The Most Miserable Public Offering: Over $60 Million Raised, Infinex's Public Sale Attracts Only $460,000 After 1 Day

marsbitPubblicato 2026-01-06Pubblicato ultima volta 2026-01-06

Introduzione

Infinex, a prominent crypto project founded by Synthetix creator Kain Warwick, has experienced one of the most disappointing public token sales in recent memory. Despite raising over $65 million in earlier funding rounds from major VCs and industry figures, its public sale—launched in early 2026—attracted only $460,000 within the first 30 hours, less than 10% of its reduced $5 million goal. The project had already significantly lowered its valuation from $300 million to $100 million in response to weak market conditions. However, strict participation limits—capping contributions at $2,500 per address—and a one-year token lockup deterred wider interest. Even after removing the cap and adjusting allocation rules, participation remained low, with only 508 transactions totaling $1.34 million by the following day. Infinex aims to offer a unified DeFi interface with perpetual contracts, cross-chain bridging, and simplified key management. But its failed sale highlights deeper structural issues in the current market: declining risk appetite, reduced on-chain activity, and growing investor skepticism toward long lockups and high valuations. This case may signal challenges for other upcoming token launches in a cooling market.

Author: Gu Yu, ChainCatcher

Just a few days into 2026, the most dismal public offering of a well-known project in the crypto industry in recent years may have already occurred: nearly 30 hours after the Infinex token public sale launched, the subscription amount was only $460,000, less than 10% of the target.

It's important to note that the Infinex project team had already considered the bleak market conditions and made significant concessions in valuation, fundraising targets, and terms. The valuation for this public offering was drastically reduced from the $300 million announced last November to $100 million, and the planned fundraising amount was cut from $15 million to $5 million.

Even with such drastic adjustments, Infinex's public offering still met with a cold reception from the market, which came as a surprise to many observers. After all, Infinex, as a star project, had previously raised over $60 million, and its founding team and investor background are very impressive. Infinex's situation is a true reflection of the current downturn in the crypto market.

What is the Infinex Project?

Founded by DeFi OG and Synthetix founder Kain Warwick, Infinex became independent from Synthetix in 2023. Initially positioned as a decentralized perpetual contract protocol, it has gradually evolved into a comprehensive crypto application that allows users to seamlessly switch between different DeFi protocols and chains on a unified interface. Its current focus is on perpetual contracts based on Hyperliquid, cross-chain bridging and trading, multi-chain asset management, yield earning, and other functions.

Another main feature is its use of a new security architecture centered on on-chain smart accounts and keys, which replaces traditional seed phrases and email modes, making login more convenient and faster. It also supports using biometric technology (touch or face ID) for on-chain transaction signing.

Overall, Infinex aims to be user-experience oriented, emphasizing lowering user barriers, integrating multi-chain liquidity, and attempting to solve the long-standing issues of complexity and asset fragmentation in DeFi at the product level.

In October 2024, Infinex recently raised $65.3 million in sponsorship revenue by selling "Patron NFTs," which were sold in four rounds to retail traders, venture capital firms like Solana Ventures and Breyer Capital, and well-known individuals such as Solana founder Anatoly Yakovenko and Aave founder Stani Kulechov, totaling 41,252 NFTs.

Infinex recently revealed in an article that the implied valuation for this NFT financing round was $400 million, and participants have priority allocation rights in the latest public sale round.

Infinex Investor Lineup Source: RootData

Why Did the Public Sale Flop?

From $65.3 million to $460,000, Infinex's public sale has experienced a stark contrast in treatment. While the bleak market is certainly a factor, the primary issue lies in the project team's strategic missteps.

According to the public sale rules, Infinex limited each address to a maximum investment of $2,500. This setting was intended to attract more participants and reduce the impact of whale addresses on token concentration. Although the intention was positive, market feedback shows that the team did not consider that the number of active on-chain users is far lower than expected in the recent sluggish market. Only 285 addresses participated in the public sale after it launched, with only 134 addresses reaching the $2,500上限.

Infinex's latest tweet response expressed a similar sentiment: "We tried to balance existing NFT patrons, new participants, and fair distribution, but the result was that almost no one was willing to participate in this sale."

All INX tokens purchased in this public sale will be locked for 1 year, which is unusually long compared to other public sales. Although buyers can choose to redeem the tokens early, the purchase valuation must be correspondingly increased to $300 million.

Furthermore, the significant valuation下调 may have also played a negative role. Although Infinex's intention in lowering the valuation was to show goodwill to the market, such a drastic adjustment objectively intensified the wait-and-see sentiment among some investors. For some participants, the "plunge-like correction" in valuation反而 reinforced their judgment of a downward trend in the overall industry expectations, rather than constituting a reason to enter.

In response to the糟糕的公募状况, Infinex announced on January 5th the removal of the per-address maximum limit and a change from random allocation to a "max-min fair distribution," also known as "waterfall allocation." Everyone's allocation will increase equally until the上限 is reached or sold out.Infinex founder Kain Warwick also tweeted that he would fund the project's operations himself if necessary.

However, even after the rule adjustments, the market still did not respond positively. As of noon on January 6th, on-chain data showed that the cumulative investment in this public sale was $1.34 million from 508 transactions, still $3.66 million short of the $5 million target. This suggests that the problem may not just be "unfriendly rule design" but rather a systematic decline in investors' interest in participating in such public sales.

The Deep Structural Contradictions of the Public Sale Model

To some extent, Infinex's public sale failure is particularly striking because it occurred at a time when "ICOs seem to be warming up."

Since the second half of 2025, as Bitcoin prices stabilized and some sectors experienced阶段性反弹, discussions about "primary market recovery" in the crypto market have gradually increased. Projects like Monad, Pump.Fun, Plasma, Falcon Finance, and others have重新 chosen token public sales for fundraising. The ICO public sale model, which had been明显边缘化 in the past two years, began to reappear in the industry's视野, with fundraising platforms like Buidlpad and echo also rising rapidly.

But rather than a return of the ICO热潮, this is more of a passive choice.

In the current environment, traditional venture capital investment frequency has significantly decreased, valuation systems have become more conservative, and fundraising cycles have been noticeably lengthened. For many projects that have not yet formed stable revenue but need continuous development investment, token public sales have become one of the few still "feasible" fundraising paths. It does not rely entirely on institutional endorsement nor require accepting extremely compressed private placement terms, theoretically allowing direct access to market liquidity.

It is against this background that more and more projects are turning to public sales. However, Infinex's experience clearly shows: a project's fundraising motivation does not equate to the market's willingness to provide capital.

More critically, this current wave of "ICO resurgence" is exposing the deep structural contradictions of the token public sale model.

On one hand, projects attempt to demonstrate restraint and rationality to the market by lowering valuations, extending lock-up periods, and emphasizing long-termism; on the other hand, investors are expressing冷淡 towards this narrative with their actions. In an environment of insufficient liquidity and limited secondary market capacity, long-term lock-ups are not seen as a value consensus but rather as a one-sided risk transfer.

In past cycles, the core appeal of public sales came from two premises: the expectation of quick circulation and market sentiment premium. Currently, both premises have significantly weakened. Token issuance is increasingly resembling a transaction of "cashing in the future early," but the market is in no hurry to price these futures.

Infinex's public sale results precisely reveal this misalignment. As more projects choose to raise funds through public sales, the market has not correspondingly expanded its risk-bearing capacity for public sale assets but has instead become more selective. The result is that even with solid project backgrounds and significantly reduced valuations, public sales can still encounter collective观望.

In the coming period, well-known projects like Zama (January 12th) and MegaETH will相继 launch their public sales. With Infinex serving as a negative example, this will be an excellent test to检验 market confidence and the effectiveness of the public sale mechanism.

In a cycle of contracting liquidity, declining risk appetite, and increasingly rational investors, any form of token issuance will face stricter scrutiny. For the entire industry, this is both pressure and an unavoidable reality check.

Letture associate

Gensyn AI: Don't Let AI Repeat the Mistakes of the Internet

In recent months, the rapid growth of the AI industry has attracted significant talent from the crypto sector. A persistent question among researchers intersecting both fields is whether blockchain can become a foundational part of AI infrastructure. While many previous AI and Crypto projects focused on application layers (like AI Agents, on-chain reasoning, data markets, and compute rentals), few achieved viable commercial models. Gensyn differentiates itself by targeting the most critical and expensive layer of AI: model training. Gensyn aims to organize globally distributed GPU resources into an open AI training network. Developers can submit training tasks, nodes provide computational power, and the network verifies results while distributing incentives. The core issue addressed is not decentralization for its own sake, but the increasing centralization of compute power among tech giants. In the era of large models, access to GPUs (like the H100) has become a decisive bottleneck, dictating the pace of AI development. Major AI companies are heavily dependent on large cloud providers for compute resources. Gensyn's approach is significant for several reasons: 1) It operates at the core infrastructure layer (model training), the most resource-intensive and technically demanding part of the AI value chain. 2) It proposes a more open, collaborative model for compute, potentially increasing resource utilization by dynamically pooling idle GPUs, similar to early cloud computing logic. 3) Its technical moat lies in solving complex challenges like verifying training results, ensuring node honesty, and maintaining reliability in a distributed environment—making it more of a deep-tech infrastructure company. 4) It targets a validated, high-growth market with genuine demand, rather than pursuing blockchain integration without purpose. Ultimately, the boundaries between Crypto and AI are blurring. AI requires global resource coordination, incentive mechanisms, and collaborative systems—areas where crypto-native solutions excel. Gensyn represents a step toward making advanced training capabilities more accessible and collaborative, moving beyond a niche controlled by a few giants. If successful, it could evolve into a fundamental piece of AI infrastructure, where the most enduring value in the AI era is often created.

marsbit6 h fa

Gensyn AI: Don't Let AI Repeat the Mistakes of the Internet

marsbit6 h fa

Why is China's AI Developing So Fast? The Answer Lies Inside the Labs

A US researcher's visit to China's top AI labs reveals distinct cultural and organizational factors driving China's rapid AI development. While talent, data, and compute are similar to the West, Chinese labs excel through a pragmatic, execution-focused culture: less emphasis on individual stardom and conceptual debate, and more on teamwork, engineering optimization, and mastering the full tech stack. A key advantage is the integration of young students and researchers who approach model-building with fresh perspectives and low ego, prioritizing collective progress over personal credit. This contrasts with the US culture of self-promotion and "star scientist" narratives. Chinese labs also exhibit a strong "build, don't buy" mentality, preferring to develop core capabilities—like data pipelines and environments—in-house rather than relying on external services. The ecosystem feels more collaborative than tribal, with mutual respect among labs. While government support exists, its scale is unclear, and technical decisions appear driven by labs, not state mandates. Chinese companies across sectors, from platforms to consumer tech, are building their own foundational models to control their tech destiny, reflecting a broader cultural drive for technological sovereignty. Demand for AI is emerging, with spending patterns potentially mirroring cloud infrastructure more than traditional SaaS. Despite challenges like a less mature data industry and GPU shortages, Chinese labs are propelled by vast talent, rapid iteration, and deep integration with the open-source community. The competition is evolving beyond a pure model race into a contest of organizational execution, developer ecosystems, and industrial pragmatism.

marsbit8 h fa

Why is China's AI Developing So Fast? The Answer Lies Inside the Labs

marsbit8 h fa

3 Years, 5 Times: The Rebirth of a Century-Old Glass Factory

Corning, a 175-year-old glass company, is experiencing a dramatic revival as a key player in AI infrastructure, driven by surging demand for high-performance optical fiber in data centers. AI data centers require vastly more fiber than traditional ones—5 to 10 times as much per rack—to handle high-speed data transmission between GPUs. This structural demand shift, coupled with supply constraints from the lengthy expansion cycle for fiber preforms, has created a significant supply-demand gap. Nvidia has invested in Corning, along with Lumentum and Coherent, in a $4.5 billion total commitment to secure the optical supply chain for AI. Corning's competitive edge lies in its expertise in producing ultra-low-loss, high-density, and bend-resistant specialty fiber, which is critical for 800G+ and future 1.6T data rates. Its deep involvement in co-packaged optics (CPO) with partners like Nvidia further solidifies its position. While not the largest fiber manufacturer globally, Corning's revenue from enterprise/data center clients now exceeds 40% of its optical communications sales, and it has secured multi-year supply agreements with major hyperscalers including Meta and Nvidia. Financially, Corning's optical communications revenue has surged, doubling from $1.3 billion in 2023 to over $3 billion in 2025. Its stock price has risen nearly 6-fold since late 2023. Key future catalysts include the rollout of Nvidia's CPO products and the scale of undisclosed customer agreements. However, risks include high current valuations and potential disruption from next-generation technologies like hollow-core fiber. The company's long-term bet on light over electricity, maintained even through the telecom bubble crash, is now being validated by the AI boom.

marsbit8 h fa

3 Years, 5 Times: The Rebirth of a Century-Old Glass Factory

marsbit8 h fa

Trading

Spot
Futures
活动图片