Dedollarization is no longer a theoretical topic for economists—it has become a national security issue for a number of countries. The turning point was the repeated use of the dollar as a tool of pressure: disconnecting Iran from SWIFT, sanctions against Russia, and then the freezing of Russian currency reserves. Each such step pushed countries to find ways to conduct settlements bypassing the American financial infrastructure—and China was ready to offer an alternative.
We are talking about the Cross-border Interbank Payment System (CIPS)—a cross-border interbank payment system that China is developing as an analogue to SWIFT for settlements in yuan. Launched in 2015 with nearly zero volume, the system now processes cross-border payments equivalent to approximately $7 trillion per month.
How the Freezing of Russia's Reserves Changed the Yuan's Trajectory
The growth dynamics of CIPS have not been uniform. On the graph of cross-border transaction volumes, acceleration points are clearly visible, and each coincides with another case of the "militarized" use of the dollar:
2012 — Iran's disconnection from SWIFT
2014 — Sanctions against Russia
2017–2018 — Launch of the yuan-denominated oil contract and the first Trump-China trade war
2022 — Freezing of Russia's currency reserves
2023 — Biden administration restrictions on exporting advanced chips to China
2025 — A new round of the Trump-China trade war and the US strike on Iran
The most dramatic spike occurred in 2022: after Western countries blocked Russia's access to its reserves, the volume of yuan settlements grew multiple times. The logic is simple—if a currency can be frozen by a political decision, countries have an incentive to diversify reserves and switch trade to other currencies.
From Zero to $7 Trillion Per Month in a Decade
Official statistics from the People's Bank of China (PBOC) confirm the scale of growth. In 2025, CIPS processed 8.4419 million transactions with a total value equivalent to $25.55 trillion for the year. Preliminary data for the first half of 2026 indicate the annual pace could be even higher—suggested by estimates based on monthly PBOC and CIPS operator statistics. The average daily transaction value grew from about $96 billion in 2025 to around $118 billion by June 2026.
The network itself is expanding: the system is currently used by 210 direct and 1,619 indirect participants—banks and financial organizations worldwide that in 2015 simply did not have the ability to conduct settlements in yuan directly, bypassing the dollar.
The Yuan is Still Far from Reserve Currency Status
The growth of CIPS should not be confused with displacing the dollar from the global financial system. According to SWIFT tracker data, the yuan's share in global payments in June 2026 was only 3.10%—fifth place among currencies, far behind the dollar. In trade finance, the figure is slightly higher at 8.00%.
The total volume of cross-border yuan settlements within China at the end of 2025 reached approximately $9.9 trillion equivalent, which is 10.2% more year-on-year. In other words, the yuan is becoming a significant tool for settlements between specific trade partners and for bypassing sanctions risks, but does not yet aspire to the role of a universal reserve currency.
Nevertheless, the trajectory itself is indicative: each new use of the dollar as a tool of pressure—be it disconnection from SWIFT, freezing of reserves, or trade restrictions—has historically coincided with a new wave of growth for CIPS.
AI Opinion
From the perspective of machine data analysis, the growth of CIPS looks less clear-cut when adding a technical detail not covered in the article: the platform still largely depends on SWIFT at the level of interbank message exchange. According to estimates from industry sources, about 80% of CIPS transactions pass through SWIFT channels for message routing, making the Chinese system more of a complement to the global infrastructure than a full-fledged alternative to it.
Historical context adds another layer: China's reluctance to fully liberalize the yuan exchange rate and remove capital movement restrictions long constrained the currency's internationalization more than the lack of an alternative payment system. The question is whether the CIPS infrastructure can accelerate this process by itself, or whether the yuan's convertibility remains a more fundamental barrier than any technical limitations.
