When Big Money Gets Serious, RWA Liquidity Issues Come to the Fore

marsbitОпубліковано о 2026-01-16Востаннє оновлено о 2026-01-16

Анотація

When large capital enters the RWA (Real World Asset) tokenization space, the underlying liquidity constraints become critically exposed. Tokenized assets like gold (e.g., PAXG, XAUT) and equities (e.g., TSLAx, NVDAx) suffer from severe liquidity shortages, leading to high slippage, fragile market structures, and amplified systemic risks. For instance, a $4 million trade in tokenized gold can incur ~150 bps slippage, while traditional CME gold futures show negligible impact even at $20 million. DEXs perform worse, with Uniswap recording average slippage of 25–35 bps and occasional extremes beyond 50 bps. This liquidity crisis is structural: minting/redemption fees (10–50 bps), slow redemption cycles (T+1 to T+5), and fragmented order books deter market makers. Capital remains underallocated due to high opportunity costs and inventory risks. Shallow liquidity triggers volatility spillovers—e.g., Binance’s PAXG anomalies caused cascading liquidations on Hyperliquid. For RWA scalability, the market structure must evolve: deeper integration with traditional liquidity, faster redemptions, and reduced frictions are essential. Tokenization’s promise hinges not on on-chain assets alone, but on building robust liquidity infrastructures.

Author | @ballsyalchemist

Compiled | Odaily Planet Daily (@OdailyChina)

Translator | DingDang (@XiaMiPP)

Liquidity is the prerequisite for an asset to gain confidence. When the market has sufficient depth, large amounts of capital can be smoothly absorbed, whales can build positions freely, and assets can be used as reliable collateral. This is because lenders know they can exit at any time if needed. However, if the asset itself lacks liquidity, the situation is completely reversed. Shallow liquidity struggles to attract users, and a lack of users further compresses trading depth, ultimately forming a self-reinforcing "liquidity death spiral."

Tokenization was initially held in high hopes: it was seen as a key tool to enhance capital liquidity, unlock DeFi financial utility, and bridge on-chain and off-chain assets. Ideally, trillions of dollars from traditional financial markets would be brought on-chain, allowing anyone to trade freely, use them as collateral for loans, and perform combinations and innovations within DeFi that are difficult to achieve in the traditional financial system.

However, the reality is that beneath the surface prosperity, most tokenized assets operate in extremely fragile, illiquid markets that simply cannot support meaningful capital scales. The "liquidity" that is a prerequisite for financial composability and practical utility has not truly materialized. These issues are not noticeable in small transactions, but once capital attempts to move at scale, the hidden costs and risks quickly become apparent.

The Current Liquidity Reality

The first hidden cost of tokenized assets is reflected in slippage.

Taking tokenized gold as an example, the chart below compares the expected slippage for different trade sizes between major centralized exchanges and the traditional gold market. The difference is striking.

PAXG / XAUT Perps & Spot vs CME Deliverable Gold Futures: Trade Size vs Slippage

As trade size increases, the slippage for PAXG and XAUT perpetual contracts rises rapidly and exponentially. At a nominal trade size of approximately $4 million, slippage approaches 150 basis points. In contrast, the CME's slippage curve is almost flush with the horizontal axis, barely noticeable.

At the spot market level, the liquidity constraints for PAXG and XAUT are even more apparent. Even when selecting their respective most liquid spot trading venues, the effective depth provided by their order books on either the buy or sell side is less than $3 million. This liquidity ceiling is directly reflected in the curve "cutting off" prematurely at smaller trade sizes.

The right side separately shows the CME's slippage curve. Its nearly flat shape直观地反映了传统市场的深度优势。即便交易规模远超 400 万美元,预期滑点依然保持高度稳定。一笔 2000 万美元规模的黄金期货交易,价格冲击甚至不足 3 个基点。从量级上看,CME 的流动性深度,远非加密市场中任何同类产品可比。

This difference has direct consequences. In deep traditional markets, even large trades have a negligible price impact;而在代币化资产的浅薄市场中,同样的操作会立刻产生可观成本,且平仓难度会随着规模迅速上升。The daily average volume comparison below clearly shows this gap, and this issue is not unique to the gold market; it applies to other assets as well.

CME Gold Futures vs PAXG / XAUT Perps & Spot: Daily Average Volume Comparison

The above discussion mainly focuses on CEXs. So, what about AMM DEXs? The answer is恰恰相反, it only gets worse.

For example, in a XAUT transaction in February 2025, a user spent 2,912 USDT but only received XAUT worth approximately $1,731 at the real gold price at the time, effectively paying a premium of up to 68% for this trade.

In another transaction, a user exchanged PAXG worth approximately $1.107 million (at the then gold price) for 1.093 million USDT, with a slippage of about 1.3%. Although the slippage is not as extreme as the former, it is still unacceptably high when price impact in traditional markets is typically measured in single-digit basis points.

Furthermore, over the past six months or so, the average slippage for XAUT and PAXG on Uniswap has consistently remained in the range of 25–35 basis points, and even exceeded 50 basis points during certain periods.

Average Absolute Slippage for XAUT & PAXG on Uniswap V3

This article uses gold as the primary analysis object because it is currently the largest non-dollar, non-credit tokenized asset on-chain. But the same problems appear in the tokenized stock market as well.

NVDAx / TSLAx / SPYx vs Nasdaq NVDA / TSLA / SPY: Trade Size vs Slippage

TSLAx and NVDAx are among the top tokenized stocks by market cap. On Jupiter, a $1 million TSLAx trade has a slippage of about 5%; while NVDAx's slippage is as high as 80%,几乎失去可交易性. In contrast, in traditional markets, a trade of equivalent size in Tesla or Nvidia stock has a price impact of only 18 basis points and 14 basis points respectively (and this doesn't even include off-exchange liquidity like dark pools).

These costs are easy to ignore in small trades, but once the trade size increases, they become unavoidable. Insufficient liquidity translates directly into real losses.

Why Are Tokenized Markets More Dangerous?

The problems caused by insufficient liquidity are not limited to transaction costs; they also directly disrupt the market structure itself.

When market liquidity is thin, the price discovery mechanism becomes fragile, order book noise increases significantly, and oracle data sources are affected by this noise. In highly interconnected systems, even极小规模的交易 can trigger huge chain reactions.

In mid-October 2025, PAXG on the Binance spot market experienced two noticeable "anomalous" events within a week. On October 10th, the price dropped 10.6%; on October 16th, the price surged 9.7%. Both fluctuations quickly returned to their original positions, almost certainly not caused by fundamental changes, but rather a direct manifestation of order book fragility.

Because the tokenized asset ecosystem is highly interconnected, this instability is not confined to a single exchange. Binance spot holds the highest weight in Hyperliquid's oracle construction. Therefore, during these two anomalous fluctuations, $6.84 million in long positions and $2.37 million in short positions were liquidated on Hyperliquid—a liquidation规模甚至超过了 Binance 自身.

This result is concerning. It shows that a single illiquid market is enough to amplify and propagate volatility across multiple trading venues. In extreme cases, this structure could even increase the risk of oracle manipulation. Even traders who never participated in the original spot market could passively suffer losses due to liquidations, price distortions, and widening spreads.

Ultimately, all these problems stem from the same fact: the primary market lacks real, scalable liquidity.

PAXG Liquidation Chart on Coinglass

Insufficient Liquidity is a Structural Problem

The lack of liquidity for tokenized assets is a structural problem.

Liquidity does not automatically appear just because an asset is tokenized. It relies on the continuous supply from market makers, who themselves are subject to strict capital constraints. They allocate capital to markets where inventory can be turned over efficiently, risks can be continuously hedged, and positions can be exited with minimal time and cost friction.

And most tokenized assets恰恰在这些关键维度上难以满足要求.

First, for market makers to provide liquidity, they must first complete the asset minting process. But in reality, minting itself comes with explicit costs. Issuers typically charge minting and redemption fees ranging from 10–50 basis points;同时, the minting process often involves operational coordination, KYC checks, and settlement through custodians or brokers, rather than direct on-chain execution. Market makers need to advance funds and wait for several hours or even days to actually receive the tokenized asset.

Second, even once inventory is generated, it cannot be redeemed instantly. The redemption cycle for most tokenized assets is measured in "hours or days," not seconds. Common redemption rules are T+1 to T+5, accompanied by daily or weekly quota limits. For larger positions, a complete exit often takes several days or even longer.

From a market maker's perspective, this type of inventory is largely equivalent to "low-liquidity assets" that cannot be quickly recovered and redeployed.

To maintain market depth, market makers must hold inventory over a longer周期, continuously bearing price volatility risk and hedging, while waiting for redemption to complete. During this time, the same capital could have been deployed to other crypto markets—where inventory is hardly needed, hedging is continuous, and positions can be closed at any time. Precisely because of this, this opportunity cost is particularly high in the crypto market.

Faced with this trade-off, rational liquidity providers naturally choose to allocate capital to other markets.

The existing market structure is also insufficient to solve this problem. AMMs transfer inventory risk to liquidity providers but do not eliminate redemption constraints; while order book-based trading venues fragment market maker liquidity across multiple exchanges, further weakening overall depth.

The end result is persistently insufficient liquidity, creating a vicious cycle. Insufficient liquidity dampens participation willingness, and lack of participation in turn further削弱流动性. The entire tokenized asset ecosystem is thus trapped in this cycle.

A New Market Structure

Insufficient liquidity is a structural obstacle restricting the scaled development of tokenized assets.

Shallow market depth cannot support practically meaningful position sizes, and the fragile market structure amplifies and transmits local volatility to different protocols and trading venues. Assets that cannot be exited smoothly under predictable conditions自然也难以作为可信的抵押品. Under the current mainstream tokenization model, liquidity is chronically constrained, and capital efficiency remains low.

For tokenized assets to truly become usable at scale, the market structure itself must change.

What if the price discovery and liquidity supply for assets could be directly mapped from off-chain markets, rather than being rediscovered and cold-started on-chain? What if users could acquire tokenized assets at any trade size without forcing market makers to hold low-liquidity inventory long-term? What if the redemption mechanism was fast enough, with clear paths and no restrictions?

Asset tokenization has not failed due to the technical path of "putting assets on-chain".

Where it truly fails is that—the market structure supporting these assets was never truly built.

Пов'язані питання

QWhat is the main issue highlighted in the article regarding tokenized assets?

AThe main issue is the severe lack of liquidity in tokenized asset markets, which leads to high slippage, fragile market structure, and an inability to support meaningful capital deployment.

QHow does the slippage for large trades in tokenized gold (like PAXG/XAUT) compare to traditional markets (like CME)?

AFor a trade of around $4 million, slippage for PAXG/XAUT perpetual contracts can be nearly 150 basis points, whereas for CME gold futures, a $20 million trade results in a price impact of less than 3 basis points, showing significantly better liquidity in traditional markets.

QWhat structural problem causes the liquidity shortage in tokenized asset markets?

AThe liquidity shortage is a structural problem caused by high minting/redemption fees, slow redemption cycles (T+1 to T+5), operational friction, and the inability for market makers to efficiently hedge and exit positions, making it unattractive for them to provide liquidity.

QWhat negative consequence can low liquidity in one market (like Binance spot for PAXG) have on the broader ecosystem?

ALow liquidity in one market can cause price anomalies that are propagated through interconnected systems via oracles, leading to unnecessary liquidations on other platforms (like Hyperliquid) and increasing the risk of oracle manipulation, even for traders not participating in the original market.

QAccording to the article, what must change for tokenized assets to achieve scalability and usability?

AThe market structure itself must change. Price discovery and liquidity should be sourced from off-chain markets rather than rebuilt on-chain, redemption mechanisms need to be fast and unrestricted, and the system should not force market makers to hold illiquid inventory, thereby improving capital efficiency.

Пов'язані матеріали

Agent Race Ends, Super Workbench Takes Over

The era of fragmented AI agents is ending. Over the past month, China's tech giants—Tencent, Alibaba, and ByteDance—have simultaneously shifted strategy: instead of launching new, standalone AI agents, they are consolidating their various agent projects into unified "super workbenches." Tencent integrated its QClaw teams into WorkBuddy, a strategic product hailed as a potential third flagship after QQ and WeChat. Alibaba is merging its QoderWork, Wukong, and MuleRun agents into a new "Qianwen Office" platform under DingTalk's leadership. ByteDance rebranded its TRAE SOLO coding agent to TRAE Work, signaling a broader focus on workflow collaboration. This convergence marks a pivotal industry consensus. The initial exploration phase, where companies rapidly built numerous overlapping agents for different scenarios, proved costly and inefficient. With open-source tools eroding technical barriers, competition has shifted from agent creation to resource consolidation and cost control. Historically, platform wars are won not by creating more products, but by simplifying them—as seen with browsers unifying web access and super-apps consolidating services. Now, the "super workbench" aims to become the unified AI entry point for work. This reflects a deeper market realization: the primary audience for AI is no longer just programmers (a market in the tens of millions) but all knowledge workers (a market of billions). The real opportunity lies in augmenting everyday tasks—managing emails, documents, data, and meetings—across the entire workday. The core battleground is becoming control over the primary AI entry point that employees use daily. Tencent's WorkBuddy leverages WeChat and Tencent Docs; Alibaba's Qianwen Office taps into DingTalk's organizational data; ByteDance's TRAE Work integrates with Feishu's workflows. Whoever owns this "super workbench" gains strategic control over orchestrating enterprise data and APIs. This shift is redefining enterprise software. Traditional SaaS applications, valued for their user interfaces, will recede into the background. Their core functionalities will be exposed as standardized "Skills" or APIs for the super workbench's agents to invoke. Software value will shift from selling user seats to charging based on API calls and outcomes delivered. The evolution of agents is moving through clear stages: first as novel standalone products, then as consolidated primary work entry points, and finally as pervasive, invisible capabilities embedded into the digital fabric. The recent moves by major tech firms signal the transition from the first stage into the second, accelerating toward the third. In the end, the most successful agent technology may become invisible—like electricity or the HTTP protocol—a fundamental, unnamed infrastructure powering work itself.

marsbit19 хв тому

Agent Race Ends, Super Workbench Takes Over

marsbit19 хв тому

Michael Saylor: 110 Reasons to Oppose BIP-110

Michael Saylor presents 110 arguments against Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) 110, a soft fork aimed at restricting certain non-monetary data storage uses (like inscriptions) on the Bitcoin blockchain. He acknowledges the proponents' valid concerns—such as node costs, fee pressure, and preserving Bitcoin's monetary focus—but fundamentally disagrees with the proposed solution. Saylor argues that BIP 110 represents a dangerous precedent of using consensus rules to enforce value judgments on transaction validity, moving away from Bitcoin's core principles of neutrality and permissionless innovation. His key objections are organized into eleven categories: 1) It violates neutrality and hard consensus by banning currently valid transactions. 2) It fails to meet the high burden of proof required for a consensus change, lacking concrete data on the alleged crisis. 3) Its seven bundled technical restrictions are overly broad, targeting generic script functionalities and blocking future upgrade paths. 4) It sacrifices compatibility and future optionality by closing off designed upgrade hooks. 5) Its temporary rules add significant complexity (grandfathering, expiry states) without sufficient justification. 6) The economic and security impacts, particularly on miner revenue and fee markets, are uncertain and unmodeled. 7) Superior, market-based tools (fee markets, relay/mining policies) already exist to manage blockchain load. 8) It stifles innovation by creating a chilling effect for developers. 9) Its modified activation mechanism (55% threshold, forced signaling) is aggressive and risks network splits. 10) The precedent it sets—using consensus to suppress disliked but legal uses—is more dangerous than the problem it aims to solve. 11) A better path exists: improving measurements, refining resource-based policies, and allowing market forces to work. Saylor concludes that Bitcoin's strength lies in its neutral rules, open markets, and hard consensus. Changing these foundational elements to target specific use cases is an unnecessary and risky "iatrogenic" intervention. He advocates for guarding Bitcoin's neutrality rather than acting as its redeemer.

marsbit34 хв тому

Michael Saylor: 110 Reasons to Oppose BIP-110

marsbit34 хв тому

Торгівля

Спот
活动图片