WEMIX afirma que el atacante movió alrededor de 724.000 dólares tras violación del contrato

cointelegraph2026-07-27 tarihinde yayınlandı2026-07-27 tarihinde güncellendi

Özet

La red de blockchain de capa 1 WEMIX informó que un atacante movió aproximadamente 724.000 dólares en tokens USDC.e tras comprometer la propiedad de un contrato vinculado a su stablecoin WEMIX$ y emitir tokens sin autorización. Las transacciones anómalas ocurrieron el domingo a las 9:17 UTC. El atacante emitió unos 5,23 millones de WEMIX$, que fueron convertidos en 30.736 WEMIX y 724.198,27 USDC.e. Los USDC.e fueron luego transferidos a Ethereum y BNB Smart Chain antes de ser intercambiados por activos como Ether y USDT de Tether, distribuyéndose en múltiples direcciones. WEMIX indicó que parte de los fondos fueron depositados en exchanges centralizados. La empresa identificó las billeteras del atacante y solicitó congelaciones de activos y asistencia a los exchanges y emisores de stablecoins, añadiendo que algunas plataformas ya congelaron direcciones vinculadas al incidente. La compañía suspendió temporalmente todos los puentes conectados a su red de capa 1, WEMIX3.0, incluyendo Chainlink CCIP y PLAY Bridge. También suspendió el trading en los grupos de liquidez afectados, retiró la liquidez proporcionada por la fundación y pausó servicios como el Módulo WEMIX$ y el exchange descentralizado PNIX. WEMIX señaló que la causa y el impacto total siguen bajo investigación y advirtió que las cifras preliminares podrían cambiar.

La red de blockchain de capa 1 WEMIX declaró que un atacante movió alrededor de 724,000 en tokens USDC.e después de comprometer la propiedad de un contrato vinculado a su stablecoin WEMIX$ y emitir tokens sin autorización.

Las transacciones anormales ocurrieron el domingo a las 9:17 UTC, según una actualización preliminar del incidente de WEMIX. El atacante emitió aproximadamente 5.23 millones de WEMIX$, que se convirtieron en 30,736 WEMIX y 724,198.27 USDC.e. Posteriormente, el USDC.e se transfirió a Ethereum y BNB Smart Chain a través de un puente (bridging) antes de ser intercambiado por activos que incluyen Ether y USDT de Tether, y distribuido a través de múltiples direcciones.

WEMIX afirmó que parte de los fondos fueron depositados en exchanges centralizados. La empresa identificó las wallets del atacante y solicitó congelaciones de activos y asistencia a los exchanges y emisores de stablecoins, añadiendo que algunos exchanges ya habían congelado direcciones vinculadas al incidente.

La compañía suspendió temporalmente todos los puentes conectados a su red de capa 1, WEMIX3.0, incluyendo Chainlink CCIP y el PLAY Bridge. También suspendió las operaciones en los pools de liquidez afectados, retiró la liquidez proporcionada por la fundación, y pausó servicios que incluyen el Módulo WEMIX$ y el exchange descentralizado PNIX.

WEMIX dijo que la causa y el impacto total siguen bajo investigación y advirtió que las cifras preliminares podrían cambiar.

Cointelegraph contactó a WEMIX para obtener información adicional pero no recibió una respuesta inmediata.

Relacionado: El TVL de DeFi cae un 39% en 2026 en medio de la caída del mercado y actividad récord de hackeos


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İlgili Sorular

Q¿Qué sucedió con la red blockchain WEMIX según el artículo?

AUn atacante movió aproximadamente 724.000 USDC.e comprometiendo la propiedad de un contrato vinculado a su stablecoin WEMIX$ y emitiendo tokens sin autorización.

Q¿Cuándo ocurrieron las transacciones anormales y qué cantidad de WEMIX$ se emitió ilegalmente?

ALas transacciones anormales ocurrieron el domingo a las 9:17 UTC. El atacante emitió aproximadamente 5,23 millones de WEMIX$.

Q¿Qué acciones tomó WEMIX en respuesta al ataque?

AWEMIX suspendió temporalmente todos los puentes conectados a su red, detuvo el comercio en los fondos de liquidez afectados, retiró la liquidez proporcionada por la fundación, pausó servicios como el Módulo WEMIX$ e identificó las billeteras del atacante para solicitar congelamientos de activos a los exchanges.

Q¿Qué sucedió con los fondos robados en USDC.e?

ALos 724.198,27 USDC.e robados fueron puenteados a Ethereum y BNB Smart Chain, luego intercambiados por activos como Ether y USDT, y distribuidos a múltiples direcciones. Parte de los fondos se depositaron en exchanges centralizados.

Q¿Qué información se desconoce aún sobre el incidente según WEMIX?

AWEMIX indicó que la causa y el impacto completo del incidente aún están bajo investigación, y advirtió que las cifras preliminares podrían cambiar.

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