剖析加密货币周期:机构资金引领牛市,警惕过热引发的市场反转

Odaily星球日报Published on 2024-04-04Last updated on 2024-04-04

Abstract

集体总是缺乏远见,群体的势头阻碍了个人的决策。

原文标题:《But They Won’t Trap Me》

原文作者:MATTI

原文编译:深潮 TechFlow

事后看来,事物可能似乎是必然的。有时候,必然和不可能之间的差别很小,或许仅仅是几周的价格行动。我想要在事后诸葛亮的视角下探讨这种差异。

两股相互作用的力量形成了加密货币牛市。资源(资本)自上而下流动,产品(创意)自下而上流动。将资本与正确的想法结合起来会引发创新,或者至少引发想象力。这时,探索就会转变成开发。

我将分享过去几年的个人趣闻轶事,然后讨论周期的探索阶段与开发阶段的差异。作为结束语,我将总结可能的未来情景并发表个人评论。

资源

在加密货币领域,我们经历了从极度恐惧到极度冷漠再到高期望环境的快速转变。所有这些大约在 12 个月内完成。可以说,集体总是缺乏远见,但群体的势头却阻碍了个人的决策。

在 2022 年底的极度恐慌之后,大多数投资者都不愿投入资本,而一些人已经完全放弃了加密货币。在 2023 年夏季的极度冷漠期间,许多人因为考虑到资本约束而不愿投入资本,宏观经济势头描绘出黯淡的前景。

随着 2023 年末市场上涨,受到 ETF 的语气以及 Solana 等自上而下的叙事推动,市场飙升。在 2023 年与许多同行投资者交谈时,几乎没有人表达出乐观情绪。那些有资源的人中,很少有人实际上在部署它们。

在加密货币领域,无论是在流动资金方面还是在风险投资方面,许多投资者都被突如其来的市场看涨所措手不及,至少预计还有六个月的冬天。黄金牛市的前景几乎是一夜之间发生的,投资者突然感到困惑。

那些有流动资金的人正在争先恐后地购买他们一年前本应该购买的代币,而那些拥有资源的风险投资家正在追逐最热门的故事——主要是 L2 和人工智能项目。我们可以通过观察以下几个方面来判断:

  • 超额认购

  • 只限 KOL/天使轮

  • 价格竞争激烈

  • 很快份额就被卖光

那些在 2022 年 12 月感觉过度配置的人,在 2024 年 3 月感到配置不足。流动性基金的资本流入在 2023 年末加快,随后风险基金(少数仍拥有可支配资源的风险基金)提出更多的资本需求。

根据我从 2023 年中至今筹集风险投资加密基金的个人经验,几乎不可能找到积极分配的 LP。在母基金(FoF)方面,大多数基金都在努力筹集资金,每个季度都会推迟资本部署,而少数拥有资源的基金则选择了更大的公司。

剖析加密货币周期:机构资金引领牛市,警惕过热引发的市场反转

在 2023 年夏季,一家大型 FoF 的合伙人之一表示,他们为每笔 50 万美元的支票而烦恼。另一家 FoF 在私下谈话中透露,他们已经与大约 100 家在 2023 年筹集资金的加密货币风险投资基金进行了交流(我甚至不能说出那么多),但没有分配给任何一家。这不仅仅是加密货币现象,因为整体上风险资本在各个领域都变得干涸。

然而,对于加密货币来说,除了总体宏观崩溃之外,还有一场额外的微观的危机——FTX 。在 FTX 崩盘前不久,我与一家美国 FoF 进行了交谈,他们表示他们已向加密货币管理者承诺了数千万美元,但 FoF 本身要到 2022 年底才能开始融资。我还没有听说他们真正成功融资。当加密货币基金来临时,许多 LP 发现自己无法履行其资本承诺。

FTX 的情况也推迟了新资本进入加密货币领域,许多渴望获得加密货币投资的规模较小和较大的家族办公室和基金失去了兴趣。很少有投资者真正能够独立思考,这就是我们有狂热和幻灭的原因。

然而,比较 2018 年和 2022/23 年的加密冬天的情况,结果是传统金融对加密货币的信心大大提高了。实际上,在 FTX 之前,我与传统金融界的几乎所有人交谈过,那些没有涉足或边缘涉足加密货币的人都认为加密货币会留下来。而 2018 年绝对不是这样。

总之,从我有限的个人经验来看,风险投资和流动性配置者因情绪的快速变化而被边缘化。这意味着围绕现有的叙事已经创建了一个漏斗,并且市场正在加快步伐。

牛市催化剂是资金流向 ETF 和流动加密货币基金,重新定价二级市场(已经在发生)。在一级市场方面,我预计流向加密货币风险投资的资源将在 2024 年下半年增加,但主要是在 2025 年,从而推动本已竞争激烈的一级市场。

想法

由于 Luna 崩盘和 FTX 暴跌,熊市迅速转变为一场清洗,卖家迅速抛售,而那些仍在场上的人仍然感到震惊。如果他们进行资产配置,他们会感到不安。创始人的涌入减少了,因为许多人将目光转向了人工智能的热潮。

叙事重置来得很快。加密货币的幻灭期有助于探索新的想法,选择最好的想法,以便在叙事转向狂热时得到开发。探索阶段为后来的模仿竞赛奠定了基础。探索就是寻找传说中的“创新触发点(innovation trigger)”。

整个 2023 年,交易流最为多样化,因为没有特别强大的叙事。有一些集聚,例如意图、ZK、rollup/第二层、ordinals 等,还有一些其他方面,主要是基础设施方面。

创始人实际上被迫在让风险投资者兴奋之前思考一段时间。在这一点上,创始人和投资者都渴望探索。这就是加密货币处于其创造性最佳状态的时候。对热门事物的边际改进效果并不大,因为熊市时期没有足够热门的事物,对事物的兴奋并不会在熊市中持续太久。

随着 2023 年末市场的飙升,对“创新触发点”的搜索结束了——牌已经打出。我相信,这轮牛市的 "奥弗顿窗口 "已经开启。但是,这并不意味着表现最好的公司已经出现并可以投资。

(编者注:奥弗顿窗口是一段时间內大多数人在政治上可以接受的政策范围的一种理论。 )

Uniswap 可能是上一周期被复制最多的产品之一,但是第二个最被复制的产品,DeFi 2.0 的鼻祖 OlympusDAO,仅仅在 DeFi 夏季之后的几个月才出现。仍然有创新的空间,但必须通过利用现有叙事来进行创新。

我们今天看到的潜力最大的叙事是:

  • 加密货币 AI/代理

  • 再质押

  • 第二层

  • ZK

  • 基础设施

  • DeSci

  • SocialFi/Web3社交

以上是相当不确定的类别,更像是用于模糊地识别人们正在构建的内容。许多产品可能是以上两种或更多种类的组合。胜利者将是那些掌握用户获取的传统工具的人:收益和杠杆。 “数字上涨”始终是最好的用户体验。

剖析加密货币周期:机构资金引领牛市,警惕过热引发的市场反转

探索与利用

让我们简单讨论一下探索/利用的博弈论。加密周期有两个行为。一种是人们被迫想出看似新的事物,另一种是人们通过夸大的叙事来利用这些新事物。

剖析加密货币周期:机构资金引领牛市,警惕过热引发的市场反转

在熊市中,我们陷入了一个局部最大值。由于旧的叙事已经崩溃,无法进一步支撑市场,创始人被迫进行探索,而投资者也不情愿地愿意跟随。 “创新触发点”是新的全球最大值的山麓。这成为探索的目标,围绕这个目标可以构建新的叙事。

剖析加密货币周期:机构资金引领牛市,警惕过热引发的市场反转

随着之前的想法成为死胡同,创始人又回到了起点,扩大了探索空间。随着价格持续下跌或停滞不前,放弃旧叙事的安全性并探索更大的潜在新奇领域的动力就越大。

剖析加密货币周期:机构资金引领牛市,警惕过热引发的市场反转

在某个时刻,探险家们将目光投向了可能成为新的全球最大值的山麓。通常,山麓的形成是新颖性和价格恢复的函数。虽然这可能更多地是一种相关性而不是因果关系——但它足以开始攀爬并形成整体叙事。

剖析加密货币周期:机构资金引领牛市,警惕过热引发的市场反转

攀升预示着探索阶段已经结束,我们建立了一个大本营,并开始利用市场的势头。此时,新颖性与价格行为之间的反射关系开始将全球最大值推高。价格成为采用的领先指标。

截至 2024 年 3 月,我们似乎已经找到了山麓,每个人都在争相攀登新的山峰,因为它似乎提供了比进一步探索更好的回报。

接下来是什么?

探索阶段已经结束,考虑到大多数投资者都是被动的,他们不会浪费时间探索,而是加倍努力,因为他们必须弥补失去的东西。各轮融资开始获得超额认购,这表明投资者已经处于充分利用模式。

2024 年类似于 2020 年和 2016 年,大多数是内部炒作的一年。参与活跃的零售基础在加密货币中已经比 2020 年更高,这意味着我们已经从更高的起点开始。尽管在过去两年里创新很少,但我们正在利用资源。

开发者专注于资源,而探索者专注于想法。成为投资者和“从事投资业务”(投资者与分配者)之间存在微妙的区别。

开发策略也是规模的函数。大多数拥有丰富资源的基金只进行开发,因为创新或勘探并不像在开发轴上竞争那样需要大量资金。傻钱比外人相信和内部人承认的要多得多。

考虑到在任何狂热期间,大量资本都在寻找稀缺的天才,许多人会妥协以实现他们的部署目标。或者正如 Hobart 和 Huber 所说:“虽然天才是稀缺的,但轻信者的需求总是会通过大量的欺诈行为得到满足。”人们的期望被夸大,创始人被激励卷入资源战争,补贴奇异品种的收益。

剖析加密货币周期:机构资金引领牛市,警惕过热引发的市场反转

随着 VC 的融资机器已经开始运转,自上而下的资本流动也将逐渐增加。早期的内部轮次竞争意味着,在散户大量涌入之前,内部人士和机构资金将支撑市场。此外,零售业并不是一个同质的群体,而是一个周期内的各种采用浪潮。

那些最害怕的人正在转变为无所畏惧的公牛。但这只是不安全的另一面。记住,不安全感是贪婪之母,如今市场上存在大量的不安全感。

事实是,在过去的两年中,加密货币并没有太多的创新,因此很难将这次牛市视为上一个牛市的独立现象。在主题上,它似乎是上一个周期的延续,但规模更大,因为收益套利变得更有利可图,并且随着 ETF 的开放,机构的大门也打开了。

对于一个失控的狂热期来说,想象力触发因素比创新触发因素更有效。反身性再次被释放,空间中的大多数人都在支持 kayfabe。信用的作用在本周期尚未发挥出来。

几个月前,我在投资者信中写道:

每一轮加密货币周期往往都会因其基本原理的过度而毁灭。2017 年毁于过度沉迷于 ICO 的狂热, 2021 年毁于 DeFi 叙事的过度杠杆化;每一次狂热的基本原则都是对眼前财富的模仿性争夺。

这次上涨始于机构资本的自上而下流动。没有真正闪亮的新事物。即将到来的潜在狂热的基础是机构资金流入(和信贷?)和价格走势本身。这个周期是否会因暴露于机构的过度敞口而毁灭?让我们拭目以待。

剖析加密货币周期:机构资金引领牛市,警惕过热引发的市场反转

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