Over 100 Illegal Mining Farms Found in the North Caucasus Since the Beginning of the Year

RBK-cryptoPubblicato 2025-12-11Pubblicato ultima volta 2025-12-11

Introduzione

Since the beginning of 2025, over 100 illegal cryptocurrency mining farms have been discovered in Russia's North Caucasus Federal District, according to "Rosseti Severny Kavkaz." The total financial damage from their operations is estimated at over 656 million rubles. Although cryptocurrency mining is officially banned in the region until Spring 2031, many illegal miners continue to operate by stealing electricity, either bypassing meters or connecting directly to the grid without contracts. The breakdown of discovered farms by region is as follows: 79 in Dagestan (causing 89.5 million rubles in damage), 14 in Ingushetia (455.5 million rubles), 5 in Karachay-Cherkessia (104.1 million rubles), 2 in Stavropol Krai (1 million rubles), 2 in North Ossetia (390,000 rubles), and 1 in Kabardino-Balkaria (5.8 million rubles). Dagestan leads in the number of cases, which the energy company attributes to individuals attempting to generate profit without using their own funds for electricity. In response to the widespread issue, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak announced on December 8th that the government plans to establish both administrative and criminal liability for violations related to cryptocurrency mining.

More than 100 illegal mining farms have been identified since the beginning of 2025 in the North Caucasus Federal District, according to the company "Rosseti Severny Kavkaz" (Russian Grids of the North Caucasus) as cited by TASS. The total amount of damage exceeded 656 million rubles.

Cryptocurrency mining is prohibited in the republics of the North Caucasus until the spring of 2031. However, many illegal miners remain in the regions, stealing electricity by bypassing meters or connecting to the grid directly without contracts.

5 underground farms were discovered in Karachay-Cherkessia (damage of 104.1 million rubles), two in the Stavropol Territory (1 million rubles) and North Ossetia (390 thousand rubles), and one more in Kabardino-Balkaria (5.8 million rubles).

The most significant damage to energy companies was caused by 14 farms in Ingushetia — 455.5 million rubles. The largest number of illegal miners was identified in Dagestan. There, 79 farms were found, which caused damage amounting to 89.5 million rubles.

"Dagestan still leads in the number of illegal mining cases. This is related to attempts by certain citizens to profit without using their own funds," the energy company reported.

On December 8, at a meeting of the Council for Strategic Development and National Projects, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated that the government plans to establish both administrative and criminal liability for violations related to cryptocurrency mining. Lawyers told "RBC-Crypto" where the line between administrative and criminal offenses in the field of mining might be drawn.

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Domande pertinenti

QHow many illegal mining farms were discovered in the North Caucasus since the beginning of 2025?

AMore than 100 illegal mining farms were discovered.

QWhat is the total amount of financial damage caused by these illegal mining operations?

AThe total financial damage amounted to more than 656 million rubles.

QUntil when is cryptocurrency mining banned in the republics of the North Caucasus?

ACryptocurrency mining is banned until the spring of 2031.

QWhich Russian region suffered the most financial damage from these illegal mining farms?

AIngushetia suffered the most financial damage, with 14 farms causing 455.5 million rubles in damage.

QWhat did the Russian government plan to establish regarding cryptocurrency mining violations, as stated by Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak?

AThe government plans to establish both administrative and criminal liability for violations related to cryptocurrency mining.

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