The United States is preparing to demand that European and other partners abandon Chinese artificial intelligence initiatives under threat of exclusion from the Pax Silica coalition, according to an internal State Department letter draft reported by Reuters. The document is addressed to the 35 signatories of the ‘AI Opportunity Statement’ from June 2026, a significant portion of which are European states. Countries that join the competing Beijing-led structure risk losing access to the Washington-led initiative.
The letter draft clearly outlines the American position: membership in Pax Silica cannot coexist with participation in overlapping projects whose expectations contradict the alliance's goals. Signing the declaration is interpreted not as a formal membership card, but as a firm commitment that excludes dual loyalty. Although China is not directly mentioned in the text, the document's context unequivocally points to Beijing. The State Department declined to comment on the leaked document, but its very existence confirms the intensification of geopolitical competition in the technology sphere.
Dominance Strategy and Europe's Choice
Pax Silica represents a US strategy for hegemony in AI and semiconductors, launched by the US State Department in December 2025. This initiative covers critical minerals, energy, advanced manufacturing, and artificial intelligence infrastructure, focusing efforts on reducing so-called forced dependencies. The program is conceived as a comprehensive tool for preserving technological leadership.
European presence in the alliance expanded significantly in June 2026 when the European Union, Germany, Greece, and the Netherlands joined. This event marked an important stage in the consolidation of the Western bloc. Prior to this, Finland and Sweden were already members in an individual capacity. The official list of declaration signatories also includes Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, India, Kazakhstan, and a number of other countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.
Now these states face a difficult choice. Washington's ultimatum presents them with a dilemma: maintain integration into the Western technological ecosystem or support alternative cooperation formats. For European countries, this is a particularly sensitive issue, given their desire for strategic autonomy and simultaneous dependence on American technologies and security markets. Refusing to participate in Chinese projects could limit opportunities for diversifying supply chains and accessing innovations from Asia.
Alternative Architecture for Global Governance
Parallel to the formation of the Western bloc, a competing international structure is taking shape. In July 2026, China, Russia, and 27 other countries established the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) with its headquarters in Shanghai. The agreement was signed by 29 states, positioning the new organization as an independent intergovernmental platform.
WAICO declares its goal as promoting international cooperation and global AI governance based on the principles of the UN Charter. The organization's creation became a direct response to attempts by individual countries to establish monopoly rules of the game in the digital sphere. The existence of two parallel institutional frameworks creates risks of fragmentation in the global technological space. Developers and regulators may face the need to comply with two different sets of standards and requirements, complicating cross-border interaction.
The US demand to choose one side could accelerate this process of division. Global South countries, many of which maintain pragmatic relations with both Washington and Beijing, may come under pressure. Exclusion from Pax Silica for participating in WAICO would deprive them of access to advanced American developments and investments. On the other hand, refusing cooperation with China would close access to the world's largest market and electronics manufacturing capacities.
Consequences of a Bipolar Model
The formation of rigid blocs is changing the landscape of international technology and component trading. Companies will be forced to adapt their strategies to political realities, dividing value chains into friendly and unfriendly segments. This leads to increased costs and reduced efficiency of the global innovation system. Deviation from the course set by leading powers will be punished with economic and technological sanctions.
For the AI industry, such polarization means the end of the era of open globalization. Research and development will increasingly be conducted in closed loops, and the exchange of knowledge will be limited to the framework of political alliances. Standards, protocols, and technical solutions may become incompatible, creating barriers to system interoperability. Market participants must consider these structural shifts when planning long-term investments and partnerships.
The current situation demonstrates a transition from market competition to geopolitical confrontation, where technology is the primary tool of influence. The decision of European and other partners regarding participation in WAICO or Pax Silica will determine the configuration of the global digital economy for decades to come. The actual significance of these diplomatic maneuvers extends far beyond bureaucratic procedures, shaping a new reality in which technological sovereignty becomes more important than economic efficiency.
AI Opinion
From the perspective of machine data analysis, the current ultimatum resembles Cold War practices: the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) coordinated restrictions on technology transfers to Eastern Bloc countries for forty-five years. This mechanism created a similar dilemma for allies: a rigid attachment to one technological camp limited trade opportunities, but a complete rupture of ties between the blocs never occurred due to the economic interests of the participants.
The historical parallel points to a risk the article does not address: rigid technological barriers often push the excluded side towards circumvention schemes, parallel imports, and accelerated development of their own alternatives, rather than capitulation—this is precisely how the USSR learned to bypass export bans in its time. Will the new restrictions avoid the same fate, or will the technological split merely accelerate the formation of two parallel AI ecosystems, incompatible with each other at the level of standards?
