"New Fed News Agency": Regardless of Whether a Ceasefire Agreement is Reached, the Outlook for Fed Rate Cuts Remains Bleak

marsbitPublicado em 2026-04-09Última atualização em 2026-04-09

Resumo

Nick Timiraos, known as the "New Fed Whisperer," argues that a potential ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran would not brighten the Federal Reserve’s dimming prospects for interest rate cuts. Instead, it would replace one economic challenge with another: an energy shock that could prolong inflationary pressures without severely damaging demand, thereby keeping rates higher for longer. The Fed’s March meeting minutes revealed that officials were already cautious about cutting rates even before the conflict, as progress on inflation had stalled while the labor market remained stable. While a ceasefire might reduce the risk of a worst-case recession scenario, it could also leave underlying inflation pressures intact. Energy and commodity prices that rose during the conflict may not fully retreat, and financial conditions could loosen amid post-ceasefire optimism. The Fed is weighing dual risks: a sudden labor market downturn that would warrant rate cuts, and persistent above-target inflation that might require hikes. Although most officials still expect at least one cut this year, some have grown more hesitant. Even if the conflict ends quickly, supply chain "echo effects" and geopolitical vulnerabilities may keep inflation elevated, reinforcing the Fed’s cautious stance.

Author: He Hao

Source: Wall Street News

On Wednesday, Nick Timiraos, a well-known financial journalist known as the "New Fed News Agency," wrote that a ceasefire between the United States and Iran provides an opportunity to alleviate the latest serious threat facing the global economy. However, for the Federal Reserve, this may simply replace one problem with another: an energy shock that lasts just long enough to push up prices but not severe enough to significantly disrupt demand, thereby leading to prolonged high interest rates.

Timiraos cited the minutes of the Fed's March 17-18 meeting released on Wednesday, stating:

The minutes emphasized that the Iran war did not make the Fed reluctant to cut rates but rather complicated an already cautious stance. Even before the Iran conflict erupted, the path to rate cuts had narrowed. The U.S. labor market had stabilized enough to ease recession concerns, while progress in bringing inflation back to the Fed's 2% target had stalled.

The March meeting minutes noted that, partly due to the risk of a prolonged war, the vast majority of participants indicated that progress in reducing inflation toward the target might be slower than previously expected and believed that the risk of inflation persistently exceeding the Committee's target had increased.

At the March FOMC meeting, the Fed kept the benchmark interest rate unchanged in the range of 3.5% to 3.75%, marking the second pause after three consecutive rate cuts in the final months of 2025.

Timiraos stated that if the risk of an expanded Iran conflict dragging down economic growth and pushing the economy into a recession was the last and strongest reason to resume rate cuts, then paradoxically, the end of the war might make it harder for the Fed to ease policy in the short term:

This is because a ceasefire eliminates the worst-case scenario—a severe price surge disrupting supply chains and destroying demand—but it may reduce the degree of inflation risk less than it reduces the extreme scenario. Energy and commodity prices that rose during the conflict may not fully retreat, and financial conditions are easing with the optimism brought by the ceasefire, such as Wednesday's market rally.

Once the risk of severe demand destruction is ruled out, what remains is an inflation problem that has not been fully resolved, and recent energy price increases may also bring some "echo effects," which will persist even if the ceasefire holds, albeit more mildly than before.

Timiraos quoted Marc Sumerlin, managing partner of economic consulting firm Evenflow Macro, as saying: "As the probability of recession decreases, the probability of inflation increases because price pressures remain, but demand destruction is not as severe."

Timiraos pointed out that, at the same time, the ceasefire also reduces another less likely but more destructive risk—a sustained surge in energy prices forcing the Fed to consider raising interest rates.

Timiraos noted that the Fed's March meeting minutes showed that officials were weighing the dual risks brought by the war: on one hand, it could lead to a sudden deterioration in the job market, necessitating rate cuts; on the other hand, it could lead to persistently high inflation, requiring rate hikes.

In their post-meeting forecasts, most officials still expected at least one rate cut this year. However, the minutes emphasized that this expectation depended on whether inflation would resume its decline toward the target. The minutes stated that two officials had already delayed their judgment on the appropriate timing for rate cuts due to the lack of recent improvement in inflation.

The Fed's post-meeting statement still hinted that the next interest rate move was more likely to be a cut than a hike. However, the minutes showed that compared to the January meeting, the number of officials who believed this "bias" could be removed had increased. The minutes noted that if the wording of the statement were adjusted, it would imply that if inflation persistently exceeds the target, a rate hike could also be an appropriate option.

Timiraos stated that the Fed's current stance reflects a "layered problem," quoting Fed Chair Powell's recent speech:

Powell said last week that after the pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and last year's import tariff hikes, the Fed is facing its fourth supply shock in recent years.

The Fed's policy has enough room to wait and assess the economic impact, but Powell also warned that a series of one-off shocks could weaken public confidence in the return of inflation to normal. The Fed is highly focused on this risk because it believes inflation expectations could become "self-fulfilling."

Timiraos pointed out that even before this week's ceasefire announcement, current and former Fed officials had stated that even if the conflict is resolved quickly, it does not mean policy will immediately return to normal. Part of the reason is that the world has seen how easily the Strait of Hormuz can be blocked, and this vulnerability may be factored into energy prices and corporate decisions for years to come. Some geopolitical analysts doubt whether a ceasefire can bring energy prices fully back to pre-war levels. Iran has strong incentives to maintain higher oil prices to fund reconstruction and maintain influence over its Gulf neighbors.

Timiraos quoted St. Louis Fed President Musalem's speech last week, stating that even if the conflict ends in the coming weeks, he would focus on the "ripple effects" that could continue to push up prices even after supply chains recover. "I am always looking for these echoes because even if the war ends quickly, it takes time to restore damaged capacity."

Timiraos stated that the Fed's cautious attitude echoes a framework proposed by then-Governor Bernanke over twenty years ago: central banks should decide how to respond to oil price shocks based on the level of inflation at the time the shock occurs:

If inflation was already low and expectations were stable, policymakers could "ignore" the inflationary pressures from rising energy prices; but if inflation was already above target, the risk of supply shocks further disrupting inflation expectations would require tighter policy, and some officials believe this is closer to the current situation the Fed faces.

Perguntas relacionadas

QAccording to the article, why might a ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran make it harder for the Fed to ease monetary policy in the short term?

ABecause a ceasefire eliminates the worst-case scenario of severe demand destruction that would have justified rate cuts, but it doesn't fully eliminate inflation risks. Energy and commodity prices that rose during the conflict may not fully retreat, and the resulting financial easing could sustain inflationary pressures.

QWhat did the March FOMC meeting minutes indicate about the Fed's view on inflation progress?

AThe minutes indicated that the vast majority of participants believed progress on inflation returning to the 2% target was likely to be slower than previously expected, and they saw increased risks of inflation persisting above the Committee's target.

QHow did the article describe the Fed's current policy stance regarding future interest rate moves?

AThe article described the Fed's stance as reflecting a 'superimposed problem' with enough room to wait and assess the economic impact. The post-meeting statement still suggested the next move was more likely to be a cut than a hike, but some officials were open to removing this 'bias', opening the door for potential rate increases if high inflation persists.

QWhat framework, mentioned in the article, did former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke propose for responding to oil price shocks?

ABen Bernanke proposed that central banks should decide how to respond to an oil price shock based on the level of inflation when the shock occurs. If inflation is already low and expectations are stable, policymakers can 'look through' the inflationary pressure from rising energy prices; but if inflation is already above target, the risk of the shock further disrupting inflation expectations calls for tighter policy.

QAccording to the 'new Fed wire' Nick Timiraos, what is the potential long-term impact of the conflict on energy prices and business decisions, even with a ceasefire?

AThe article suggests that the global exposure of the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz to being blocked means this fragility could be priced into energy costs and corporate decision-making for years to come. Furthermore, Iran has a strong incentive to maintain higher oil prices for reconstruction and regional influence, which may prevent a full return to pre-war price levels.

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