Non-Dollar Stablecoins Are Winning the Wrong Battle

marsbitОпубліковано о 2026-04-09Востаннє оновлено о 2026-04-09

Анотація

The article argues that non-USD stablecoins (euros, local currencies) create a misleading impression of challenging dollar dominance by merely changing the currency label, without altering the underlying monetary power structure. True monetary sovereignty is analyzed through three layers: 1. **Pricing Layer (most visible):** The currency unit used for pricing. Non-USD stablecoins win here, but this is a superficial, low-cost change—like changing a shop's sign without changing its ownership. 2. **Settlement Layer (most valuable):** The actual infrastructure (banking, payments, compliance, liquidity networks) through which money moves. This "plumbing" is controlled by existing players. Changing the currency flowing through these pipes doesn't change who owns them. 3. **Freeze Layer (most powerful):** The ultimate authority to freeze, blacklist, or halt transactions. This final control often remains with external entities enforcing KYC/AML and sanctions. The case of Argentina's $LIBRA token scandal is used to illustrate that such initiatives are often not genuine innovation but a symptom of a failing local currency. When a national currency loses its pricing power and trust (e.g., due to hyperinflation), external digital credit (like dollar-based or crypto narratives) rushes in to fill the void. The dependency merely shifts from traditional dollar systems to on-chain dollar networks; the underlying power dynamics remain. The conclusion is that non-USD stablecoins are expan...

The easiest illusion non-dollar stablecoins create is that once the word "dollar" is no longer on the coin, the monetary order begins to loosen.

Whether it's a euro stablecoin or a local currency stablecoin, on the surface, they all seem to be pushing towards "de-dollarization".

But scrubbing the word "dollar" off the label is not the same as dismantling the dollar order from the system.

It's like changing the house number plate; it doesn't mean the landlord has changed.

Changing the car body doesn't mean the engine has changed.

What many non-dollar stablecoins have achieved is precisely this: the currency type has changed, but the pipeline hasn't, the valves haven't, and the master switch hasn't either.

So this issue shouldn't be looked at solely based on which currency it's pegged to.

What we really should look at are three layers:

  • Pricing Layer: Which currency is used for pricing

  • Settlement Layer: Which path the money actually takes

  • Freeze Layer: Who can stop this money

Monetary sovereignty is not just a word.

It's more like a building.

Just because you've taken back the first floor doesn't mean you've got the whole building back.


I. The Pricing Layer is the Most Visible, and the Most Overestimated

The market always sees the pricing layer first.

When a euro stablecoin emerges, the first reaction is: finally, it's not the dollar.

When a local currency stablecoin emerges, the first reaction is: the national currency is now on-chain.

This layer is the easiest to see, so it's also the most容易被误判 (easily mistaken) as "structural change has already occurred".

But the pricing layer is essentially more like a signboard.

It answers "what is this shop called", not "who owns this shop".

You can label goods in euros, you can package assets as local currency, you can change the unit on the payment interface from USD to EUR, KRW, ARS.

But as long as the network keeping the books behind it, the channels for flow, and the final authority for execution remain in others' hands, this change is merely a cosmetic one, not a power shift.

Therefore, the easiest layer for non-dollar stablecoins to win is precisely the most superficial one.

Because this layer is the cheapest, the easiest to create the effect that "things are already different".


II. What's Truly Valuable Isn't the Currency Type, It's the Settlement Layer

The payments industry looks at stablecoins from a different perspective than the crypto circle.

The crypto circle looks first at issuance volume, circulation, narrative, and market cap.

The payments industry looks first at something more mundane, and more critical: whose path does the money ultimately take.

Because coins can be issued quickly, but networks don't automatically grow.

For money to truly enter the real world, it needs to connect to so many things behind it:

  • Bank deposits and withdrawals (on/off ramps)

  • Wallets and custody

  • Merchant acceptance

  • Payment routing

  • Cross-border settlement

  • Compliance and transparency

  • Dispute resolution

  • Freeze and execution capabilities

These things put together are called a network.

The network is the plumbing.

The currency type is just the water flowing inside.

Today it flows dollar stablecoins, tomorrow euro stablecoins, the day after local currency stablecoins.

For the players who truly occupy the settlement layer, the taste of the water isn't that important; what matters is, who owns the pipes.

This is also why many people think stablecoins are冲击 (impacting/shocking) traditional payment networks, but what is more commonly seen in reality is traditional payment networks absorbing stablecoins.

They don't need to win the debate about "which currency is more advanced" first.

They just need to hold the settlement layer.

Because whoever holds the settlement layer holds the cash flow, the access rights, and also the pricing power.


III. The Freeze Layer is the Deepest Hand

If the pricing layer is the signboard, and the settlement layer is the plumbing, then the freeze layer is the master valve.

Normally it's not conspicuous.

When something really goes wrong, everyone will find that what is ultimately valuable is not "which currency you are using", but "who can make you stop immediately".

Can the address be frozen.

Can the asset be blacklisted.

Can the transfer be intercepted.

Can the contract execute a freeze or burn.

This layer determines not circulation efficiency, but the ultimate relationship of obedience.

Therefore, monetary sovereignty cannot be determined just by asking "which country's currency is this".

You must also ask:

  • In which system does the money flow?

  • Who can change its path?

  • Who can press the pause button?

The first two questions determine economic利益 (interests/benefits).

The last question determines power boundaries.


IV. What Exactly Happened in Argentina

The Argentina incident cannot be glossed over with a vague phrase like "the president supports crypto".

More accurately, in February 2025, Argentine President Javier Milei publicly mentioned and promoted a token called $LIBRA on X, saying it could finance small businesses and startup projects in Argentina. Subsequently, the price of $LIBRA surged in a very short time, approaching $5 at one point, before rapidly crashing below $1. Milei later deleted the post, denying any formal association with the project. The Argentine opposition then pushed for political accountability, and a federal judge介入介入 (intervened/initiated an investigation).

An even harder-to-understand layer of this incident was the on-chain fund flow.

Reuters cited on-chain research indicating that multiple wallets associated with the project's creators withdrew approximately $99 million worth of crypto assets from the $LIBRA market. This is also why the incident quickly turned from "the president endorsing a new project" to "涉嫌 (suspected of) rug pull and judicial investigation".

But what is truly worth writing about Argentina is not just the scandal itself.

The key lies in: why this narrative found a market in Argentina.

Because Argentina's problem was never the sudden emergence of an on-chain project.

The real underlying problem is that the local currency failed first.

Long-term high inflation, distorted price systems, and the repeated erosion of residents' purchasing power have already created a strong survival habit in Argentine society: don't hold onto pesos for long, try to base price judgments on more stable external anchors. A 2026 Reuters report on disputes over Argentina's inflation data also mentioned that public anxiety about prices and purchasing power has always been strong in Argentina. The external controversy over the credibility of inflation statistics essentially reflects long-term social unease about monetary信用 (credit/trust).

Therefore, what the $LIBRA incident truly exposed is not "Argentina is starting to embrace crypto innovation".

But a more real fact:

When the local currency first loses some of its pricing power in real transactions, external credit will seize the opportunity to fill the void.

First, dollar thinking enters daily pricing.

Then, external assets become a store of value anchor.

Later, narratives of on-chain dollars, on-chain financing, and on-chain liquidity are packaged as a "rescue solution".

What you see at this point,表面上 (superficially) looks like financial innovation.

但从底层看 (But from the bottom layer), it's actually a sovereign gap being filled by external substitutes.

So Argentina is not on the offensive.

It's more like discussing whether to use an iron bucket or a plastic bucket after the roof has already started leaking.

The buckets are certainly different.

But the real leak isn't in the bucket.


V. Why Argentina Isn't "Entering the Crypto Game", But Moving the Sovereign Gap On-Chain

Using the three-layer framework, things become very clear.

First Layer: The Pricing Layer Loosened First

When residents, merchants, and enterprises increasingly get used to using external currencies as a price ruler, the local currency is no longer firmly seated in the pricing seat.

This step is the most important.

Because the first thing a currency often loses is not its circulation资格 (qualification), but its pricing资格 (qualification).

The local currency is still spent.

But people no longer use it to think about value.

It's like the nominal boss is still sitting in the office, but the real decision-maker has become someone else.

Second Layer: The Settlement Layer Begins to Shift Outward

If more and more transactions, store-of-value narratives, and financing narratives subsequently need to be completed through on-chain dollar assets, external wallets, and external liquidity networks, then the fund paths also move out.

Previously, it relied on the dollar banking system.

Now it relies on the on-chain dollar network.

The interface has changed, the dependency has not.

Third Layer: The Freeze Layer is Still Not in Domestic Hands

As long as you need to access mainstream markets, compliant institutions, and cross-border liquidity, you cannot avoid KYC, AML, sanctions lists, and freezing capabilities.

In other words, the final hand is still outside.

Therefore, the truly worth-writing line about the Argentina incident is not "the country is starting to接触 (engage with) on-chain assets".

But rather:

The local currency was breached first, and external credit came in to fill the gap in a more digital, more liquid, and harder-to-reverse form.

It was outsourcing in bank accounts before.

Now it's outsourcing in wallet addresses.


VI. This is Also the Deepest Misjudgment of Non-Dollar Stablecoins

Many people, upon seeing "not the dollar", automatically equate it with "de-dollarizing the order".

This jump is too quick.

Because what non-dollar stablecoins often achieve is just:

  • Removing the dollar label

  • Putting the local currency symbol on it

  • Making the market feel that "the power structure has already changed"

But if it runs on existing public chain infrastructure, connects to existing global liquidity networks, and submits to existing freezing and compliance frameworks, then what it achieves is more like:

Putting a new dashboard on an old machine.

You see euros, new dollars, local currencies.

What's really operating is likely still the original engine.

So non-dollar stablecoins are not meaningless.

Their significance lies in making monetary expression more diverse.

But "more diverse expression" does not equal "redistribution of power".


VII. The Real Choice Countries Face is Not Whether to Go On-Chain, But Whether They Dare to Take Back the Two Most Expensive Layers

The difficulty of this matter has never been in issuing a coin.

Issuing a coin is too easy.

The name, pegged asset, narrative you want can all be designed.

The hardest part is the two layers behind.

If you only want to take back the pricing layer, the cost is lowest.

Create a local currency stablecoin, let the market see "our currency is also on-chain".

This is more like hanging your own flag in чужой (someone else's/chuzhoy - foreign) system.

If you want to take the settlement layer back too, things immediately become an infrastructure war.

Because the settlement layer is not a token, not a whitepaper, not a smart contract.

It's an entire network.

You have to lay your own roads, connect banks, connect merchants, connect wallets, connect liquidity, connect regulation, connect legal certainty.

This isn't making a product.

This is building plumbing.

If you want to take the freeze layer along with it, it's even more expensive.

Because this is no longer just a payments issue, but an international financial power issue.

So the real question is not "do you support blockchain".

But rather:

How many layers do you actually want to take back?

How much political cost, economic cost, and network cost are you willing to pay for these layers?

The pricing layer is the cheapest.

The settlement layer is the most valuable.

The freeze layer is the most sensitive.

The deeper you go, the more expensive it gets.


VIII. Conclusion: Non-Dollar Stablecoins Aren't Losing, They're Just Winning in the Least Decisive Place

Non-dollar stablecoins are not without progress.

Of course they have progress.

They at least let the market see more clearly, for the first time, that money is not a monolithic thing, but something built layer by layer:

  • Outside is pricing

  • In the middle is settlement

  • Deep inside is freezing

But precisely because this is看清 (seen clearly), we should all the more acknowledge its current boundaries.

What they often win first is the most visible layer.

What they find hardest to touch is precisely the two most valuable layers.

So a more accurate judgment is not:

"Non-dollar stablecoins are rewriting the monetary order."

But rather:

Non-dollar stablecoins are expanding monetary expression, but have not yet truly rewritten monetary power.

In the end, judging the monetary order boils down to two things:

Whose path does the money actually take.

Who does it ultimately obey.

As long as these two things remain unchanged, so-called de-dollarization has not hit the deepest level.

The easiest illusion non-dollar stablecoins create is making people think that changing the unit of account equals changing the monetary order. What is truly valuable has never been the house number plate, but the plumbing and the master valve.

Пов'язані питання

QWhat are the three layers of monetary sovereignty as described in the article, and which one is the most superficial?

AThe three layers are the pricing layer (most superficial), the clearing layer, and the freezing layer.

QAccording to the article, what is the clearing layer more valuable than the currency denomination (pricing layer)?

AThe clearing layer is more valuable because it consists of the entire network infrastructure—banking channels, wallets, merchant acceptance, payment routing, and compliance—that determines where the money actually flows and who controls the cash flow and access rights.

QWhat does the article argue is the real significance of the Argentine $LIBRA incident, beyond being a scandal?

AThe real significance is that it exposed how a sovereign currency (the Argentine peso) first lost its pricing power due to high inflation and instability, creating a vacuum that was then filled by external digital credit and narratives, moving the country's monetary dependency onto the blockchain.

QWhat is the deepest misjudgment that non-USD stablecoins often make, as per the article?

AThe deepest misjudgment is equating a change in currency denomination (e.g., from USD to EUR or a local currency) with a change in the underlying monetary power structure, when in reality the clearing and freezing layers—the plumbing and the switch—often remain controlled by existing dollar-dominated systems.

QWhat is the ultimate question the article suggests countries must ask themselves regarding blockchain and currency sovereignty?

AThe ultimate question is not whether to adopt blockchain, but how many layers of monetary sovereignty they want to reclaim—the pricing, clearing, or freezing layer—and what political, economic, and network costs they are willing to bear to do so.

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