This Time It's Really Different—Detailed Analysis of the Eight Departments' 'Notice on Further Preventing and Disposing of Virtual Currency and Related Risks'

比推Publicado em 2026-02-07Última atualização em 2026-02-07

Resumo

Summary of the "Notice on Further Preventing and Disposing of Risks Related to Virtual Currency" Jointly Issued by Eight Departments On February 6, 2026, eight Chinese regulatory bodies, including the People's Bank of China and the Ministry of Public Security, jointly issued a significant notice (referred to as the "2.6 Notice") targeting risks associated with virtual currencies. This notice marks a pivotal shift in China's regulatory approach, as it explicitly revokes previous key documents, including the 2021 notice (commonly known as the "924 Notice"), which is unprecedented in the history of virtual currency regulation in China. Key changes and implications include: 1. **Broader Regulatory Scope:** Unlike the previous 924 Notice, which focused on "trading and speculation risks," the 2.6 Notice addresses "virtual currency and related risks" more broadly. 2. **New Stance on Stablecoins:** A major breakthrough is the explicit statement that stablecoins pegged to fiat currency are "de facto performing some functions of legal tender." This raises significant concerns, particularly for OTC (over-the-counter) trading platforms, as it could potentially be interpreted as engaging in illegal foreign exchange activities, which carries severe penalties including confiscation of illegal gains and fines up to five times the amount involved. 3. **Strict Prohibition on RWA:** The notice firmly prohibits any Real World Asset (RWA) tokenization activities within China. Domestic ent...

Author Profile

Liu Yang

2022 LEGALBAND Recommended Top 15 Digital Economy Lawyers

2024, 2025 THE LEGAL 500 China List "Fintech" Area Recommended Lawyer

2024 THE LEGAL 500 Fintech Lawyer of the Year Nominee

2025 LEGALBAND Client Choice: Top 15 Fintech Lawyers

2026 THE LEGAL 500 Asia Pacific List: Fintech Area Recommended Lawyer

Two cases handled received LEGAL ONE "Exemplary Level" rating

February 6, 2026, originally thought to be a very ordinary day before the New Year. In the morning, Bitcoin plummeted significantly, approaching the $60,000 mark at its lowest point. In the evening, the People's Bank of China, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the National Financial Regulatory Administration, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and eight other departments jointly issued the "Notice on Further Preventing and Disposing of Virtual Currency and Related Risks" (Yin Fa [2026] No. 42, hereinafter referred to as the "2.6 Notice"). "2.6" is destined to be recorded in the annals of virtual currency history and also seems to explain the reason for this crash.

1. Different from previous regulatory documents such as the 94 Announcement and the 924 Notice, this 2.6 Notice adds one item at the end: This Notice shall take effect from the date of issuance. The "Notice on Further Preventing and Disposing of Virtual Currency Trading Speculation Risks" (Yin Fa [2021] No. 237) issued by the People's Bank of China and ten other departments is simultaneously repealed. Repealing previous regulatory documents is a first in the history of virtual currency regulation.

At the end of last year's Financial Street Forum, Central Bank Governor Pan Gongsheng specifically mentioned stablecoins and RWA, while also emphasizing that the regulatory policies since 2017 are still effective. Now, eight departments jointly issued a document, repealing the 924 Notice, so the earlier regulatory document, the 94 Announcement, should naturally also be repealed.

Judging from the titles, the 924 Notice is the "Notice on Further Preventing and Disposing of Virtual Currency Trading Speculation Risks," highlighting trading speculation risks, while the 2.6 Notice is simply summarized as "Virtual Currency and Related Risks," with a clearly broader coverage.

2. Looking at the issuing units again, compared to the ten-department 924 Notice, this 2.6 Notice lacks the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Supreme People's Court, which actually greatly exceeded the author's expectations. Since 2024, the Two Supremes have successively stepped in, using research on handling cases involving virtual currency as a starting point, carrying out a large amount of work. In the author's view, the legal policy regarding the handling of cases involving virtual currency was also expected to be the earliest virtual currency-related law or regulation to be introduced. It was also clearly proposed at the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission meeting that preemptive research and legislation should be conducted on virtual currency, making the absence of the Two Supremes even more unexpected.

However, the 2.6 Notice also clearly states that it was "reached unanimously with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and agreed upon by the State Council." This kind of statement has not appeared in previous virtual currency regulatory documents. The specific reasons and intentions are temporarily uninterpretable. My understanding is: agreement in principle on the relevant content, the specific wording might not yet be finalized.

3. Compared to previous statements, the biggest breakthrough of the 2.6 Notice is that it explicitly states for the first time: "Stablecoins pegged to fiat currency, in circulation and use, partially perform the functions of fiat currency. Without the lawful and regulatory approval of the relevant departments, any unit or individual, domestic or foreign, shall not issue stablecoins pegged to the RMB outside China."

The second half of this sentence is not difficult to understand; the literal meaning is very clear. The most crucial part is the first half: "partially perform the functions of fiat currency." As a criminal defense lawyer, the author is most concerned about whether, in judicial practice, this will be used as a basis to consider the exchange between fiat currency and stablecoins as 'disguised foreign exchange trading'? It must be known that disguised foreign exchange trading constitutes the crime of illegal business operation, and the crime of illegal business operation can be combined with a fine of one to five times the illegal gains, and the illegal gains are turned over to the state treasury. This clause targets OTC; the key is to see whether it will be implemented in a way that is excessive, biased, or intensified during the specific implementation process. If the force is too strong, the risk for the entire OTC industry will surge. As is well known, OTC is an indispensable industry in the virtual currency field.

4. Regarding RWA, in a word, within China, it is strictly prohibited. Domestic entities are strictly prohibited from engaging in it. Foreign companies and individuals are also not allowed to target domestic entities or provide services to domestic entities.

However, whether it can be targeted at overseas activities leaves an opening. The CSRC issued the "Regulatory Guidelines for the Domestic Asset Issuance of Asset-Backed Security Tokens Overseas," which will be interpreted later.

5. Compared to previous regulatory documents, the 2.6 Notice uses a larger篇幅 to regulate sound working mechanisms, strengthen risk monitoring, prevention, and disposal.

First, 8+3, central and local management. Eight departments, together with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme Procuratorate, and the Supreme Court, coordinate and guide各地区 to carry out risk prevention and disposal work for virtual currency-related illegal financial activities.

Second, strengthen属地 implementation, form a working pattern of central-local coordination and block combination, actively prevent and properly handle issues, maintain economic and financial order and social stability.

Third, strengthen risk monitoring, continuously improve monitoring technical means and system support, strengthen cross-departmental comprehensive research, judgment and sharing, establish a sound information sharing and cross-verification mechanism, provincial-level people's governments fully play the role of local monitoring and early warning mechanisms, local financial management departments, together with State Council financial management department branch offices, dispatched agencies, and cyberspace, public security and other departments, do a good job in effective dovetailing of online monitoring, offline investigations, and fund monitoring, efficient and accurate identification, and establish a quick response mechanism for investigation and disposal. Technology companies may usher in a spring of business explosion.

Fourth, strengthen the management of financial, intermediary, technical and other service institutions, virtual currency and related financial products shall not be included in the scope of collateral. Strengthen the management of internet information content and access, and provide technical support and assistance for relevant investigations and detection work. Strengthen the management of business entity registration and advertising. Continue to rectify virtual currency "mining" activities. Close存量, strictly prohibit增量. Severely crack down on related illegal financial activities, transfer suspects involved in crimes to judicial organs for handling according to law. Severely crack down on virtual currency, real-world asset tokenization-related fraud, money laundering, illegal business operation, pyramid schemes, illegal fundraising and other illegal and criminal activities, as well as related illegal and criminal activities carried out under the banner of virtual currency, real-world asset tokenization, etc.

6. Domestic entities going overseas to carry out related business自带原罪. First, cannot issue virtual currency, not even issuing it overseas. Second, domestic entities engaging in RWA should be supervised according to the principle of "same business, same risks, same rules." Third, overseas subsidiaries and branch institutions of domestic financial institutions providing RWA overseas must comply with certain requirements, which counts as leaving an opening, but it must be clear that this opening is left for financial institutions.

7. Compared to previous regulatory policies, the text of the 2.6 Notice newly adds "Legal Liability." The literal meaning is not complicated and will not be over-interpreted.

Twitter: https://twitter.com/BitpushNewsCN

Bitpush TG Exchange Group: https://t.me/BitPushCommunity

Bitpush TG Subscription: https://t.me/bitpush

Original link:https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/dTthWZav_LlJWS0-Rb1naQ

Disclaimer: All articles on Bitpush only represent the author's views and do not constitute investment advice.

ComplianceVirtual CurrencyRisk

Perguntas relacionadas

QWhat is the most significant difference between the '2.6 Notice' and previous regulatory documents like the '94 Announcement' and '924 Notice'?

AThe most significant difference is that the '2.6 Notice' explicitly states that the previous key regulatory documents, including the '924 Notice', are simultaneously repealed upon its issuance. This is the first time in the history of virtual currency regulation that a previous document has been officially repealed.

QWhich government bodies, present in the earlier 'Ten-Department 924 Notice', were notably absent from the list of issuing authorities for the '2.6 Notice'?

AThe Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Supreme People's Court, which were part of the ten departments that issued the '924 Notice', were absent from the list of the eight departments issuing the '2.6 Notice'.

QWhat new and critical regulatory stance did the '2.6 Notice' take regarding stablecoins?

AThe '2.6 Notice' for the first time explicitly stated that 'stablecoins pegged to fiat currency, when circulated and used, partially perform the functions of fiat currency in a disguised form.' It also prohibits any domestic or foreign entity or individual from issuing RMB-pegged stablecoins overseas without approval from the relevant authorities.

QAccording to the author, what potential risk does the new stablecoin regulation pose for OTC (Over-The-Counter) trading?

AThe author, a criminal defense lawyer, is concerned that in judicial practice, the new rule could be used as a basis to deem the exchange between fiat currency and stablecoins as 'disguised foreign exchange trading', which constitutes the crime of illegal business operation. This could drastically increase risks for the entire OTC industry, which is essential to the virtual currency ecosystem.

QDid the '2.6 Notice' completely close the door for Real World Asset (RWA) tokenization involving Chinese entities?

AWhile it strictly prohibits domestic entities from engaging in RWA and prohibits foreign companies and individuals from providing such services to domestic entities, it left a potential opening. It mentioned that overseas subsidiaries and branches of domestic financial institutions providing RWA services overseas must comply with certain requirements, suggesting a possible avenue specifically for financial institutions.

Leituras Relacionadas

The Impossible Trilemma Is Basically a Pseudo-Problem

The article argues that the core limitation of blockchain technology is not the scalability trilemma, but its fundamental lack of privacy, which acts as a barrier to institutional capital. It defines blockchain as a slow, expensive, shared computer whose primary value is "permissionlessness" (no administrator) and verifiable trust. While this is ideal for native financial assets like stable币, which now process trillions, two critical flaws remain for mainstream adoption: regulatory legitimacy and a default transparency that leaks all financial activity. The author contends that transparency is not a feature but a tax, quantified through MEV extraction, making the public ledger unusable for serious institutions. However, modern cryptography, specifically zero-knowledge proofs, now offers a solution: "provable privacy." This allows users to prove compliance (e.g., solvency, KYC) without revealing underlying data. This fusion of privacy and auditability resolves the transparency-compliant privacy-compliance dichotomy, enabling a purely upgraded system where transactions are verified but not broadcasted. Closing these flaws is presented as the essential bridge to onboard the next wave of trillions in capital.

marsbitHá 7h

The Impossible Trilemma Is Basically a Pseudo-Problem

marsbitHá 7h

The "Impossible Triad" Is Fundamentally a Pseudo-Problem

The article argues that blockchain's fundamental limitation is not the scalability trilemma (decentralization, scalability, security), which has been largely solved, but the lack of **privacy** and, until recently, clear **legitimacy**. Blockchain is described as a slow, expensive, globally shared computer whose core value is censorship resistance and verifiability. While ideal for native digital assets like money (e.g., stablecoins), its default transparency acts as a **tax**, exposing all transactions and enabling MEV extraction, which deters serious institutional capital. Simultaneously, its permissionless nature created regulatory ambiguity. The piece contends that **privacy** is the missing critical feature. It rejects the false choice between total transparency and complete anonymity. Modern cryptography (like zero-knowledge proofs) enables **compliant privacy**: users can prove facts (solvency, KYC status, compliance) without revealing the underlying sensitive data (specific holdings, identities). This preserves auditability for regulators and eliminates the leak of financial information. With recent regulatory progress (e.g., the GENIUS Act) addressing legitimacy, adding default, provably compliant privacy becomes a pure upgrade. It transforms blockchain from a costly, public ledger into a confidential settlement layer, finally bridging the gap to mainstream institutional and individual adoption of on-chain finance.

链捕手Há 7h

The "Impossible Triad" Is Fundamentally a Pseudo-Problem

链捕手Há 7h

Optical Chips: Collective Capacity Expansion

The global optical chip industry is experiencing a massive wave of expansion driven by surging AI data center demand. Major players across the US, Japan, Europe, and China are aggressively investing to ramp up production capacity. In the US, Coherent is expanding its 6-inch Indium Phosphide (InP) semiconductor fab in Texas, supported by CHIPS Act funding and a $2 billion strategic investment from NVIDIA. Lumentum is building a new factory for InP optical devices, and Nokia is scaling its advanced photonic chip packaging and testing capabilities. NVIDIA's investments aim to secure future supply of critical lasers and optical interconnect products for AI infrastructure. Japan's JX Advanced Metals, a leading InP substrate supplier, plans a multi-billion yen investment to increase its capacity 7-10 times, strengthening its grip on the crucial upstream materials market. In Europe, IQE and Tower Semiconductor settled a patent dispute and signed a multi-year InP epitaxial wafer supply agreement, highlighting that next-generation silicon photonics platforms will integrate high-performance InP components. STMicroelectronics and Sivers Semiconductors are also expanding silicon photonics production and partnerships. China is rapidly building out its domestic supply chain. Dongshan Precision's subsidiary, Source Photonics, announced a $12 billion project to expand optical chip and module production. Companies like Sanan Optoelectronics and Yunnan Germanium are scaling up InP chip manufacturing and substrate production, moving towards vertical integration from materials to modules. While debate continues around the exact future architecture—whether CPO (Co-Packaged Optics), NPO, or pluggables will dominate—analysts like Morgan Stanley argue the underlying driver is unchangeable: the explosive growth in bandwidth demand. This will inevitably increase the volume of optical engines, lasers, and related content per GPU, regardless of the final technical path. The competition for "more light" in the AI era has intensified into a global, full-chain capacity race.

marsbitHá 9h

Optical Chips: Collective Capacity Expansion

marsbitHá 9h

Stablecoins Finally Find Real Yield: An In-Depth Look at On-Chain Reinsurance Re | A Conversation with Re Founder Karan Saroya

Stablecoin Real Yield Found: A Deep Dive into On-Chain Reinsurance with Re's Karan Saroya As stablecoin supply exceeds $170 billion, the search for sustainable, non-speculative yield intensifies. Re, an on-chain reinsurance platform, provides an answer: connecting stablecoin capital to the trillion-dollar traditional reinsurance market. Re operates as a regulated reinsurer, accepting stablecoin deposits as collateral to back US insurance companies. These insurers pay premiums, generating yield that flows back to on-chain depositors. Currently supporting 35 insurers and underwriting $500 million, Re projects scaling to over $1 billion soon. Key insights from a Bankless podcast with founder Karan Saroya and investor Avichal of Electric Capital: 1. **Uncorrelated, Real-World Yield:** Re offers stablecoin holders access to reinsurance returns (targeting 12-14%+), an asset class entirely separate from crypto or equity markets. 2. **Operational Efficiency via Smart Contracts:** Re replaces traditional, labor-intensive capital fundraising with smart contracts, allowing a ~12-person team to compete with industry giants. 3. **Regulatory Leverage:** For every $1 of collateral, regulations allow backing $5-7 in written premiums. This leverage amplifies returns from the underlying risk-free rate. 4. **DeFi Integration:** Depositors receive receipt tokens, which can be used in protocols like Morpho for "looping," potentially pushing yields to 18-20%+. 5. **The "DeFi Mullet" Model:** A compliant front-end (regulated reinsurer) paired with a decentralized back-end (smart contracts, DeFi capital markets). 6. **RE Governance Token:** Modeled on Lloyd's of London, the token governs the central capital pool's allocation, counterparty acceptance, and parameters. 7. **Real Economic Impact:** Capital funds real-world productivity (factories, clinics, businesses) via insurance, moving beyond crypto's internal loops. The discussion highlights a pivotal moment: DeFi's supply-side infrastructure is now met by real demand for productive yield, potentially kickstarting a flywheel where vast on-chain stablecoin capital seeks these real-world returns.

链捕手Há 10h

Stablecoins Finally Find Real Yield: An In-Depth Look at On-Chain Reinsurance Re | A Conversation with Re Founder Karan Saroya

链捕手Há 10h

1996 or 1999? Walsh's First Test is 'How to View AI'

"1996 or 1999? Wall's First Big Test Is 'How to View AI'" Federal Reserve Chairman Wall's initial challenge is not whether to raise or cut rates, but a more fundamental judgment: what kind of boom is the current AI boom? This will determine the Fed's policy path and define his legacy. Economics is split between two opposing views, according to reporter Nick Timiraos. One sees imminent productivity gains that will increase supply and cool inflation, allowing the Fed to hold steady. The other argues that while productivity benefits are distant, demand shocks are here now, and waiting for data confirmation risks missing the intervention window, forcing sharper rate hikes later. Wall has signaled a leaning toward the first view, echoing 1996-era Alan Greenspan, who embraced strong, productivity-driven growth without fear of inflation. However, Wall faces a different macro environment than Greenspan did, with tariff pressures, expanding fiscal deficits, and diminishing globalization benefits, which could force more significant inflation pressures even if AI benefits materialize. Wall's logic, expressed before taking office, is that AI-driven productivity gains won't show in official data for years. If the Fed waits for confirmation, it might mistakenly tighten policy and choke off the very growth that could suppress inflation. This argues for using forward-looking narratives over lagging data. Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee presents a key counter-argument. He distinguishes between expected and unexpected productivity booms. A widely anticipated boom, like the current AI wave, can cause people to spend future wealth gains in advance, overheating the economy before productivity actually rises, thus requiring preemptive rate hikes. He cites rising costs for AI data centers as evidence of such overheating. Fed Governor Christopher Waller offers a rebuttal to Goolsbee, noting the "expected spending" mechanism only works if people can borrow against future income, which many households cannot do due to borrowing constraints. Wall also faces a paradox related to his desire to reduce the Fed's use of "forward guidance" (pre-announcing policy moves). This practice was established in 1999 when Greenspan began signaling hikes to avoid market shocks. If the economy follows a less optimistic path, Wall may be forced to choose between using the guidance he wants to abolish or risking market volatility by staying silent. The ultimate question defining Wall's first major test remains: Is this 1996 or 1999?

marsbitHá 11h

1996 or 1999? Walsh's First Test is 'How to View AI'

marsbitHá 11h

Trading

Spot

Futuros