Coinbase 2024 Q2财报解读:营收14.5亿美元,净利环比下滑97%

Odaily星球日报Published on 2024-08-03Last updated on 2024-08-03

Abstract

Coinbase第二季度在收入多元化方面取得了不错的进展。

Coinbase 于今日公布第二季度财报,营收为 14.5 亿美元,环比下降 11% ,同比增长超 100% ,与分析师预期的 13.7 亿美元几乎持平。净收入为 3600 万美元,环比下降 97% 。调整后的 EBITDA(税前息前折旧前摊销前利润)为 5.96 亿美元。Coinbase 连续四个季度实现营收正增长。

Coinbase 第二季度总交易量为 2260 亿美元,较第一季度下降了 28% ,交易收益为 7.81 亿美元,环比下降 27% ,订阅和服务收入增长 17% ,至 5.99 亿美元。总运营费用为 11 亿美元,环比增长 26% 。Coinbase 第二季度在收入多元化方面取得了不错的进展,订阅和服务收入达到近 6 亿美元。资产负债表增加到 78 亿美元。

值得一提的是,Coinbase 第二季度托管费收入为 3500 万美元,环比增长 7% 。主要驱动力是第二季度的平均加密资产价格高于第一季度,也受益于其作为 BTC ETF 产品的托管人的相关资金流入。此外,Coinbase 在二季度产生了 2.4 亿美元的 USDC 稳定币利息收入,环比增长 22% 。

Coinbase 2024 Q2财报解读:营收14.5亿美元,净利环比下滑97%

Coinbase 还在Q2财报中特别强调了 Base 在性能方面的较大提升:提速降费——基础费用低于 1 美分,处理速度低于 1 秒。Base 处理交易量第二季度增长 300% 。此外,Coinbase 在第二季度还推出了 Coinbase Wallet 的升级版本的自托管钱包 Smart Wallet,以简化用户体验。

收入多元化:交易费收入下降,订阅和服务收入上涨

总体而言,Coinbase 第二季度在收入多元化方面取得了不错的进展。Q2 总交易量为 2260 亿美元,环比下降 28% 。总交易费用收入为 7.8 亿美元,环比下降 27% ,同比增长 138% 。收入占比从Q1的 65% 降低到 54% ,但仍为最主要的营收来源。订阅和服务收入达到近 6 亿美元,环比增长 17% 。公司利息和其他收入为 6970 万美元,环比增长 40% 。

Coinbase 2024 Q2财报解读:营收14.5亿美元,净利环比下滑97%

  • 零售交易费用

2024 Q2 零售交易费收入为 6.65 亿美元,环比下降 29% ,同比上涨 130% 。Q2零售交易量为 370 亿美元,环比下降 34% 。Coinbase 交易费用直接受到加密市场行情的影响,第二季度加密货币现货市场交易状况比第一季度更加疲软,尤其是在美国。

  • 机构交易费用

第二季度机构交易相较第一季度有所放缓。Q2机构交易收入为 6400 万美元,环比下降 25% ,同比增长 272% 。第二季度的机构交易量为 1890 亿美元,环比下降 26% 。

第一季度得益于 2024 年 1 月比特币 ETF 的获批上市,Coinbase 吸引了机构投资者的大量涌入,机构平台 Coinbase Prime 2024 Q1 交易量和活跃客户数量创下历史新高。尽管第二季度交易收入降低,但在 7 月,以太坊现货 ETF 正式获批,Coinbase 被 9 只中的 8 只授权成为托管方,Coinbase 机构交易费用收入仍在持续受益于加密 ETF 的上市。

订阅和服务收入

Coinbase Q2的订阅和服务收入为 5.99 亿美元,同比增长 17% 。订阅和服务收入受益于更高的 USDC 平均平台余额和 USDC 市值以及较高的平均加密资产价格,尤其是 SOL 和 ETH。

  • 稳定币收入为 2.4 亿美元,,环比增长 22% 。主要驱动力是较高的平均 USDC 平台余额和较高的平均 USDC 市值。平台上 USDC 的价值为 57 亿美元,仅比第一季度末的 55 亿美元增长了 2% 。

  • 区块链的奖励收入为 1.85 亿美元,环比增长 23% 。增长的主要驱动力是更高的 SOL 和 ETH 均价。

  • 利息和财务费用收入为 6900 万美元,环比增长 4% 。增长的主要驱动力是较高的平均托管法定余额。

  • 托管费收入为 3, 500 万美元,环比增长 7% 。第二季度增长的主要驱动力是平均加密资产价格高于第一季度。此外,托管费收入的增长同样受益于作为 BTC ETF 产品的托管人的角色相关的资金流入。

  • 其他订阅和服务收入为 7000 万美元,同比增长 9% ,主要由 Coinbase One 收入的增长推动。

资产负债表

截至第二季度,Coinbase 持有 78 亿美元资产,环比增加 10% ,即增加了 7.33 亿美元,具体组成如下图所示。

Coinbase 2024 Q2财报解读:营收14.5亿美元,净利环比下滑97%

第三季度展望

Coinbase 第三季度的订阅和服务收入将在 5.3-6 亿美元之间。2024 年 7 月,Coinbase 已创造了约 2.1 亿美元的交易总收入,表示将继续推动目标的实现。

Coinbase 2024 Q2财报解读:营收14.5亿美元,净利环比下滑97%

此外,Coinbase 将在第三季度继续推动 USDC 在全球的采用,使其成为最合规的稳定币。因此Q3与 USDC 相关的费用将增加。截至第二季度,Coinbase 拥有 3486 名全职员工,增长 2% 。在今年接下来半年里,Coinbase 还将持续增加员工,来支持产品开发和国际扩张等业务。

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