Attracting Global Capital, Asia's New 'Super Cycle' Is Unfolding

marsbitPublished on 2026-05-11Last updated on 2026-05-11

Abstract

Investors are turning to Asia as the next frontier for global equity growth, with a new "super cycle" unfolding across the region. Driven by the AI revolution, Asian markets, particularly South Korea, have seen significant rallies. According to Morgan Stanley analysis, the underlying drivers of Asia's industrial cycle are shifting from traditional sectors like real estate and manufacturing to massive investments in AI infrastructure, energy security and transition, and supply chain resilience. Fixed asset investment in Asia is projected to grow from around $11 trillion in 2025 to $16 trillion by 2030, with a 7% annual growth rate from 2026-2030. The AI wave is a primary catalyst, driving immense capital expenditure for chips, servers, data centers, and power systems. Asia is central to this hardware supply chain. In China, AI investment is focused on building a full-system domestic capability, with the local AI chip market potentially reaching $86 billion by 2030. Beyond AI, China's export story is expanding from EVs and batteries to robotics. The country already captures about half of new global industrial robot demand and over 90% of humanoid robot shipments. This growth phase mirrors the early stages of China's EV export boom. Simultaneously, energy security investments, spurred by AI's massive power needs, are rising, with China benefiting from its leadership in solar, batteries, and EVs. Regional defense spending is also increasing structurally, supporting demand for a...

Author: Bao Yilong

Investors are turning their eyes to Asia, searching for the next breakthrough in the global stock market rally.

Driven by the AI wave, South Korea's stock market led the world in gains this month, attracting a large influx of capital. The implied volatility in the options market has climbed to extreme levels, with derivatives strategists competing to recommend long structures.

All these signals point to the same conclusion: Asia's upward trend may have just begun.

According to Wind Trading Desk, Morgan Stanley's Asia-Pacific team has recently repeatedly emphasized that the underlying drivers of Asia's industrial cycle are shifting from traditional real estate and general manufacturing inventory replenishment to AI and its infrastructure, energy security and transition, defense, and supply chain resilience investments.

(Asia's total fixed investment is set to grow to $16 trillion by 2030)

Morgan Stanley expects Asia's fixed asset investment scale to rise from about $11 trillion in 2025 to $16 trillion in 2030, with a nominal compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of about 7% from 2026 to 2030, significantly higher than recent levels.

(Asia's total fixed capital investment will maintain a 7% CAGR between 2026 and 2030)

The Underlying Logic of the 'Super Cycle': Asia's Capital Expenditure Is Set to Accelerate Significantly

The most core difference in this round of Asia's industrial cycle is that AI has pushed capital expenditure back to the forefront.

Over the past two years, market discussions on AI focused more on models, applications, and the US 'Magnificent Seven.' However, from an Asian perspective, the real meaning of AI is: the comprehensive expansion of chips, memory, servers, optical modules, data centers, power systems, and cloud infrastructure.

Morgan Stanley mentioned that the proportion of global CIOs listing AI as their top priority has risen to 39%. Correspondingly, global AI data center investment is expected to reach about $2.8 trillion from 2026 to 2028, with an annual growth rate of about 33%.

(Capital expenditure related to data centers in the global AI field will increase further)

Asia is at the center of the AI hardware supply chain: from TSMC, Samsung, SK Hynix to semiconductor, server, optical communication, and cloud infrastructure companies in Mainland China, all will benefit from this investment cycle.

The report also expects capital expenditure by major chip companies to potentially rise from about $105 billion in 2025 to about $250 billion annually by 2028. This means AI is a capital-intensive race.

China's role is particularly noteworthy.

Morgan Stanley believes China's AI competition is about complete system capabilities: computing power determines speed, cloud platforms determine scale, token usage determines cost-effectiveness, and application scenarios determine value capture.

Amid ongoing external chip restrictions, the linkage between domestic AI chips, local cloud platforms, and the large model ecosystem is becoming a new investment theme in Chinese technology.

(The relative advantages of the AI industry in China and the US)

Their analysis shows that China's AI chip market could reach $67 billion by 2030, with domestic self-sufficiency potentially rising to 86%.

Whether this prediction materializes fully remains to be seen, but the direction is clear: domestic computing power has gradually shifted from a policy imperative to a commercial one.

The Export Story of 'Made in China' Is Expanding from the 'EV Trio' to Robotics

In recent years, the brightest spots in China's export structure were the 'new three'—electric vehicles, lithium batteries, and photovoltaic products.

The report suggests that the new growth driver for Chinese manufacturing in the next stage could come from robotics, especially industrial robots and humanoid robots.

Morgan Stanley points out that China has already captured about half of the incremental global demand for industrial robots. Global humanoid robot shipments in 2025 are estimated at about 13,000 to 16,000 units, with about 90% coming from Chinese manufacturers. In contrast, markets like the US and Japan remain more in the prototype or early validation stages.

More interestingly, the report draws an analogy between current Chinese robotics exports and electric vehicle exports around 2019: back then, EV exports hadn't entered an explosive growth phase, but the supply chain, policy support, and manufacturing capabilities were largely in place.

(China's humanoid and industrial robotics industry is at a development stage similar to the early phase of the electric vehicle industry)

Today, the robotics industry exhibits similar characteristics—the market size is still not large, but the industrial chain is expanding rapidly.

Looking at the data, China's 12-month rolling scale of humanoid robot and robotics-related exports reached about $1.5 billion in March 2026, similar to the level of Chinese EV exports in early 2020.

In the following years, EV exports expanded rapidly, reaching about $70 billion for the full year 2025, with the quarterly annualized run rate further rising to about $86 billion.

Of course, whether robotics can replicate the EV curve depends on cost reductions, application scenarios opening up, and overseas regulatory environments. But China's advantages in components, complete machine manufacturing, supply chain synergy, and rapid iteration are beginning to show.

Energy Security and Defense Spending Are Providing the Second and Third Growth Engines

The flip side of AI data center expansion is the enormous demand for power and energy infrastructure. The more intensive the computing power, the greater the importance of electricity, cooling, grid, and energy storage.

Morgan Stanley believes energy shocks will catalyze Asia's investment in energy security, and the share of renewable energy in Asia's primary energy consumption remains low, meaning significant room for subsequent investment.

(The proportion of renewable energy in Asia's energy mix remains small, and China benefits significantly from increased spending related to the energy transition)

China has industrial advantages in areas like photovoltaics, electric vehicles, and lithium batteries. The 12-month rolling scale of its related exports has approached the $200 billion level, making it a key beneficiary in this round of energy transition capital expenditure.

Meanwhile, defense spending is also showing a structural upward trend in multiple Asian economies.

The share of defense expenditure in GDP has risen in Japan, South Korea, India, and other places. China and South Korea are also among the world's top ten defense exporters.

(Across the region, the ratio of defense spending to GDP is trending upward)

For capital markets, this means that demand in industrial chains like high-end manufacturing, materials, electronic components, and precision equipment may receive longer-term support.

In other words, AI provides computing power demand, energy provides infrastructure constraints, and defense and supply chain security provide 'resilience investment' under the backdrop of geopolitics. The combination of the three constitutes the foundation of Asia's super cycle.

Who Benefits Most? China, South Korea, and Japan Are at the Core of the Value Chain

In terms of regional beneficiary order, Morgan Stanley highlights China, South Korea, and Japan.

Mainland China excels in industrial chain completeness, manufacturing scale, engineering capabilities, and emerging export categories like new energy and robotics.

South Korea holds advantages in memory, HBM, batteries, and some equipment materials; Japan still possesses deep accumulation in semiconductor equipment, materials, precision manufacturing, and industrial automation.

The proportion of capital goods exports also illustrates the point. The report shows: Thailand ~38%, China ~36%, Japan ~35%, South Korea ~30%. This means that when the global economy enters a new round of equipment investment cycles, the external demand elasticity of these economies will be more pronounced.

Finally, from a capital market structure perspective, these markets have higher weightings in industrial, tech hardware, and materials-related sectors, making it easier for macro capital expenditure cycles to be reflected in stock market performance.

This also means the pricing logic of Asian markets may change in the coming years, focusing on which companies in the capital expenditure chain have orders, technological barriers, and profit elasticity.

Risks That Cannot Be Ignored: Overcapacity, Profit Margins, and Geopolitical Friction

The super cycle narrative is attractive but does not mean all industries and companies will benefit simultaneously.

First, capital expenditure expansion may bring temporary supply pressure.

China's new energy industry has proven that scale advantages can quickly open global markets but may also be accompanied by price competition and profit margin volatility. Industries like robotics, AI hardware, photovoltaics, and energy storage may face similar issues in the future.

Second, technology restrictions and export controls remain variables.

The space for AI chip localization is vast, but gaps still exist in advanced process nodes, HBM, EDA, equipment, and materials. The report also notes that while there is still a gap between domestic chips and top-tier US chips, competitiveness can be enhanced through system optimization, advanced packaging, and software adaptation.

Third, employment structures will also be affected by AI.

Morgan Stanley's 'Future of Work' research estimates that about 90% of occupations will be affected to varying degrees by AI automation and augmentation. In its sample of companies, early AI adoption has brought over 11% productivity gains but also accompanied an average net job reduction of about 4%, with significant differences across countries and industries.

For China, advancing retraining and job transitions while improving efficiency will be a crucial medium- to long-term policy and corporate management challenge.

Fourth, market volatility may increase. The report also cautions that the widening gap between bull and bear scenarios in regional markets means investor divergence over expectations for AI capital expenditure, export orders, and profit realization will persist.

Related Questions

QWhat is the core reason that investors are turning their attention to Asian markets according to the article?

AThe core reason is the emergence of a new 'super-cycle' in Asia, primarily driven by AI and its infrastructure demands. This has shifted the underlying drivers of Asia's industrial cycle from traditional real estate and general manufacturing inventory restocking to investments in AI infrastructure, energy security and transition, defense, and supply chain resilience.

QWhat are the projected figures for Asia's fixed asset investment from 2025 to 2030 according to Morgan Stanley's analysis?

AMorgan Stanley projects that Asia's fixed asset investment scale will rise from approximately $11 trillion in 2025 to $16 trillion in 2030. The nominal investment compound annual growth rate from 2026 to 2030 is expected to be about 7%, significantly higher than recent levels.

QWhich new export sector is highlighted as a potential major growth driver for Chinese manufacturing, following electric vehicles and batteries?

AThe article highlights robotics, particularly industrial robots and humanoid robots, as the next potential major growth driver for Chinese manufacturing exports. China already accounts for about half of the global incremental demand for industrial robots and an estimated 90% of global humanoid robot shipments in 2025.

QBesides AI, what are the other two key growth pillars identified for Asia's 'super-cycle'?

ABesides AI, the other two key growth pillars for Asia's 'super-cycle' are energy security (including investment in power, renewables, and grid infrastructure to support AI and general growth) and defense spending (driven by geopolitical factors and supply chain resilience needs).

QWhat are some of the major risks associated with this predicted Asian 'super-cycle'?

AMajor risks include potential overcapacity and profit margin pressure in sectors like robotics and AI hardware, similar to what happened in the new energy sector. Other risks are technological restrictions and export controls, the impact of AI on employment structures requiring significant re-skilling, and increased market volatility due to diverging investor expectations.

Related Reads

Claude Accused of Becoming Dumber by the Entire Internet, Anthropic Steps In to Reveal: It’s Not the Model That’s Tricking You

When users complained that Claude was "getting dumber," the root cause wasn't the AI model itself. In an official blog post, Anthropic clarified the critical difference between two key settings in Claude Code: Model and Effort. Model refers to the core "brain"—the fixed, trained weights of a specific AI (like Sonnet, Opus, or Fable). Changing the Model addresses *capability* ("can it do this?"), but its knowledge is static post-training. Effort, however, controls the AI's *approach and thoroughness* for a specific task. A higher Effort level instructs Claude to read more files, run tests, perform verification, and complete multi-step reasoning before responding, significantly increasing its "work output" for that job. Conversely, low Effort leads to quicker, less thorough replies. This distinction explains the March 2024 uproar where users experienced a sudden drop in Claude's performance. The cause was not a model change but Anthropic quietly lowering the *default* Effort setting from "high" to "medium" to reduce latency, which was later reverted. The key insight is that a smaller, capable model (like Sonnet) on high Effort can often outperform a larger, more powerful model (like Opus) on low Effort for many tasks. The article provides a practical troubleshooting framework: if Claude makes an error, first check the context and instructions. If it seems to skip necessary steps or validations, increase Effort. If it diligently attempts the task but fails conceptually or makes consistent factual errors despite good context, then consider switching to a more capable Model. The takeaway is a shift in focus: effective AI programming is less about always choosing the "strongest" model and more about intelligently *orchestrating* models and effort levels—acting like a project manager to assign the right "brain" with the right level of diligence for each job, optimizing both results and cost.

marsbit14m ago

Claude Accused of Becoming Dumber by the Entire Internet, Anthropic Steps In to Reveal: It’s Not the Model That’s Tricking You

marsbit14m ago

Will the Ethereum Foundation Evolve into a 'Mascot'? Diversified Organizations Are Fragmenting Its Functions

The Ethereum Foundation (EF) is undergoing significant internal turmoil and functional erosion. Following its largest-ever layoff of 54 staff (20% of its workforce) and a major organizational restructuring announced in June, its Protocol Support Team has been officially dissolved. This comes alongside the high-profile resignation of key figures like co-executive director Xiaowei Wang, bringing senior departures this year to at least eight. Criticism of EF's rigid structure, opaque decision-making, and perceived lack of a clear value narrative for ETH has intensified within the community. The layoffs have catalyzed the emergence of independent, non-profit organizations like Ethlabs and Ethereum Institutional, founded by former EF researchers and members. These entities are now taking on core functions such as protocol research/development and institutional adoption, effectively fragmenting the EF's traditional leadership role. Concurrently, EF's security team is adapting to technological change, deploying specialized AI agents to audit Ethereum's codebase, which successfully discovered a critical vulnerability (CVE-2026-34219). While EF states AI complements rather than replaces researchers, it signals a potential future shift in its operational model. Faced with these challenges—internal restructuring, talent drain, the rise of competing organizations, and AI integration—the Ethereum Foundation appears to be stepping back from a central commanding role. Analysts and community observers speculate it may increasingly transition towards a symbolic "ecosystem mascot" function, while decentralized initiatives drive Ethereum's future growth and institutional adoption.

marsbit40m ago

Will the Ethereum Foundation Evolve into a 'Mascot'? Diversified Organizations Are Fragmenting Its Functions

marsbit40m ago

Nearly a Hundred Players Rush into Embodied Data: With 4.47 Billion Yuan in Financing in One Year, Who Can Really Make Money by 'Selling Data'?

The domestic embodied AI data industry has attracted nearly 100 players, with 70 focused on data collection and 27 on data infrastructure. In the past year, 15 independent embodied data service providers raised approximately 4.47 billion yuan. Despite this growth, the sector remains early-stage, fragmented, and faces significant challenges. Data collection methods are diverse, categorized into four main routes: teleoperation of real robots, human demonstration without a robot (using motion capture, exoskeletons, etc.), simulation synthesis, and distillation from internet videos. Most companies (43%) adopt hybrid approaches, combining multiple routes, as no single method can meet all training needs. Teleoperation alone is pursued by 31% of players, often by state-owned platforms and robot companies, while newer firms favor asset-light, no-hardware human demonstration. Independent data service providers now form the largest player group (40%), indicating the emergence of a distinct industry segment rather than just a subsidiary function for robot makers. Two-thirds of all players are "embodied-native" startups, while one-third are companies that pivoted from fields like AI data annotation, which are more prevalent in the data infrastructure layer. Current annual industry capacity is estimated at 1.6-1.8 million hours plus 70-80 million data points, with a short-term goal to increase this 15-20 fold within 1-3 years. Data collection factories are spread across 20 provinces in China, concentrated in the Yangtze River Delta, Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, and Pearl River Delta regions. Financially, the 4.47 billion yuan raised in the past year pales compared to the 43.8 billion yuan raised by the broader embodied intelligence sector in just the first half of 2026, highlighting that data remains a less "sexy" bet for investors. The 15 funded independent providers show clear stratification: a top tier led by a unicorn (Lightwheel Intelligence, 3.1 billion yuan), a middle tier of 11 firms raising tens to hundreds of millions, and an early-stage tier of 3 companies. Sixty-nine investment institutions have participated, but none have made concentrated bets, reflecting uncertainty about viable business models. Over half of these funded companies are less than a year old, most are at pre-A or A rounds, and profitability remains largely unproven. In summary, the embodied data industry has become an independent track creating jobs and local economic activity. However, it is still nascent, with unformed consensus, unsolved problems, and unproven business models. The coming 1-2 years will be a critical validation window to see if companies can build sustainable, profitable businesses purely by "selling data."

marsbit3h ago

Nearly a Hundred Players Rush into Embodied Data: With 4.47 Billion Yuan in Financing in One Year, Who Can Really Make Money by 'Selling Data'?

marsbit3h ago

Trading

Spot
活动图片