曾硬刚 SEC 的灰度即将登陆纽交所

marsbitPublished on 2025-11-13Last updated on 2025-11-14

北京时间 11 月 13 日晚间,灰度(Grayscale)向纽交所递交了 IPO 申请,计划通过 Grayscale Investment, Inc. 登陆美股市场。本次 IPO 由摩根士丹利、美银证券、Jefferies、Cantor 担任主承销商。

值得注意的是,灰度本次上市采用了伞型合伙公司结构(Up-C),即灰度的运营和控制主体 Grayscale Operating, LLC 并非上市主体,而是通过新成立上市主体 Grayscale Investment, Inc. 进行 IPO,通过收购 LLC 的部分权益实现公开交易。公司创始人和早期投资者可将 LLC 权益转换为上市主体的股票,且转换过程享受资本利得税优惠,只需要缴纳个人所得税。IPO 投资者则需要为企业利润缴税,还需要对股票的分红缴纳个人所得税。


这样的上市结构除了对公司「元老」在税收上有利之外,还可以通过 AB 股实现上市后依然对公司拥有绝对控制权。S-1 文件显示,灰度由母公司 DCG 全资控股,且灰度就明确表示上市之后灰度母公司 DCG 仍然会通过对投票权更大的 B 类股的 100% 持股对灰度的重大事项有决定权,IPO 所筹集的资金也将全部用于从 LLC 手中收购权益。


大家对灰度自然不陌生,最早推出比特币和以太坊投资产品,通过与 SEC 艰苦卓绝的斗争实现了将比特币和以太坊信托转换为现货 ETF,其推出的数字大盘基金也颇有「加密货币版标普 500」的威力,在上一轮牛市周期中,大盘基金的每一次调整,都会让被移除和新加入的代币价格在短期内出现不小的波动。


DeFi


S-1 文件显示,截至当地时间今年 9 月 30 日,灰度总资管规模达到了 350 亿美元,实现了加密货币资管规模的全球第一。旗下数字资产投资产品超过 40 种,覆盖了超过 45 种加密货币。350 亿美元中包括了管理规模达 339 亿美元的 ETP 和 ETF(主要是比特币、以太坊、SOL 相关产品)以及规模为 11 亿美元的私募基金(主要是山寨币投资产品)。


DeFi


此外,单从收入来看,灰度旗下主要投资产品的收入能力是强于主要竞争者的,但这主要也来源于此前不可赎回信托积累的 AUM 和高于同行平均水平的管理费率。


DeFi


财务表现方面,在截至 2025 年 9 月 30 日的 9 个月内,灰度营业收入约为 3.19 亿美元,同比下降了 20%,营业支出约 1.16 亿美元,同比增长 8.4%,营业利润录得约 2.02 亿美元,同比下降 30.4%。加上其他收入并扣除所得税准备金的净利润约为 2.03 亿美元,同比下降 9.1%。此外,平均资管规模数据显示,今年的资管规模相较去年可能有所下降。


DeFi


剔除非经常性科目,报告期内经调整后净利润约为 2.08 亿美元,净利润率为 65.3%,虽然前者同比下降了 8.5%,但净利润率却较去年同期的 57.2% 有所上升。


DeFi


目前灰度的负债率相当健康,虽然收入和利润均有所下降,但从公司资产价值提升,负债下降以及利润率提升这三点来看,灰度的运营状况在不断改善。


S-1 文件还披露了灰度未来的发展计划,包括拓展私募基金种类(推出更多山寨币私募投资产品);推出主动型管理产品以作为被动型投资产品(ETF、ETP)的补充;进行主动投资,标的包括自身的投资产品、加密货币或其他标的。


在拓展分销渠道方面,灰度披露称,目前已完成了三家 AUM 总计达 14.2 万亿美元的券商的尽职调查,并于本月在一家拥有超过 17500 名财务顾问,咨询和经纪资产规模超过 1 万亿美元的大型独立经纪交易商的平台上上线了比特币和以太坊迷你 ETF。今年 8 月,灰度与拥有 6700 家咨询公司组成的网络的 iCapital Network 达成合作,根据协议,灰度将在未来通过旗下主动管理策略为网络中的公司提供数字资产投资渠道。


总体而言,灰度披露的信息显示出该公司是一家发展比较稳定的资管公司,收入的主要来源就是投资产品的管理费用,并没有太大的想象空间。但鉴于上市的传统资管公司先例,对于灰度的市值,市盈率等的预计是有迹可循的,也算是提供了一个比较可预测的投资标的。

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