Circle Q3 成绩单出炉:在下一盘更大的棋?

深潮Published on 2025-11-12Last updated on 2025-11-13

稳定币第一股 Circle 的 Q3 财报有哪些看点?

撰文:KarenZ,Foresight News

昨晚,稳定币第一股 Circle 公布三季度财报,交出了一份令人瞩目的成绩单,更在生态建设上打出了一套组合拳。同时,Circle 揭示了其在构建 Arc Network 和 CPN 支付网络方面的进展。

以下是本次财报的几大看点:

一、USDC 供应量:相比去年同期增长 108%

截至三季度末,USDC 的流通量达到 737 亿美元,同比增长高达 108%,反映了稳定币市场的整体扩张。

与此同时,USDC 的市场份额达到 29%,相比去年同期提升了 643 个基点。在众多稳定币竞争者中,USDC 已成为仅次于 USDT 的重要玩家,这个份额的增长说明用户对 USDC 的信任度在持续上升。

二、净利润:达 2.14 亿美元,同比增长 202%

这直接带动了公司总营收和储备利息收入的显著提升,达到 7.4 亿美元,同比增长 66%。这其中,储备利息收入贡献 7.11 亿美元,同比增长 60%,成为营收核心支柱,这主要得益于 USDC 流通量的增加。

更值得关注的是利润端的表现。Circle 在第三季度实现净利润 2.14 亿美元,同比增长 202%。这个高增幅一方面来自于业务规模的扩大,另一方面也包括了税收优惠和公司可转换债券公允价值的下降。

其他收入虽规模较小但增速惊人,达 2851.8 万美元,较上年同期的 54.7 万美元增长超 50 倍,主要得益于订阅服务和交易收入的强劲增长。

三、Arc 网络:Circle 正在探索在 Arc 上推出原生代币的可能性

Circle 表示,正在探索在 Arc Network 上发行原生代币的可能性。Circle 在 10 月 28 日推出了 Arc 公链测试网,吸引了超过 100 家公司参与。这些参与者涵盖了银行、支付、资本市场、资产管理公司、科技等多个领域的机构以及数字资产生态系统的多个环节。

Circle 希望 Arc 代币能够推动网络采用,进一步协调 Arc 利益相关者的利益。

四、CPN 支付网络:年化交易量达 34 亿美元

Circle 支付网络 Circle Payments Network(CPN)自今年 5 月底推出以来,已有 29 家金融机构加入,另有 55 家正在审核中,还有 500 家正在筹备加入。当前,CPN 现已支持 8 个国家的资金流动。

基于截至 11 月 7 日的 30 天滚动交易量计算,CPN 的年化交易量可以达到 34 亿美元,显示了机构客户的强劲需求。

此外,Circle 还与 Brex、德意志交易所集团、Finastra、Fireblocks、Hyperliquid、Kraken、Unibanco Itaú和 Visa 等公司建立了新的合作关系,进一步提升了 USDC 在全球支付和金融基础设施中的地位。

五、代币化货币市场基金 USYC:规模达到 10 亿美元

Circle 的代币化货币市场基金 USYC 同样表现出色,从 2025 年 6 月 30 日到 2025 年 11 月 8 日,其规模增长超过 200%,达到约 10 亿美元。这反映出数字资产与传统金融结合的潜力。

六、2025 财年展望

基于 Q3 的强劲表现和市场需求增长,Circle 将其他收入预期从原先的 7500 万 - 8500 万美元上调至 9000 万 - 1 亿美元,主要得益于订阅服务和交易收入的持续增长;RLDC 利润率预期将达到 38%(「收入 - 分销成本」/ 收入),处于此前指引区间的上限;调整后运营费用预期上调至 4.95 亿 - 5.1 亿美元,这说明 Circle 正在加大投入。

如何看待 Circle 最新财报?

这份财报展现出 Circle 在稳定币领域的强势地位和多元化探索的初步成果。这种增长不是单点突破,而是多个维度同时推进,包括供应量、收入、利润、市场份额都在上升。

「其他收入」虽基数较小但增速惊人,订阅服务、交易收入的增长暗示 Circle 正尝试突破「单一利息依赖」,收入结构初现多元化苗头。

同样值得强调的是,今年是 Circle 生态落地的关键节点,Arc 公链测试网落地和支付网络(CPN)规模化扩张反映出 Circle 正在经历一个重要的转变——从单纯的稳定币发行方,逐步演进成为提供综合金融基础设施的平台型公司。USDC 规模的稳健增长为这种演进奠定了基础,而 Arc 生态、CPN 支付网络的发展,则打开了未来更大的想象空间。叠加美国《GENIUS 法案》落地后的合规红利,传统金融机构入场正成为 USDC 流通量增长的新引擎。

不过,这份财报也暴露了 Circle 发展过程中需直面的潜在挑战。

尽管「其他收入」增速迅猛,但储备利息收入占总营收的比重仍接近 96%,公司收入高度依赖 USDC 储备资产产生的利息收益。这种单一的收入结构使其对利率环境高度敏感,若未来市场利率进入下行周期,储备金收入增长将直接承压,进而影响整体盈利水平。而「其他收入」目前占比仍不足 4%,尚未形成能够支撑业绩的独立盈利支柱,收入多元化转型仍需时日。

仔细看财报可以发现,Q3 净利润 2.14 亿美元中,包含了 6100 万美元的所得税优惠(tax benefit,非经常性),以及 4800 万美元的可转换债务公允价值下降收益(非经常性),这两项加起来占净利润的一半。除去这些非经营收益,实际经营利润的亮度会大幅下降。

另外,成本压力对利润的稀释也比较明显。分销、交易及其他成本达 4.48 亿美元,同比增长 74%,成本增速高于营收增速。高额成本直接导致利润空间受到挤压,虽净利润实现大幅增长,但利润率提升幅度与营收增速的匹配度有待优化。从业务逻辑看,这类成本与合作伙伴分成等因素密切相关,短期内难以快速压降,成为制约盈利释放的重要因素。

与此同时,Arc 当前仅仅在测试网阶段,真正能否吸引足够的开发者和用户,推动形成活跃的生态,还需要时间验证。

总体而言,本份财报展现了一家处于快速成长期企业的典型特征:机遇与挑战并存,短期成绩亮眼,长期则取决于战略执行与风险应对能力。随着加密资产与传统金融的融合加速,以及全球对数字美元需求的持续提升,Circle 的故事才刚刚开始。

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