If Tencent stopped procuring tomorrow, how much would Suiyuan be worth?
This is the question that runs through Suiyuan's IPO prospectus, unspoken by anyone, yet ever-present.
In 2025, 74.9% of Suiyuan's 9.9 billion yuan in revenue came from Tencent.
By another statistical measure, that figure even exceeds 80%.
In other words, for this soon-to-list AI chip star company on the STAR Market, nearly 8 out of every 10 yuan earned comes from the same customer.
On the 15th, news came from the Shanghai Stock Exchange that Suiyuan Technology's IPO application for the STAR Market was officially approved by the listing committee. This means it has successfully submitted its paper, completing the final encirclement of the domestic GPU "Four Little Dragons" in the capital market.
Last December, Moore Thread and Muxi Stock successively made landings on the STAR Market, both having grown into behemoths close to 300 billion yuan in market value; this January, Biren Technology also successfully listed on the Hong Kong stock market.
Although Suiyuan arrived last, its successful passing signals an extremely clear migration trend in China's AI chip industry to the outside world: The computing power industry has completely bid farewell to PPT-style financing-driven models and has fully entered an extremely brutal cycle of order delivery.
I. Why Was Suiyuan the Latest?
Suiyuan may be the least startup-like company among the Four Little Dragons.
Moore Thread aimed at a general-purpose GPU route from the start, telling the story of a Chinese GeForce; Biren focused on high-performance training chips, taking a hardcore parameter route; Muxi pushed forward in the training card direction, emphasizing technological catch-up.
The rhythm of these three was to first charge into the capital market, first maximize valuation, first amplify the story.
Suiyuan took a somewhat different path. From its inception, it anchored itself to one thing: big customer delivery. It's not about telling stories first, it's about doing business first.
The data makes it clear.
Revenue of 3 billion yuan in 2023, 7.2 billion in 2024, 9.9 billion in 2025. A three-year compound annual growth rate of 81%. An even more astonishing explosion occurred in Q1 2026, with single-quarter revenue soaring to 2.87 billion yuan, a staggering year-on-year increase of 1474.85%. Revenue for the first half of 2026 is projected to directly skyrocket past 10.6 billion yuan, surpassing the total of the entire previous year in just six months.
This extremely abnormal steep growth rate is by no means a natural, evenly distributed industry bounty, but rather the concentrated, targeted release of computing power orders from a super-large customer.
Suiyuan has reaped the dividends of China's computing power construction cycle. It traded delivery capability for orders, orders for revenue, and revenue for the confidence to go public.
The fact that it is the latest to list itself illustrates a principle: in the AI chip industry, what matters now is not who lists first, but who has real revenue in hand.
II. The Industrial Truth Behind 83.79%
There is a conspicuous set of numbers in the prospectus. In 2025, sales revenue from Tencent accounted for 74.9% of Suiyuan's total. According to the response to the second round of inquiries (including the AVAP model), this figure is 83.79%.
Viewed superficially in terms of structure: excessively high customer concentration, related-party transactions, doomed if Tencent reduces procurement.
Correct. These are all facts.
But viewed from an industrial perspective, the more worthwhile question is: Under Nvidia's technological monopoly and the squeeze from domestic competitors, why is Tencent so determined to buy so much from Suiyuan?
You have to understand, for major manufacturers like Tencent and ByteDance, the procurement logic used to be simple: buy Nvidia if possible, never use domestic; buy from the first tier if possible, never compromise with the second tier.
But today, Tencent is starting to procure from Suiyuan on a large scale. In 2023, Tencent's procurement from Suiyuan was only 1 billion yuan; in 2024, it climbed to 2.7 billion; by 2025, it switched to large-scale direct sales, pulling orders up to 7.68 billion yuan in one go. In three years, it increased nearly eightfold.
Behind this is not Tencent suddenly becoming a philanthropist; it's that Tencent's computing power demand has grown too large to rely solely on Nvidia anymore.
Yuanbao, Hunyuan, WeChat AI, Enterprise WeChat, Tencent Meeting, CodeBuddy, WorkBuddy – all these products burn GPUs in the background. And it's continuous burning, burning more and more.
Tencent's Q1 2026 financial report shows that new AI products alone dragged down operating profit by approximately 8.8 billion yuan for the quarter; capital expenditure reached 31.9 billion yuan, a significant year-on-year increase, with management expecting full-year investment in new AI businesses to double.
Under this demand pressure, what Tencent needs is no longer just a more powerful card, but a controllable, stable computing power supply system that won't be choked by supply chain issues.
Especially since over 80% of Suiyuan Technology's accelerator card and module revenue currently comes from inference products, which are most urgently needed for large model deployment. What Suiyuan sells is never just silicon wafers; it's the sense of security urgently needed by Tencent's large models.
III. The Dual Identity of Shareholder and Customer
Many are accustomed to interpreting the 83.79% as a one-way, transfusion-like dependency. But looked at the other way, it's Tencent actively nurturing Suiyuan.
Why? Because Tencent clearly understands one thing: if domestic AI chip companies don't have enough orders, they will never grow up. Without production scale, there's no process iteration; without iteration, they'll never catch up to Nvidia.
Why is Nvidia strong? Not because it was strong from day one. It's because Microsoft, Meta, Amazon continuously gave orders, continuously provided scenarios, continuously gave feedback. It was nurtured by one big customer after another.
What Tencent is doing for Suiyuan today is essentially the same thing.
This strongly resembles when Apple, to combat industry monopoly, poured resources into supporting TSMC. The relationship between the two had long transcended ordinary buyer-seller contracts; it was about using definitive orders to help the supplier refine the underlying process to the extreme, then making it an irreplaceable part of my supply chain.
Tencent, through its technology affiliate and related parties, collectively holds 20.26% of Suiyuan's shares, firmly sitting as the largest shareholder, while also being the largest customer. The deep binding of shareholder + customer dual identity. This structure is seen as a related-party transaction risk in traditional PE eyes, but in industrial logic, this is supply chain cultivation.
Suiyuan's response in the first round of inquiries was blunt enough: Tencent lacks both the motivation and the practical conditions to replace the company's products on a large scale with other suppliers at this stage.
Simply put, Tencent has already deployed Suiyuan's chips into numerous real business scenarios, possibly including the inference clusters for the Hunyuan large model, the daily dialogues of Yuanbao, and Tencent Cloud's AI computing power services for enterprise customers.
To switch isn't just about swapping a card; it's about redoing the entire software stack, drivers, scheduling system. The cost is extremely high.
This also explains why, although a small number of domestic competitors have entered Tencent's supply chain, as Suiyuan itself acknowledged, Tencent's main procurement position is still reserved for it. What Tencent needs isn't to buy from multiple suppliers to diversify risk; it's to get one company to run through the entire process, then replicate it on a large scale.
At this moment, the 74.9% sales concentration transforms from a weakness into Suiyuan's ecosystem moat.
IV. The Ecosystem Fragmentation of the Third Tier in AI Chips
If you look at the AI chip industry today in isolation, the landscape is already very clear.
First Tier: Nvidia. The rule-maker. Global ecosystem, CUDA lock-in, dictates capacity.
Second Tier: Huawei Ascend. A national-level player. Own ecosystem, tied to operators and state-owned enterprises, not entirely market-driven.
Third Tier: Suiyuan, Moore Thread, Muxi, Biren. Commercial players, survive on market orders.
In the past, people thought these companies in the third tier were competitors, all making domestic GPUs, all competing for the same batch of customers.
But today, it looks more like another pattern: each is binding to different ecosystems.
Moore Thread takes the general-purpose GPU route, targeting inference and PC scenarios, with the broadest product line. Muxi focuses on the training scenario, competing head-to-head with Moore Thread. Biren went to Hong Kong, leaning towards high-performance training.
And Suiyuan? It's increasingly taking on one identity: the computing power foundation of the Tencent ecosystem.
This IPO aims to raise 6 billion yuan, with clear investment directions: R&D and industrialization of fifth-generation AI chips, R&D of sixth-generation AI chips, and advanced software-hardware collaborative innovation.
Note, it's not taking money to make general-purpose GPUs to grab the consumer market, but continuing to drill deeper down the line of cloud AI training and inference. The product roadmap and Tencent's demand roadmap are highly aligned, clearly not a coincidence, but the result of co-design.
Suiyuan's shareholder list is also worth a glance. National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund Phase II, Tencent, Summitview Capital, Shanghai Guofang, Shanghai ChanTou. This is a standard combination of state capital + industrial capital. The national team provides endorsement, the industrial side provides orders. This structure in the chip industry means it stands firm on both policy and market legs.
Looking at the entire industry landscape, this is somewhat similar to AWS having its own Graviton chips, Google having TPUs, Meta having its own ASICs. The future may not be everyone buying the same kind of GPU, but each super cloud vendor having its own computing power system.
If this trend holds, Suiyuan's biggest competitor may not be Moore Thread or Muxi. It's another question: will Tencent continue to support it in the future, will Tencent venture into chip-making itself.
V. The 80/20 Rule of China's AI Industry
Over the past five years, the market evaluated AI chip companies based on financing amounts, valuations, technical parameters, computing power metrics on PPTs, and architectural innovations.
In the next five years, the industry will look at another set of metrics: order volume, delivery capability, customer structure, depth of ecosystem binding.
What makes Suiyuan Technology most worthy of attention across the industry is no longer its financial pain of losing 4.3 billion yuan over three years, nor when its fifth-generation chip will roll off the production line. It's why Tencent is willing to place over eighty percent of its massive computing power pie entirely on this company's table.
Behind this question lies the next stage of China's AI industry. The past was about who could make the chip; the future is about who can enter the supply chain of super customers.
Suiyuan is the first among domestic chip companies to truly step into this deep-water zone of the supply chain.
Moore Thread, Muxi, and Biren have all already gone public, and have valuations in the capital market. Suiyuan is the last to submit its paper, but what it holds in its hand is different from the first three: it has a procurement order from China's largest internet company, written for three years with the amount doubling year after year.
In the current market environment, the substance of this purchase order speaks more clearly to the company's value than any top-tier technical white paper.
Words from 【Beyond the Layout】:
For years, the story told about China's AI chips has been about how to catch up with Nvidia.
But perhaps the endpoint of catching up is not making a chip as strong as Nvidia's.
It's finding a customer willing to keep buying your chips.
Nvidia is Nvidia not just because its technology is strong. It's because the world's largest companies place orders worth tens of billions of dollars with it every quarter.
Technology can be chased. But trust, scenarios, and orders must be earned, one by one.
This, perhaps, is the only long-termism for domestic chips in this computing power Long March.
This article is from the WeChat public account "Beyond the Layout," author: Huahua
