ZachXBT:先潜伏再攻击,起底朝鲜加密黑客不为人知的幕后

链捕手Publicado em 2024-08-16Última atualização em 2024-08-16

作者:ZachXBT,加密侦探;

翻译:金色财经xiaozou

 

最近有一个团队寻求我的帮助,事情的起因是有人通过恶意代码从他们的金库中盗走130万美元。

这个团队不知道的是,他们雇佣了多名虚假身份的朝鲜IT人员作为开发者。

然后,我发现了自2024年6月以来与这些开发人员有关的一直保持活跃的加密项目就有至少25个。

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lheEauB1zFVBuxvxomKNT3qSLLbwsu5cSf0qIMru.jpeg

该事件的洗钱途径如下:

1)将130万美元转移到偷盗地址

2)通过deBridge将130万美元从Solana桥接到以太坊

3)向Tornado存入50.2 ETH

4)向两个交易所转账16.5 ETH

偷盗地址为:

6USfQ9BX33LNvuR44TXr8XKzyEgervPcF4QtZZfWMnet

wa4FN9wAIQ1HWVh33aZQKEdnpZpeDihbIfujeQPi.jpeg

借助21个开发者的多个支付地址,我能够绘制出过去的一个月里最近一批约37.5万美元的支付集群。

0 xb721adfc3d9fe01e9b3332183665a503447b1d35

在过去的一周里,你可能也看到了,我请这些项目直接联系我。

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此前,有550万美元流入了一个外汇存款地址,其中包括朝鲜IT人员从2023年7月至2024年期间收到的款项,该地址与OFAC制裁人员Sim Hyon Sop有关。

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调查过程中发现了一些有趣的事:

- 俄罗斯电信IP被美国和马来西亚的开发者使用。

- 在开发记录中他们不小心泄露了他们在记事本上的其他身份。

- 开发付款地址涉及到OFAC制裁名单上的Sang Man Kim和Sim Hyon Sop的。

- 一些开发者是由招聘公司安排的。

- 多个项目具有3名以上互推荐IT人员。

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许多经验丰富的团队都雇佣了这些开发者,所以把他们当成是罪魁祸首是不公平的。

各团队未来可以关注的一些指标包括:

1) 他们互推荐的角色

2) 漂亮的简历/ GitHub活动,尽管有时会谎报工作经历。

3) 通常表面上乐意接受KYC,但却提交假身份证,希望团队不会进一步调查。

4) 关于他们所声称的来源地,问些具体问题。

5) 一个开发人员被解雇了,但立即出现了好几个找工作的新账户。

6) 可能一眼看起来是很优秀的开发者,但往往工作起来就表现不佳。

7) 查看日志

8) 喜欢使用流行NFT pfps

9) 亚洲口音

以防你是那种把一切归咎于朝鲜的事都称为巨大阴谋的人。

无论如何,这项研究证明:

在亚洲,一个实体通过使用假身份可以同时从事25个以上的项目,每月可以获得30万至50万美元的收入。

后续:

在本文发布不久后,另一个项目发现他们雇佣了我名单里列出的一个朝鲜IT人员(Naoki Murano),项目管理人员在他们的聊天中分享了我的文章。

jvXUP0DEZLmknHOLMThafxwC5wwdV3pcKCLcGNiu.png

结果是,就在两分钟之内,Naoki退出了聊天,并删除了他的Github

cK5dh6lYjLeodNZOP7QKAaJ3vAh4cgQDX3kI2srC.png

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