ETHPreço de Ethereum

Vitalik Buterin, co-founder of Ethereum, has proposed EIP-8288, aimed at drastically reducing the cost of transactions that are resistant to quantum attacks. Named the recursive STARK mempool, this proposal is intended for inclusion in the planned I-star upgrade following the Hegota update. The goal of EIP-8288 is to move signatures and cryptographic proofs outside Ethereum's main execution process, bundling them with recursive STARK proofs within the transaction pool. This is designed to significantly reduce both the computational load on the blockchain and data costs. According to Buterin, the system offers major advantages, particularly for quantum-secure signatures and privacy-focused protocols. Currently, the cost of a privacy-preserving, quantum-secure transaction can reach around 10 million gas, but with EIP-8288, it is projected to fall to tens of thousands of gas. The proposal can also support next-generation signature systems or proofs of work, such as Falcon and ML-DSA, without requiring changes to the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). It may pave the way for privacy-enhancing applications in account abstraction. In the proposed system, Ethereum nodes would periodically bundle transaction dependencies to generate recursive STARK proofs. Block builders would then generate the necessary proofs for including transactions in a block. The system's overhead is estimated at roughly 100–300 KB of STARK proofs per block and 96 bytes of extra data per verified claim. Buterin added that this approach could help establish a RISC-V architecture as a standard instruction set for recursive STARK transactions within the Ethereum ecosystem. If included in the I-star upgrade, EIP-8288 would represent a significant advance for Ethereum's long-term quantum resilience and privacy infrastructure.

The article argues that while Layer-2 (L2) scaling solutions like Base, Arbitrum, and Robinhood Chain have achieved massive commercial success, they have failed to deliver on the original Ethereum-centric vision of becoming decentralized, Stage 2 rollups. Most major L2s remain at Stage 0 or 1, where operators retain centralized control, including the ability to censor, freeze assets, and upgrade contracts, often due to legal and regulatory pressures. Consequently, the anticipated symbiotic relationship where L2s significantly "feed back" value to Ethereum L1 has not materialized. The four potential value transfer channels—Data Availability rents, ETH as gas/money, settlement authority, and brand licensing—are largely weak, voluntary, or unpriced. Only true settlement authority (Stage 2) would create a structural, fee-generating relationship, but corporate L2 operators have no commercial incentive to adopt it, as it would strip them of the control their compliance needs demand. Therefore, the author concludes that L2s primarily use Ethereum as a "regulatory arbitrage" branding tool and a call option, not a true settlement layer. Ethereum's core development focus should shift away from trying to serve these clients and instead double down on its unique, defensible "CROPS" value proposition—Censorship Resistance, Open-source freedom, Privacy, and Security—which can be unilaterally delivered and offers a sanctuary market that competitors cannot replicate.

The race between Bitcoin, Ethereum, and quantum computing is intensifying as the U.S. launches a $300 million hardware development program under the CHIPS Act, funding companies like Rigetti, D-Wave, and Quantinuum. In response, Ethereum developers have set a target of December 2029 for implementing quantum-resistant cryptography at the base protocol level, anticipating a potential "Q-day" in 2030. While Bitcoin lacks a formal deadline, significant work is underway on proposals (BIP-360 and BIP-361) for new post-quantum transaction formats and a transition away from current ECDSA and Schnorr signatures. Bitcoin researchers also view 2029 as a critical deadline. This urgency persists even though a quantum computer capable of stealing crypto is not expected by then. Recent analysis suggests breaking 256-bit elliptic curve cryptography could require under 1,200 error-corrected qubits. IBM and others aim for systems with hundreds of logical qubits by the late 2020s, prompting proactive measures. The transition poses unique challenges. For Bitcoin, millions of coins, including an estimated 1 million BTC linked to Satoshi Nakamoto, are on addresses with exposed public keys, risking being locked if not moved. Ethereum, despite having a dedicated team, faces a complex coordination challenge in migrating wallets and applications after the core protocol upgrade. The race is not a direct fight but a race against time: can these blockchains upgrade their cryptography, securing hundreds of billions in assets, before quantum hardware closes the technological gap?

Researchers have more than halved the computational complexity estimate for a key stage of a future quantum attack on Bitcoin and Ethereum, compared to a prior benchmark from Google. In a collaborative effort involving over 100 specialists and AI agents, a team from the Ethereum Foundation, Theta Labs, StarkWare, and others developed a quantum circuit for a core operation in Shor's algorithm. The new design requires 1,151 logical qubits and about 1.3 million Toffoli gates, resulting in a final cost estimate of approximately 1.5 billion units—over 50% lower than Google's previous estimate of around 3 billion units published in March. The optimization focused on the elliptic curve point addition operation. The work was conducted during an eight-week open challenge called ECDSA.Fail, which generated over 400 accepted improvements. AI agents assisted by writing code, running tests, and performing minor optimizations, while humans guided the research direction and made major architectural changes. The researchers clarified that the study does not represent a complete attack; it covers only one major computational component and excludes physical error correction and other full-scale implementation costs. Therefore, current systems cannot use these results to hack Bitcoin or Ethereum. They also noted that progress in quantum attacks isn't solely dependent on building more powerful hardware; software and algorithmic optimizations can significantly lower the hardware requirements. The authors do not believe a successful quantum attack on these cryptocurrencies is imminent. However, they highlight a key concern: transitioning to quantum-resistant cryptography could take years, and already compromised private keys cannot be retroactively secured.

Cryptocurrency researchers have reduced the estimated quantum computing risk to Bitcoin and Ethereum by 50%. A collaborative paper from Theta Labs, StarkWare, and others describes an optimized quantum scheme for performing elliptic curve point addition, a core computation within Shor's algorithm. This new scheme requires approximately 1.15 billion "logical qubit-gates" (a resource metric), significantly lower than the roughly 3 billion reported by Google Quantum AI in March. The research, involving over 100 participants and AI coding agents over two months in the ECDSA.Fail open challenge, focused on the secp256k1 cryptography used by Bitcoin and Ethereum. While noting that the figures from different projects are not directly comparable, the findings indicate that the resources needed for a potential quantum attack are decreasing through algorithmic and implementation optimizations. The authors stress that a practical, error-corrected quantum computer capable of executing the full attack does not yet exist. However, they emphasize the urgency of preparing cryptographic transitions now, as such upgrades will take years and cannot be applied retroactively. Concurrently, recent U.S. government grants under the CHIPS Act to companies like Rigetti and Quantinuum aim to fund the development of larger, fault-tolerant quantum machines.