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Besides the Resolv Hack, This Type of DeFi Vulnerability Has Occurred Four Times Already

An attacker exploited a compromised off-chain signing key in the stablecoin protocol Resolv, minting 80 million USR tokens (pegged to USD) from a $100k–$200k USDC deposit within minutes. The stolen keys allowed unlimited minting due to a design flaw—lacking a minting cap—despite multiple audits. The attacker then converted USR to its wrapped version (wstUSR) and dumped it on DEXs, netting ~11,400 ETH (~$24M). This caused USR to depeg, trading at ~$0.25. The depeg triggered a second-phase crisis: lending markets (including Morpho and Fluid/Instadapp) using wstUSR as collateral relied on hardcoded oracles that priced it near $1 instead of its real market value. Arbitrageurs bought cheap wstUSR, used it as overvalued collateral to borrow stablecoins, and amplified losses. Fluid absorbed over $10M in bad debt; Morpho had 15 vaults exposed. This incident repeats a known DeFi pattern: similar oracle failures occurred with Usual Protocol (Jan 2025), Stream Finance (Nov 2025), and Moonwell (late 2025), where mispriced collateral led to massive bad debt. Critics highlight flawed incentives in the "curator" model (e.g., Gauntlet), where third-party vault managers prioritize high yields without adequate risk controls, and protocols outsource risk management without enforcing safeguards. The root cause is systemic: over-reliance on static oracles for volatile assets and insecure off-chain infrastructure.

marsbit03/24 12:10

Besides the Resolv Hack, This Type of DeFi Vulnerability Has Occurred Four Times Already

marsbit03/24 12:10

Post-Mortem of the Venus THE Attack: How to Profit in a Fleeting Window?

Approximately two hours ago, Venus Protocol's THE token was exploited using a classic Mango Markets-style price manipulation attack. The attacker targeted THE, a low-liquidity collateral asset, by depositing it, borrowing other assets, and using those to buy more THE, artificially inflating its price. Once the time-weighted average oracle updated, the inflated price allowed further leveraged borrowing. To bypass THE's borrowing cap, the attacker performed a "donation attack" by transferring THE directly to the vTHE contract, increasing the recognized collateral value. After the first manipulation phase, THE's price stabilized around $0.50. The attacker attempted to further amplify gains by continuing to buy THE, but mounting sell pressure limited price increases and pushed their health factor near 1.0, risking liquidation. The collateral, nominally valued around $30M, had extremely low liquidity, making large-scale liquidation at inflated prices impossible. Recognizing the situation, the writer opened a short position on THE with high leverage, anticipating a price collapse due to overvaluation, illiquidity, and forced selling. After liquidation, THE price plummeted to ~$0.24, below its pre-attack level, resulting in a ~$15K profit for the writer. Venus Protocol was left with ~$2M in bad debt. The attacker likely gained little or lost funds, though may have profited from off-chain positions. The event highlights that nominal collateral value in DeFi does not equal realizable value during liquidity crises.

marsbit03/16 08:37

Post-Mortem of the Venus THE Attack: How to Profit in a Fleeting Window?

marsbit03/16 08:37

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