a16z 图表周报:10 家科技公司的市值,已经超过 G7 六国的 GDP

marsbitPublished on 2026-04-27Last updated on 2026-04-27

作者: a16z New Media

编译: 深潮 TechFlow

深潮导读: a16z 最新一期图表周报用大量数据拆解了一个核心论点:科技行业对全球经济的统治力仍在加速。全球市值前十的公司已经超过 G7(除美国外)的 GDP 总和,而 AI 可能像当年铁路催生现代企业制度一样,再次重塑组织形态。此外,稳定币正从转账工具转向真实支付场景,美国年轻人对传统媒体的信任已跌至历史低点。

软件吞噬了世界

我们当然有立场偏向,但科技对全球经济的重要性确实很难被高估。

你甚至可以说,软件真的把世界给吃了:

图注:全球市值前十大上市公司 vs G7(除美国外)各国 GDP

全球市值前十的上市公司加起来,比 G7(除美国外)所有国家的 GDP 总和还大。即便把没人会归为「科技公司」的沙特阿美剔除,结论也一样。(不过沙特阿美确实是在旧金山成立的!)[^1]

说句公道话,前十名更像是「科技+半导体(再加上不好归类的特斯拉和苹果)」,而不是纯软件公司。但结论不变:科技不只是个大生意,它就是最大的生意。

而且科技对全球的接管发生得很快:

图注:前十大科技公司市值 vs G7(除美国外)GDP,时间序列

前十大科技公司的市值曾经只是 G7(除美国外)GDP 的一个零头,直到 2016-2017 年云计算真正起势。从那之后,不到十年时间,这些公司的合计市值就超过了除中国以外整个世界的 GDP。

科技的崛起也不只是简单的换了一批赢家。

最大的公司比 10 年前大得多:

图注:S&P 500 前十大公司的市值规模与占比变化

标普 500 中最大 10 家公司的合计市值是 2015 年的约 6 倍,在指数总市值中的占比也翻了一番。

确实有一次「换血」。前十名的构成相比之前几十年发生了剧烈变化。到 2025 年,只有三家是上一个十年的延续,只有一家(微软,一家科技公司)从再上一个十年留下来。

如果你是 2015 年的投资者,想拿当时指数中最大的公司来给科技股建模,你会把上涨空间低估大约 6 倍。科技从根本上「打破了模型」,重新定义了公司能做到多大的天花板。

而这个天花板看起来还在往上移。

实际上,科技在全球增长故事中的核心地位最近还在加强。上周我们展示过,科技板块的盈利预期增速是市场其余部分的约 2 倍。往回看更久,你会发现科技正在贡献整个市场盈利增长中历史性的大比例:

图注:各行业对市场整体盈利增长的贡献占比

自 2023 年以来,科技贡献了整个市场约 60% 以上的盈利增长。

除了 21 世纪初能源行业短暂风光过,没有其他行业在盈利增长中扮演过如此核心的角色,而且持续这么久。

到了今天,可以说科技不是一个周期,它就是这个周期本身。

铁路 GPT

我们刚说科技是史无前例的大事,但这话其实不够准确。

在工业时代,没有任何行业比铁路更具统治力:

图注:铁路行业在美国市场总市值中的占比(历史峰值约 63%)

巅峰时期,铁路占据了美国市场总市值的约 63%,美银称其为「有史以来最具统治力的创新行业」。

看空者喜欢拿这张铁路图讲故事:你看,铁路曾经占了市场的 63%,后来泡沫破了,现在几乎可以忽略不计。

但事情没那么简单。铁路至今仍然重要,真正发生的是:铁路催生了一个全新的、此前无法想象的经济体系,而且这个经济体系比铁路本身要大得多。

图注:美国股市各行业市值占比变迁(19 世纪至今)

铁路把主导地位让给了工业,工业又让给了科技(中间金融和房地产在全球金融危机前短暂上位过)。

虽然科技今天很大,但从相对比例看,它远没有 19 世纪的运输业(或房地产和金融业)在巅峰时那么大。

经济变得更大、更复杂了。今天市场中约 70% 的行业,在 1900 年要么很小,要么根本不存在。

图注:1900 年 vs 今天的美国股市行业构成

1900 年的美国经济基本上就是纺织、钢铁、煤炭、烟草,加上运输它们的铁路和给它们融资的银行。现在这些行业加起来只占一个很小的比例。

所以更有意思的问题不是某个平台转型是不是泡沫,而是这次技术跃迁会解锁什么新经济。

铁路是一项不可思议的通用技术。它催生的一个戏剧性(但出人意料的)变化是现代企业制度的诞生。铁路出现之前,一家企业通常小到一个人脑子里就能装下。但铁路有太多车组、太多车站、太多同时发生的决策。

1855 年,纽约和伊利铁路公司的总监画出了被认为是第一张现代组织架构图:一棵层级式的汇报关系树,用来解决铁路日益棘手的调度问题。在很多方面,中层管理、多事业部结构、职业经理人阶层、MBA 学位,所有这些都起源于铁路制造的组织问题。

铁路改变的不只是美国生产什么,它改变了「企业」这个东西本身。铁路催生中层管理,就是阿尔弗雷德·钱德勒说的「看得见的手」。

AI 的有趣之处在于,和铁路相比,AI 可能再次改写铁路在一百多年前确立的那套主流组织模板。

上个月,Jack Dorsey 和 Block 的管理层发了一篇文章,观点正是如此:AI 在企业里的价值不是给每个人配一个 copilot,而是替代中层管理的功能。吸收和路由信息、维持对齐、预先计算决策——这些通常由管理层负责的协调工作——在一家 AI 企业里,可以交给技术来做,让人回到边缘,把判断力集中在客户接触和人际互动上。

按他的说法,一个存在了 170 年的企业管理模式将被委托给技术,创造出全新的组织形态。这事听起来不小。

Dorsey 说得对不对(以及最终会出现什么样的新型企业),当然还是开放性问题。但这些影响远比「科技股这个季度会不会从高点回调」重要得多。

稳定币交易量从转账转向支付

把交易、资金管理和交易所相关的机械性操作剥离之后——这些占了稳定币交易的大头——去年不同方之间的真实支付交易估计在 3500 亿到 5500 亿美元之间。

图注:稳定币支付按类型拆分(B2B、B2C、C2B)

B2B 业务在稳定币支付中占了大头(考虑到规模,这不意外),但 B2C 和 C2B 也在增长。

总之一句话,稳定币越来越多地参与到日常商业活动中。这是一个更大趋势的一部分,a16z crypto 在这篇文章里有详细讨论。

新闻业的下一个十年

美国人对大众媒体的信任度最近又创了新低,这是现代民调史上最壮观的慢动作崩塌之一。

图注:美国人对大众媒体的信任度变迁(1975-2025)

2025 年,只有 28% 的美国人表示对大众媒体(报纸、电视、广播)有「很大」或「相当」的信任。1975 年这个数字是 72%。

但总体信任度并没有讲完整个故事。

真正的故事在代际分裂里,而且裂痕巨大:

图注:不同年龄段对传统媒体 vs 社交媒体的信任度对比

越年轻,对传统媒体的信任越低、对社交媒体的信任越高。反过来也成立——越老,越信传统媒体,越不信社交媒体。

信任差距之外,还有消费差距:

图注:不同年龄段通过社交媒体获取新闻的比例

30 岁以下的成年人中,76% 至少偶尔从社交媒体获取新闻。65 岁以上群体中只有 28%(甚至比五年前还略低了一点)。

大众媒体的信任度确实从高峰跌下来了,但这里面很大一部分故事是年轻一代媒体习惯的转变。和长辈相比,年轻人对大众媒体信任度低得多,同时也是社交媒体替代品的重度用户。

回到最初的观察:1975 年 72% 的媒体信任巅峰通常被当作新闻业的黄金时代来追忆。但同样事实是,70 年代初只有少数几家电视网和报纸垄断了信息供给,几乎没有竞争。

那么有理由问一句:那个「巅峰」信任度,有多少来自优秀的新闻,又有多少来自没有其他选择?两者当然不矛盾——60 年代末 70 年代初可能既有好新闻,又有被俘获的受众。但很难不注意到,对大众媒体信任度最低的那代人,恰恰是在选择最多的环境下成长起来的。

这正是 Martin Gurri 在《公众的反叛》(The Revolt of the Public)中提出的论点:信息垄断在各个领域(媒体、政府、专业权威)的瓦解,揭露了从未被真正赢得的权威。公众看到了幕布后面的东西,信任随之下降。

Gurri 也说,公众擅长拆毁旧东西,但不擅长建设新东西。他可能说得没错。但至少,建设新媒体替代品的资金门槛从来没有像现在这么低过。它们能否重建新闻的信任,将是下一个十年的核心故事。

再见了,生产力加成

Zyn(尼古丁袋)的销售进入了未知领域:同比增长首次转负。

图注:Zyn 销售额同比增长率(4 周滚动),首次转负

按 4 周滚动口径计算,Zyn 的销售额同比增长率有史以来第一次变成负数,虽然幅度很小。

实际上按销量看,Zyn 还在增长。但由于近期大量促销活动,总销售金额略有下降。

生产力加成完好无损(笑)。

还有一个有趣的细节:Zyn 在尼古丁袋市场的份额不再过半了:

图注:Zyn 在尼古丁袋市场中的份额变化

Zyn 的市场份额在去年底跌破了 50%。

[^1]: 是的,我们知道股票市值和 GDP 是存量和流量的比较。但图看着还是挺爽的。

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