The construction of an isolated Runet demonstrates another measurable result: the share of user sessions in mobile networks that passed without restrictions in the Central Federal District in July 2026 averaged only 30.5% — the remaining over 60% of connections passed only through the Ministry of Digital Development's "white list," which includes permitted domestic sites and services. The data from the company Vigo is based on the analysis of about 1 billion user sessions. Since January, the share of connections in "white list" mode in Central Russia has grown on average by 31% — the project is gaining momentum faster than the number of permitted services in the list itself is growing.
The regional picture shows that the plan is being implemented unevenly but consistently. As of July 31, about 49% of sessions in Moscow and the Moscow Region passed without restrictions, while another 51% went via the "white list." In St. Petersburg, the share of free connections was 43.9%, and in the Leningrad Region — 58.9%. The isolation has advanced the furthest in the border regions:
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in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod Regions, on average only 12% of sessions pass without restrictions;
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in other border regions, about 90% of connections go exclusively via the "white list";
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restrictions are introduced pointwise — when security threats arise in a specific region.
The Ministry of Digital Development previously emphasized that the "white list" regime applies only to mobile internet and does not affect home wired networks.
Help comes from outside as well: international certification centers wind down work with Russian domains
The isolation of the Russian segment of the network is being helped not only by internal restrictions but also by decisions of foreign infrastructure operators, which effectively act in the same direction. On June 13, the international certification authority GlobalSign began the forced revocation of some previously issued TLS certificates for Russian companies. The reason is updated requirements from the CA/Browser Forum consortium, which came into force on May 4 and imply compliance with international sanctions restrictions. This was reported by Dmitry Ryzhikov, General Director of the Russian legal entity "GM-O Global Sign Rus".
The revocation is proceeding in stages and has already affected a noticeable part of the Runet. According to estimates, approximately 15–20 thousand second-level domains are potentially affected. During the second wave, which started on June 18, about 310 domain names from 44 companies and structures were revoked, including resources of Rosneft, Gazprombank, Alrosa, and VEB. At the same time, according to statements from the Ministry of Digital Development, GlobalSign's share in the Runet does not exceed 5% — meaning the measure itself is not critical but fits organically into the general trend of separating the Russian segment of the network from the global infrastructure.
The state hedges its bets from within
While external operators are reducing their presence in Russia, the authorities have taken care in advance so that isolation does not affect functions critical for citizens. Back in early June, following an April meeting with Government members, Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the Cabinet of Ministers together with the FSB to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the most important services — medical care systems, the "Gosuslugi" portal, and payment systems — as well as citizens' access to them during periods of restricted Internet operation. The responsibility for execution is assigned to Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov.
In case of certificate revocations, the Ministry of Digital Development has also prepared a technical replacement: the agency recommends switching to certificates from the National Certification Center. Russian browsers support them by default, while for some other devices, the root certificate will need to be installed separately — it can be obtained on the Gosuslugi portal.
Thus, the reduction in the share of free mobile access within the country and the reduction of work by foreign certification centers with Russian domains are moving in the same direction — even though they were initiated independently of each other. For ordinary users, the result is the same: dependence on "white lists" and national certificates when working in mobile networks is growing, especially in border regions, where the share of free access has already dropped to single-digit percentages.
AI Opinion
From the point of view of machine data analysis, the current scheme with the National Certification Center resembles the Kazakh experiment of 2019, when the authorities tried to impose a state certificate on users for intercepting HTTPS traffic, and then browsers Chrome and Firefox blocked such a certificate as a security threat. Participants in the Russian market as early as 2022 warned that foreign browsers could refuse to trust domestic certificates, even if formally issued by a legitimate structure. This creates a fork: domestic browsers will accept the replacement without problems, but the fate of access through foreign applications remains open.
The technical risk here is not only in domain blocking but also in trust: if major vendors repeat the Kazakhstan precedent, users of the mobile segment will have to choose between a foreign browser without access to some resources and domestic software with full trust in state certificates. Whether this choice will remain truly voluntary or will eventually turn into a technical given remains an open question.
