, the FCA implemented a promotions regime for crypto that includes requirements like adding risk warnings and a 24-hour cooling-off period for first-time buyers. It has also been consulting on a regime for stablecoins.

In its strategy for 2024 to 2025, it also said that it intends to recover “GBP 6.2m [$7.9 million] of costs for the new regulation of stablecoins and wider regime and GBP 200,000 for extending the financial promotions perimeter.” But it did not set out how it planned to do so.

CoinDesk reached out for further comment.

Edited by Parikshit Mishra.






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