la

Subida acentuada de Lagrange (LA)

Histórico de subidas acentuadas de LA

No último ano, LA registou uma subida de 24h de 5 % um total de 41 vezes, de 10 % um total de 15 vezes e de 20 % um total de 4 vezes.

Gráfico em Tempo Real de LA (LA/USD)

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Histórico de subidas acentuadas de 24h de LA (>5%)

Acompanhe os movimentos de preço de LA e os principais eventos de subida acentuada na HTX, com os últimos 10 registos.Ver mais dados sobre os preços de LA

DataCriptoOcorrência nºPreçoVariação de 24h
2026/08/06Lagrange (LA)41$0,0519+10,66%
2026/07/25Lagrange (LA)40$0,0769+17,4%
2026/07/23Lagrange (LA)39$0,0739+22,35%
2026/07/22Lagrange (LA)38$0,0604+11,23%
2026/07/20Lagrange (LA)37$0,0577+14,94%
2026/06/18Lagrange (LA)36$0,0722+5,4%
2026/06/09Lagrange (LA)35$0,076+11,11%
2026/05/28Lagrange (LA)34$0,1073+8,82%
2026/04/12Lagrange (LA)33$0,1664+7,08%
2026/03/31Lagrange (LA)32$0,192+5,96%

Histórico de subidas acentuadas de 24h de LA (>10%)

Acompanhe os movimentos de preço de LA e os principais eventos de subida acentuada na HTX, com os últimos 10 registos.Ver mais dados sobre os preços de LA

DataCriptoOcorrência nºPreçoVariação de 24h
2026/08/06Lagrange (LA)15$0,0519+10,66%
2026/07/25Lagrange (LA)14$0,0769+17,4%
2026/07/23Lagrange (LA)13$0,0739+22,35%
2026/07/22Lagrange (LA)12$0,0604+11,23%
2026/07/20Lagrange (LA)11$0,0577+14,94%
2026/06/09Lagrange (LA)10$0,076+11,11%
2026/02/22Lagrange (LA)9$0,2569+20,38%
2026/02/06Lagrange (LA)8$0,2957+62,29%
2025/11/16Lagrange (LA)7$0,5198+13,32%
2025/11/14Lagrange (LA)6$0,5326+24%

Histórico de subidas acentuadas de 24h de LA (>20%)

Acompanhe os movimentos de preço de LA e os principais eventos de subida acentuada na HTX, com os últimos 10 registos.Ver mais dados sobre os preços de LA

DataCriptoOcorrência nºPreçoVariação de 24h
2026/07/23Lagrange (LA)4$0,0739+22,35%
2026/02/22Lagrange (LA)3$0,2569+20,38%
2026/02/06Lagrange (LA)2$0,2957+62,29%
2025/11/14Lagrange (LA)1$0,5326+24%

Artigos

Hyperliquid Policy Center Maps Out Multi-Year Agenda, CEO Sets 3 Key Goals

Jake Chervinsky, CEO of the Hyperliquid Policy Center (HPC), has outlined a multi-year policy agenda to reshape DeFi regulation in the U.S. The independent research and advocacy organization aims to promote clear rules for decentralized finance, focusing on expanding lawful U.S. access to decentralized perpetual derivatives markets and protecting open-source developers from being misclassified as financial intermediaries. HPC is actively supporting the CLARITY Act to include explicit protections for DeFi builders. Chervinsky highlighted three key goals: establishing CFTC and SEC pathways for legal trading of commodity and equity perpetuals on decentralized platforms like Hyperliquid, and securing passage of the CLARITY Act with strong developer safeguards.

Hyperliquid Policy Center Maps Out Multi-Year Agenda, CEO Sets 3 Key Goals - bitcoinist

CFTC sues Illinois in case that could decide how prediction markets scale in the U.S.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has sued the State of Illinois, escalating a legal battle that could determine the regulatory future of prediction markets in the U.S. The lawsuit, filed on April 2, challenges Illinois' cease-and-desist orders against platforms like Kalshi and Polymarket, which the state considers unlicensed sports betting. The CFTC argues these event contracts are swaps under federal jurisdiction, preempting state regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act and the Supremacy Clause. This case tests whether prediction markets will develop as a unified financial system under federal oversight or face a fragmented, state-by-state regulatory landscape that could hinder their growth and nationwide access. The outcome may define if these platforms become core financial infrastructure or remain constrained like state-regulated gambling.

CFTC sues Illinois in case that could decide how prediction markets scale in the U.S. - ambcrypto

Why Did OpenAI Decide to Make a Phone? ChatGPT Is Taking the Permissions Apple Won't Give

The article discusses OpenAI's surprising move into developing its own AI-powered smartphone, reportedly targeting a 2027 launch. Initially driven by faith that superior AI models alone would secure its dominance—evidenced by ChatGPT's viral success—OpenAI now faces a strategic pivot. Key challenges include slower-than-expected revenue growth and competition from rivals like Anthropic's Claude Code, which successfully monetized a specific, high-value user base (developers) by deeply integrating into workflows. OpenAI recognizes that for ChatGPT to evolve from a conversational tool into a true "AI Agent" that completes tasks (e.g., booking travel, managing files), it needs direct system-level permissions and a default user interface. Currently, as a service integrated into platforms like Apple's iOS and Microsoft's Windows, ChatGPT lacks the necessary access and control ("sovereignty") over hardware, data, and user interactions. Building its own device is seen as a way to give ChatGPT its "first body"—a dedicated terminal where it can operate with full autonomy, bypassing the limitations imposed by partner ecosystems. This shift underscores a broader realization: in the AI Agent era, owning the end-user device and experience is critical to capturing value and maintaining competitive advantage, even if it means directly competing with former allies like Apple.

Why Did OpenAI Decide to Make a Phone? ChatGPT Is Taking the Permissions Apple Won't Give - marsbit

La Liga Team Bets $1 Million Against Themselves Before Match: Does Using Prediction Markets for Insurance Comply with Sports Regulations?

A Spanish La Liga club, reportedly Osasuna, purchased insurance against relegation and was linked to a transaction of over $1 million on the prediction market platform Kalshi, betting against its own victory in a crucial season-ending match. While Osasuna confirmed buying €1.2 million insurance for a potential €6 million payout in case of relegation through broker Howden, it did not confirm involvement with Kalshi. The reported trade involved intermediaries like Game Point Capital and Greenlight Commodities, with quant firm Susquehanna as the counterparty. This incident highlights the blurring line between financial hedging and gambling in prediction markets. Such markets allow trading on future event outcomes, like sports results. In the US, Kalshi operates as a regulated event contract market under the CFTC. However, Spanish authorities recently initiated penalties against Kalshi and Polymarket, considering their activities unlicensed gambling. The case raises core questions about prediction markets: who can trade, how insider information is handled, and whether participants can influence outcomes, especially in sports where results are human-driven. While leagues like La Liga and Serie A have partnered with Polymarket in North America, the regulatory clash and potential for conflicts of interest, as seen in this club's alleged transaction, present significant challenges as prediction markets evolve toward institutional risk management.

La Liga Team Bets $1 Million Against Themselves Before Match: Does Using Prediction Markets for Insurance Comply with Sports Regulations? - Foresight News

After the Lending Markets Disappear, What's Left for These Public Chains?

"The Lending Market Vanishes: What Remains for These Blockchains?" Last week, Aave announced the closure of its lending markets on six blockchains where each generated less than $5,000 in quarterly revenue. This move highlights a critical trend: while the DeFi lending sector is growing overall, it is becoming highly concentrated on a few leading chains like Ethereum, Base, and Arbitrum. The article analyzes the cascading effects when a major lending protocol like Aave exits a chain. Past examples, such as Harmony Protocol and Fantom (later rebranded as Sonic), demonstrate that losing core lending infrastructure leads to a complete collapse of the credit ecosystem. This is because a functional lending market relies on a costly, interconnected stack of services—including reliable price oracles (often maintained by the largest protocol), deep DEX liquidity for liquidations, and stablecoin issuers willing to support native minting and redemption. Once the primary lending demand disappears, maintaining this infrastructure becomes commercially unviable, triggering an exodus of other service providers. The six chains Aave is leaving (including Soneium, Aptos, zkSync, and Scroll) are in an even weaker position than Harmony or Fantom were. They never developed substantial native lending demand despite significant initial funding. Aave's departure will likely accelerate the withdrawal of oracle providers, market makers, and stablecoin issuers, as their business cases depend on a functioning credit market. This creates a self-reinforcing cycle of centralization, where resources and activity consolidate on the most viable chains. The dilemma mirrors challenges in traditional finance, such as global banks withdrawing correspondent banking services from small countries due to high fixed compliance costs. However, unlike the traditional system where institutions like the World Bank can provide subsidies, there is no such safety net in the decentralized crypto space. The key takeaway is that while launching a new blockchain is cheap, operating a full-featured, sustainable credit infrastructure on it is extremely expensive. Aave has now set a minimum annual revenue threshold of $2 million for new chain deployments, roughly covering these fixed costs. The future for many smaller chains may be a fragmented ecosystem with flawed, unofficial forks of major protocols, or they may be left with nothing at all as DeFi lending continues its aggressive consolidation.

After the Lending Markets Disappear, What's Left for These Public Chains? - marsbit

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