Old Case Resurfaces: The 1011 Crash Sparks a Mixed Battle of Public Opinion Between Exchanges and Ecosystems

marsbitPubblicato 2026-02-02Pubblicato ultima volta 2026-02-02

Introduzione

"Old Case Resurfaces: The 1011 Crash Sparks a Public Opinion Battle Between Exchanges and Ecosystems" Over the weekend, a wave of criticism targeting Binance reignited on X (formerly Twitter), centered on revisiting the "1011 Event" from October 11, 2023. The controversy was sparked by ARK Invest CEO Cathie Wood, who suggested in an interview that the crypto market's recent stagnation was an aftershock of a $28 billion leverage liquidation event caused by a system glitch on Binance. The 1011 Event was a major market crash where the global crypto market lost over $500 billion in value, with leverage liquidations surpassing $19 billion. Critics point to a liquidity anomaly on Binance during the crash, which triggered its Auto-Deleveraging (ADL) mechanism and caused massive, cascading liquidations. The exchange's high-yield USDe promotion was also cited as a contributing risk factor. Binance later paid approximately $283 million in compensation to affected users but maintained the sell-off was driven by broader market conditions. The criticism has evolved into a broader industry debate. A key figure in the accusatory camp is Leonidas, a founder in the Bitcoin Ordinals ecosystem, who has long criticized Binance's listing practices, alleging the exchange demands high token allocation fees from projects. More significantly, OKX founder Star (Xu Mingxing) entered the fray, arguing the 1011 crash fundamentally altered the market's microstructure. He claimed Binance's USDe promotio...

Original | Odaily Planet Daily (@OdailyChina)

Author | Ding Dang (@XiaMiPP)

Last weekend, a wave of concentrated criticism against Binance erupted again on X. This time, it was the settling of old scores being reignited.

The fuse of the storm was lit on January 26th when ARK Invest CEO Cathie Wood (nicknamed "Sister Wood") stated in an interview with Fox Business that while gold, silver, and US stocks were surging recently, the reason cryptocurrencies weren't rising was the lingering aftershocks of the system failure at Binance on October 11th last year (referred to as the "1011 Incident"), which caused $28 billion in leveraged positions to be liquidated.

As an early investor in Coinbase and one of the first Wall Street fund managers to incorporate Bitcoin into institutional investment narratives, Sister Wood holds a natural cross-industry voice between traditional finance and the crypto industry. Therefore, these remarks quickly revived the market's collective memory of the 1011 Incident. Coinciding with the current sluggish sentiment, everyone was in the mood for drama, allowing the matter to continue fermenting.

Binance quickly responded. Co-CEO He Yi stated that Cathie Wood is not a Binance user, and Binance does not serve US entities. The implication seemed to suggest that Cathie Wood was not aware of the real situation, or that there was some kind of conspiracy theory behind it.

The Cause and Effect of the 1011 Incident: The Butterfly Effect of a "System Failure"

To understand this battle, one must first clarify the sequence of the 1011 Incident. Simply put, it was a "black swan" event for the crypto market: that day, the market suddenly experienced violent fluctuations, with the total global crypto market capitalization evaporating over $500 billion, and the scale of leveraged position liquidations exceeding $19 billion, making it one of the largest leveraged liquidation events in the history of the crypto industry. Everyone from a large number of ordinary users to many well-known market makers and VCs suffered significant losses in this event.

The reason Binance is accused of being the "culprit" is that at the critical juncture of the sharp market fluctuations, there was a noticeable liquidity anomaly within its platform. Whether officially described as a "software issue" or a "brief malfunction of the trading module," the result seen by the market was extremely brutal: the Auto-Deleveraging (ADL) mechanism was triggered, cross-account chain liquidations started, and some market maker accounts suffered devastating losses in a short period, even being forced to exit the market. (For details, read: "Detailed Explanation of the ADL Mechanism for Perpetual Contracts, Why Your Profitable Trades Get Automatically Closed?".)

Another clue repeatedly brought up points to Binance's USDe incentive activity at the time. This activity promoted a 12% annualized yield, and some users also used looped borrowing methods by抵押ing assets like USDe to amplify returns and risks. When USDe "depegged" (more accurately, the price difference between platforms, on-chain and off-chain), it triggered large-scale liquidations.

After the fact, Binance issued statements repeatedly emphasizing that the selling was mainly driven by broader market conditions rather than a platform system failure. Subsequently, Binance paid approximately $283 million in compensation to users affected by the depegging and related issues. This compensation did quell the anger of some crypto users in the short term.

But the controversy did not disappear. Perhaps it was because Binance retrospectively modified the K-line trends of some tokens that showed abnormal movements after the fact, or the long-standing doubts surrounding the Binance Alpha listing mechanism—these accumulated grievances found a new outlet through the 1011 public opinion event.

As public opinion heated up, it now seems to be gradually evolving into camp divisions. Odaily Planet Daily will introduce some of the key figures from both sides of the public opinion below.

One of the Accusing Camps: Leonidas's Long-Term Offensive

The earliest to intensively open fire was Leonidas, co-founder of ZapApp, an important figure in the Bitcoin inscription ecosystem and a core promoter of DOG (a popular dog-themed Meme coin on Bitcoin).

He almost daily outputs criticism about Binance on X, becoming one of the most visible representatives of the current anti-Binance camp. However, looking closely at his expressions, one finds that he is not追究 the 1011 incident itself. For Leonidas, 1011 is more like "evidence": an example that can be used to prove Binance is sucking the lifeblood of the entire crypto industry.

His grudge with Binance originated from him publicly demanding Binance list the token (DOG?), which was not approved. Leonidas blasted Binance for demanding project teams pay an extremely high proportion of the token supply (he claimed up to ~10%) as a listing "fee," which Binance or insiders then massively sold off, causing the projects and retail investors to suffer heavy losses.

Leonidas directly called CZ the "biggest scammer in crypto history" and "the biggest scammer in human civilization history." He believes that although CZ has ostensibly stepped down as CEO, he still holds 90% of Binance's shares, making Binance his "proxy tool." Every post by CZ is interpreted by Leonidas as hypocritical because, in his view, CZ "extracts value from the market" through Binance while preaching鸡汤 (chicken soup/positive talk) to retail investors. In his opinion, the $283 million Binance later compensated users precisely proves its direct responsibility, stating, "Only a guilty company would pay this much money."

Thus, it appears there is a project-level direct interest conflict between Leonidas and Binance, and his emotional expression is clearly mixed with personal grievances. Simultaneously, he represents a group long dissatisfied with the power structure of CEXs.

"Competitor" Joins the Fray: Star's Systemic Risk Accusations

The one who truly pushed the conflict to its climax was OKX founder Star (Xu Mingxing). He pointed out that after 1011, the microstructure of the crypto market underwent fundamental changes, its destructiveness even exceeding the collapse of FTX. He believes the core trigger was Binance's user growth activity—offering a 12% annualized yield for USDe and allowing it to enjoy the same抵押 treatment as USDT and USDC, but without sufficient restrictions.

In his view, USDe is essentially closer to a "tokenized hedge fund" rather than a low-risk money market product like BlackRock's BUIDL. Lured by yields, users swapped stablecoins for USDe, creating implied returns of 24%–70% through循环借贷 (looped borrowing), causing systemic risk to accumulate rapidly in a short time. When volatility truly arrived, the depegging of USDe, coupled with risk management flaws in WETH and BNSOL,共同 amplified the impact, with some asset prices一度 approaching zero.

Star emphasized that his intention was not to attack Binance but to希望 the industry face real problems; as the world's largest platform, Binance should prioritize stability and transparency rather than掩盖 risks through high-leverage marketing.

But the reality is, as one of Binance's main competitors, OKX has long been suppressed by Binance. As the helmsman of OKX, Star's remarks highlighting OKX's "compliant and user-oriented" image to weaken Binance's market monopoly is also reasonable.

Facing Star's accusations, both sides naturally engaged in a war of words, with back-and-forth exchanges. However, more interestingly, both CZ and He Yi were once employees under Xu Mingxing. Although online relations are tense, offline they still maintain微妙 industry relationships. He Yi even posted a "friendly" photo with Xu Mingxing from December, mentioning they had privately discussed "poaching" matters (Binance poached a product manager from OKX) but had not discussed the 1011 incident,满讽刺意味 (full of sarcasm).

CZ Unfollows Toly, Another Undercurrent of Public Chain Competition?

Another highlight of this criticism was CZ unfollowing Solana co-founder Anatoly Yakovenko's X account. The reason was that Toly reposted Xu Mingxing's tweet criticizing Binance, adding a meaningful comment: "Took only 18 months to recover post-accident." This暗指 (implied) that Solana (SOL) took 18 months after the FTX crash to return to its 2021 bull market levels, and now Binance is being implied as a similar "accident" responsible party. Toly's move was equivalent to indirectly taking sides, supporting the criticism against Binance.

Some crypto users began to worry: Will it be harder for coins in the Solana ecosystem, especially Meme coins, to get listed on Binance in the future?

Behind this lies the head-on competition between BSC and Solana for Meme liquidity. The former is going all out to compete for the new round of Meme narrative, while the latter was once the most important incubator for this wave. The game between public chains may be quietly emerging in this public opinion battle.

Support Camp: Truth or PR?

Perhaps得益于 (benefiting from) Binance's long-term maintenance of KOL relationships, the attitude towards Binance in the Chinese circle is relatively mild. However, facing these serious accusations, there are still few major KOLs who dare to publicly support Binance. Among them, EnHeng, nicknamed the "Binance Crown Prince," is one. (Supplementary reading: "Post-05 Crypto Madman EnHeng: 'Binance Crown Prince' Is Just My Camouflage".)

Currently, support for Binance comes more from relatively neutral analysts. For example, trader Benson pointed out that Binance does bear responsibility, but USDe was not the starting point of the crash. Looking at the timeline, when the market bottomed at 5:20, USDe was only slightly depegged; the real drop to 0.65 happened after the rebound.

He believes what was more abnormal was the large-scale price dislocation between Binance and other exchanges between 5:18—5:20: half of the tokens hit the lowest prices on Binance across the entire market, with some deviations as high as 100%, and the USDT trading pairs were significantly lower than USD pairs. He believes, reasoning from the result, it is more likely that a problem occurred at Binance's system level, rather than being solely caused by market makers withdrawing liquidity. He called for using the opportunity of Binance's published review to allow the industry to have a more sufficient and open discussion of the event.

Dragonfly managing partner Haseeb Qureshi holds a similar view. He believes the narrative that "Binance and Ethena caused the crash" is difficult to成立 (hold up) in terms of timeline, market transmission path, and evidence. He pointed out that the Bitcoin price had bottomed about 30 minutes before the USDe anomaly appeared on Binance,明显因果倒置 (clearly reversing cause and effect);同时, the USDe price deviation only occurred on Binance and did not spread to other trading platforms, unable to explain the large-scale liquidations across the entire market, fundamentally different from events like Terra that caused global balance sheet shocks. In fact, regarding the USDe depegging, Haseeb had already解读 (interpreted) it shortly after the 1011 incident. For details, refer to "Ethena Investor Dragonfly: USDe Did Not Depeg, It Was Just Binance's 'Local Price Dislocation'".

In his view, a more reasonable explanation is the叠加 of multiple factors: Trump's tariff remarks disturbed the market on Friday evening, Binance API abnormalities prevented market makers from cross-platform hedging, liquidation and ADL mechanisms amplified fluctuations, and the crypto market's lack of traditional financial-style circuit breakers and self-stabilizing mechanisms ultimately caused the行情 (market trend) to evolve along an unfavorable path. He emphasized that there is no simple and conspiratorial "single mastermind" for 10/11; although the market was severely damaged, in the long run, it was not permanently destroyed, only needing time to修复流动性與信心 (repair liquidity and confidence).

After Haseeb expressed his support for Binance, CZ reposted this tweet, captioning it, "Dragonfly was once one of OKX's largest investors." However, Xu Mingxing later denied this in a response, stating that Dragonfly never invested in OKX,无论是小额投资还是大额投资 (whether a small or large investment).

SAFU Adjustment: Remedy or Signal?

Amid the spreading Binance FUD, on January 30th, Binance announced in "An Open Letter to the Crypto Community" that it would adjust the asset structure of the SAFU fund, gradually converting the original $1 billion in stablecoin reserves into Bitcoin reserves, and plans to complete the exchange within 30 days of this announcement. Binance will regularly review the asset size of the SAFU fund. If the market value of the SAFU fund falls below $800 million due to Bitcoin price fluctuations, Binance will supplement Bitcoin to restore the fund size to $1 billion.

However, the specific method of purchasing this $1 billion in BTC was not explained in the announcement. Odaily Planet Daily has inquired with Binance regarding this matter but has not yet received a response.

Conclusion

Actually, looking back at this debate, the reason Binance has once again become the focus is perhaps not just because it "did something wrong," but because it is already big enough that any structural problems will first manifest on it.

This is not the first time Binance has faced such accusations, and it probably won't be the last. What truly matters is not just how the event's responsibility is divided, but whether, as an industry hub, the leading exchange is willing to take on a higher level of stabilizing responsibility.

In a market that still highly relies on leverage, sentiment, and narrative drive, this debate itself is perhaps more important than the outcome.

Domande pertinenti

QWhat was the '1011 incident' in the cryptocurrency market, and why is Binance being blamed for it?

AThe '1011 incident' refers to the massive market crash on October 11, where the global cryptocurrency market lost over $500 billion in value, with over $19 billion in leveraged positions liquidated. Binance is being blamed because, during the critical period of extreme volatility, its platform experienced significant liquidity anomalies, described as a 'software issue' or 'temporary trading module failure.' This triggered its Auto-Deleveraging (ADL) mechanism, causing cross-account cascading liquidations that led to massive losses for users and market makers.

QWho is Leonidas and what are his main criticisms against Binance?

ALeonidas is the co-founder of ZapApp and a key figure in the Bitcoin Ordinals ecosystem. His main criticisms against Binance are not solely about the 1011 incident but use it as evidence to argue that Binance extracts value from the crypto industry. He claims Binance demands extremely high proportions of token supply (allegedly up to ~10%) from projects for listing, which Binance or insiders then dump, causing losses for projects and retail investors. He has called former CEO CZ the 'biggest scammer in crypto history' and alleges CZ still controls Binance as a 'proxy tool' despite stepping down.

QWhat was OKX founder Star (Xu Mingxing)'s primary argument regarding the systemic risk highlighted by the 1011 incident?

AStar argued that the 1011 incident caused a fundamental change in the market's microstructure, with damage even exceeding that of the FTX collapse. He identified the core cause as Binance's user growth campaign offering a 12% APY for USDe, which was treated as collateral equivalent to USDT and USDC but without sufficient restrictions. He stated that USDe is more akin to a 'tokenized hedge fund' than a low-risk product, and users were incentivized to swap stablecoins for USDe and use looped borrowing to create implied returns of 24-70%, drastically accumulating systemic risk. When volatility hit, USDe depegging and risk management flaws in assets like WETH and BNSOL amplified the crash.

QWhy did CZ unfollow Solana co-founder Anatoly Yakovenko (Toly) on X during this controversy?

ACZ unfollowed Toly because Toly retweeted Star's post criticizing Binance and added a comment: 'It only took 18 months to recover from the accident.' This was a veiled jab, implying that Solana (SOL) took 18 months to recover to its 2021 bull market levels after the FTX crash and now Binance was being implicated as the responsible party in a similar 'accident.' Toly's action was seen as indirectly taking a side against Binance, hinting at the underlying competition between the BSC and Solana ecosystems, particularly in meme coin liquidity.

QHow did Binance respond to the user losses from the 1011 incident, and what recent change did they announce regarding their SAFU fund?

AFollowing the 1011 incident, Binance paid approximately $283 million in compensation to users affected by the depegging and related issues. More recently, on January 30, Binance announced in an open letter that it would adjust the asset structure of its SAFU (Secure Asset Fund for Users) insurance fund. The $1 billion fund, previously held in stablecoins, will be gradually converted into Bitcoin reserves over 30 days. The fund's size will be regularly reviewed, and if its value falls below $800 million due to Bitcoin's price volatility, Binance will top it up with more BTC to restore the $1 billion value.

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