Power Succession, Military Structure, and Cross-Border Capital: The Iranian Political Network of Mojtaba Khamenei

marsbitPublished on 2026-03-12Last updated on 2026-03-12

Abstract

The article examines Iran's political transition around 2026, focusing on Mojtaba Khamenei's rise as emblematic of structural shifts toward a securitized state. While religious institutions retain formal authority, the Revolutionary Guards have expanded their political and economic influence, controlling key industries and infrastructure. Power succession depends not just on religious legitimacy but also military support and elite networks. Economic resources are distributed through religious foundations and quasi-official entities, intertwining wealth and political power. International sanctions have prompted the use of digital assets for trade settlements and capital transfers, creating a multi-layered financial system combining traditional banking with crypto channels. Mojtaba Khamenei operates at the intersection of these networks—religious, military, economic, and financial—reflecting Iran’s evolution toward a centralized, security-driven governance model where formal institutions coexist with informal power structures.

Author: 137Labs

I. Structural Shift in the State Behind Power Transition

Iranian politics entered a highly sensitive phase around 2026. The transition of supreme power not only changed the composition of the leadership but also concentrated long-accumulated institutional changes. Mojtaba Khamenei's entry into the core of supreme power is seen by many observers as a symbolic node in the gradual tightening of Iran's political structure.

Iran's state system remains legally based on religious authority. According to the design of the constitution, the Assembly of Experts is responsible for selecting the Supreme Leader and performs supervisory functions. However, the operation of the system does not rely entirely on these formal procedures. Religious legitimacy, military attitudes, elite alliance stability, and national security conditions often collectively determine the final direction of power. Especially in the context of war and regional conflicts, maintaining regime continuity is usually prioritized over procedural discussions.

This political reality has gradually shaped Iran's power structure into a composite form. Religious institutions still provide the institutional framework and ideological language, but the role of security agencies in national governance continues to expand. The military system not only undertakes defense tasks but also plays a key role in political stability and policy implementation. The resulting power model has gradually shifted from traditional theocratic politics to a more securitized state structure.

Mojtaba has long been at the center of this structure. His political influence did not emerge suddenly but was gradually accumulated through years of power operations. Proximity to the Supreme Leader's office, connections with conservative networks, and maintaining stable relationships among key institutions have given him sustained influence within the system.

This background indicates that the issue of power succession in Iran is often not just about personal ability or religious status but is closely related to the stability of the state structure. The Supreme Leader is both a religious symbol and a coordinator of the state apparatus. Power transition thus reflects changes in the center of gravity of the institution, not merely a change of leaders.

II. Institutional Status and Political Influence of the Revolutionary Guards

The status of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran's political system has undergone profound changes. Initially established to safeguard the achievements of the revolution and national security, its role has gradually expanded into broader political and economic domains over time.

At the security level, the IRGC is responsible for critical tasks such as intelligence, counter-infiltration, and strategic defense. Its military capabilities are used not only to defend the nation but also to play a significant role in regional affairs. Simultaneously, the organization participates in domestic political stability work, possessing strong organizational mobilization capabilities during crises.

Similar expansion is evident in the economic sphere. IRGC-affiliated enterprises participate in numerous infrastructure projects and energy industries, with a broad presence in sectors such as construction, communications, and transportation. These economic activities provide the organization with a resource base and further enhance its institutional influence.

This development trend has altered the balance of political power in Iran. Religious institutions still hold formal supreme authority, but national governance increasingly relies on the executive capabilities of security agencies. The involvement of the military system emphasizes discipline and stability in the decision-making process.

Mojtaba's long-term connections with this security system place him in a special position within the power structure. The U.S. Treasury Department's 2019 sanctions documents noted that, although he did not obtain a formal position through election or public appointment, he actually performed some power functions in practical political operations. This situation indicates that Iran's high-level politics contains numerous informal mechanisms reliant on trust and personal networks.

As the role of the Revolutionary Guards in the state structure continues to expand, the relationship between political leaders and the security system becomes particularly critical. The power succession process is therefore not solely a decision within religious institutions but also involves the attitudes and support of the military system.

III. Resource Allocation System and Its Integration with Political Power

Iran's economy contains a vast network of assets controlled by religious foundations and quasi-official institutions. These organizations are often legally structured as charitable or social entities, but the scale of economic resources they actually control is enormous.

The foundation system has extensive operations in real estate, industry, financial services, and commercial investments. Their revenues are not fully incorporated into the national fiscal system but operate within independent organizational structures. Through this mechanism, some state resources are reallocated within the system.

This mechanism plays an important role in Iranian politics. The distribution of economic interests is often closely linked to the maintenance of political alliances. Resource-controlling institutions perform economic functions while also playing a role in maintaining political stability. National governance and economic interests are thus highly intertwined.

The U.S. Treasury Department, in sanctions against the Foundation of the Oppressed, noted that the organization and its subsidiaries wield influence in several key industries in Iran and maintain close ties with the core circle of the Supreme Leader. Related explanations also mentioned that some political figures or their relatives have long used foundation assets at rents far below market levels.

This information indicates that, within the Iranian system, wealth is not merely a matter of private property but is part of the political structure. Economic resources flow between different levels through foundations, affiliated enterprises, and proxy relationships.

In such an institutional environment, overseas asset allocation has gradually become a sensitive issue. If core political figures are suspected of preserving wealth through foreign investments, public opinion often links this to domestic economic pressures. The focus is not only on the scale of assets but also on whether resource distribution aligns with the political narrative.

It is also important to note that cross-border assets, in some cases, serve risk management functions. In an environment of prolonged sanctions and currency instability, foreign investments can act as a means of capital preservation. The relationship between political power and economic resources is thus more complex.

IV. Sanctions Environment and Digital Financial Channels

International sanctions have had a continuous impact on Iran's financial system. Some banks have been excluded from the global financial communication system, and traditional cross-border payment channels face significant restrictions. Trade settlements and international financing have consequently become difficult.

Against this backdrop, digital assets have gradually entered Iran's economic activities. Cryptocurrencies can facilitate value transfers without relying on the traditional banking system, a feature that gives them practical utility in sanctioned economies.

The Iranian government has previously permitted some cryptocurrency mining activities and explored the use of digital assets for trade settlements. With the development of trading platforms and over-the-counter (OTC) markets, a local crypto ecosystem has gradually formed.

The role of digital assets in Iran's financial structure is mainly reflected in three aspects. First, as a supplementary channel for cross-border payments, providing alternative solutions for some trade transactions. Second, as a tool for capital transfer, offering new pathways for fund flows in a restricted financial environment. Third, as a means of risk diversification, used for asset preservation during periods of economic volatility.

On-chain transactions do not imply complete anonymity, but they reduce dependence on the banking system. This is of significant importance for sanctioned countries.

Simultaneously, regional commercial hubs play important roles in fund flows. The Gulf region has long been a key node in Iran's trade network. Commercial agents, OTC traders, and offshore companies together form a complex commercial system.

Within this structure, digital assets are gradually integrating with traditional trade networks. On-chain funds can be quickly transferred to external nodes and then exchanged for fiat currency or assets through OTC markets. Financial activities thus exhibit a combination of online and offline characteristics.

V. The Future Form of Iran's Power Structure

Considering the political, economic, and financial changes collectively, new characteristics are emerging in Iran's state structure.

The role of security agencies in national governance continues to strengthen. The military and intelligence systems not only undertake defense tasks but also exert significant influence on political stability and economic activities. The decision-making system is thus more centralized.

Economic resources increasingly rely on foundations and quasi-official institutions for distribution. These organizations are both economic entities and perform important functions in maintaining political alliances.

The financial structure is gradually forming a multi-layered system. The traditional banking system, regional trade networks, and digital asset channels together constitute the framework for capital flows. Different levels of financial instruments function in different scenarios.

Within this institutional framework, the role of political leaders is not only that of a symbolic national representative but also a coordination node among multiple power networks. Religious legitimacy, support from security agencies, and resource allocation capabilities collectively determine their political status.

Mojtaba's position lies precisely at the intersection of these networks. His political influence is not an isolated phenomenon but part of the long-term evolution of Iran's power structure. Religious authority, military power, economic resources, and the cross-border financial system are interconnected within this structure, collectively shaping the mode of national governance.

This combination gives Iranian politics new characteristics: institutional legitimacy is still expressed in religious language, but state operations increasingly rely on security agencies and complex resource networks. Iran's future development path will largely depend on how this structure continues to evolve and how internal society and the external environment influence it.

Related Questions

QWhat are the key factors that determine the ultimate direction of power in Iran, beyond the formal procedures outlined in the constitution?

ABeyond the formal procedures, the ultimate direction of power in Iran is determined by a combination of religious legitimacy, the attitude of the military, the stability of elite alliances, and the national security situation. In the context of war and regional conflict, maintaining regime continuity is often prioritized over procedural discussions.

QHow has the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) evolved within Iran's political system?

AThe IRGC's role has expanded from its initial purpose of safeguarding the revolution and national security to encompassing a much broader political and economic influence. It is involved in intelligence, strategic defense, domestic political stability, and has significant economic interests in infrastructure, energy, construction through its affiliated companies, altering the balance of power in the state.

QWhat is the function of the political significance of the religious foundation system in Iran's economy?

AThe religious foundation system controls a vast network of assets in real estate, industry, and finance. It functions to reallocate state resources outside the formal fiscal system, playing a crucial role in maintaining political alliances and stability. The distribution of economic benefits through these foundations is highly intertwined with political power.

QIn what ways have digital assets become integrated into Iran's financial structure under international sanctions?

ADigital assets have become integrated as a supplementary channel for cross-border payments, a tool for capital transfer amidst financial restrictions, and a means for risk diversification and asset preservation. They reduce reliance on the traditional banking system and have merged with regional trade networks and over-the-counter markets.

QWhat new characteristics is Iran's state structure developing, according to the analysis of its political, economic, and financial changes?

AIran's state structure is developing characteristics of a more securitized governance model. This includes the enhanced role of security agencies in state governance and the economy, the allocation of economic resources through foundations to maintain political alliances, and a multi-layered financial system combining traditional banking, regional trade networks, and digital assets. Political leadership acts as a coordination node within these interconnected networks.

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