Author: Chainalysis
Compiled by: AididiaoJP, Foresight News
Summary
Bloomberg reported on April 1, 2026, that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has begun collecting transit tolls from vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Shipping operators negotiate fees with the Iranian side, typically starting at approximately one dollar per barrel of oil, payable in Chinese Yuan or stablecoins, through an intermediary associated with the IRGC and a permit system. Subsequently, a Financial Times report quoted a spokesperson from the Iran Oil, Gas and Petrochemical Products Exporters Union stating that during the ceasefire period, shipping companies seeking passage through the Strait of Hormuz would be required to pay a toll of one dollar per barrel in cryptocurrency.
Although the statement specifically mentioned Bitcoin, we speculate that Iran might prioritize the use of stablecoins over Bitcoin for collecting such fees, consistent with the long-standing pattern of the Iranian regime and its regional proxies heavily relying on stablecoins for illicit trade and sanctions evasion.
This latest development is an extension of the IRGC's expanding cryptocurrency footprint. Based on sanctions designations by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), seizure lists from the U.S. National Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Center, and leaked Iranian Central Bank address data, the IRGC's crypto activities accounted for approximately half of Iran's total crypto ecosystem volume in Q4 2025, involving billions of dollars.
Shipping companies making these payments to Iran face significant sanctions exposure, as Iran is subject to comprehensive U.S. and international sanctions. This generally means that businesses must obtain specific licenses or approvals from relevant authorities before transacting with sanctioned entities or jurisdictions.
As the situation evolves, regulators, law enforcement, and stablecoin issuers all have roles to play in identifying IRGC-controlled wallets and their counterparties, and freezing illicit assets.
A New Frontier in State-Level Cryptocurrency Adoption
Bloomberg reported on April 1, 2026, that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has begun collecting transit tolls from vessels seeking safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Shipping operators are required to submit detailed information about vessel ownership, flag, cargo, destination, and crew to an intermediary associated with the IRGC, then negotiate a toll—typically starting around one dollar per barrel of oil, payable in Chinese Yuan or stablecoins—in exchange for a permit code and a route for escorted passage, what the industry calls the "Iranian toll booth."
Subsequently, a Financial Times report on April 8, 2026, quoted Hamid Hosseini, a spokesperson for the Iran Oil, Gas and Petrochemical Products Exporters Union—an industry association working closely with the state—stating that tankers would need to email Iranian authorities about their cargo, after which Iran would inform them of the toll amount to be paid in "digital currency." He specifically mentioned Bitcoin, noting that tankers would have "a few seconds to complete the payment in Bitcoin to ensure it cannot be traced or confiscated due to sanctions."
If implemented, this measure would mark a significant milestone: the first known instance of a sovereign state requiring cryptocurrency payments for transit fees through an international waterway. Beyond the immediate crisis, Tehran's move sets a dangerous precedent for future international commerce. If successful, this mechanism would provide a proof-of-concept easily replicable by other heavily sanctioned actors and applicable to other critical maritime chokepoints and strategic arteries in global trade.
Although this concept sounds novel, it aligns perfectly with the well-documented and rapidly expanding pattern of the Iranian regime utilizing cryptocurrency—particularly stablecoins—to facilitate large-scale trade in weapons, oil, and commodities.
Why We Expect Stablecoins, Not Bitcoin
Hosseini's comments explicitly mentioned Bitcoin, and this choice has surface-level logic: Bitcoin is fully decentralized and, unlike stablecoins such as USDT, cannot be frozen by an issuer. However, based on our in-depth analysis of the Iranian regime's on-chain behavior, we speculate that if this plan is implemented, stablecoins will ultimately become the preferred tool for large-scale toll collection.
Historically, the Iranian regime has utilized stablecoins because their peg to the U.S. dollar provides a store of value and the liquidity needed for large-scale application. As the Iranian rial plummets and Iran's economy remains in crisis, the regime's reliance on stablecoins has taken on greater strategic importance. In contrast, Bitcoin experiences regular price volatility. Lacking an issuer and being immune to seizure or freezing by intermediaries, Bitcoin is primarily used by Iranian cyber actors for ransomware payments and supporting malicious cyber operations—a vastly different use case from the large-scale, commercially-oriented fund flows involved in Strait of Hormuz tolls.
According to documented records, the on-chain activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—covering oil sales, weapons procurement, and proxy financing—overwhelmingly rely on stablecoins as the medium of exchange. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world's most critical chokepoints, with about 20% of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas passing through it. Given that tankers in the Persian Gulf currently hold approximately 175 million barrels of crude oil and refined products, even collecting tolls on a fraction of this oil transport could provide much-needed revenue for the regime during one of the most severe threats it has faced in decades.
The IRGC's Crypto Empire: Billions On-Chain
To understand why cryptocurrency-denominated tolls for the Strait of Hormuz are a logical next step for the Iranian regime, one must understand the scale and sophistication of the IRGC's existing on-chain operations.
As documented in our earlier analysis of Iran's $7.8 billion crypto ecosystem, the IRGC's on-chain activity has been steadily growing, accounting for roughly half of Iran's total crypto ecosystem volume by Q4 2025. Addresses linked to the IRGC received over $2 billion in funds in 2024, surging to over $3 billion in 2025. These figures are conservative estimates, as they only cover addresses identified through OFAC sanctions designations and seizure lists from the U.S. National Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Center, and not the entirety of shell companies, financial intermediaries, and other wallets controlled by the IRGC.
Sanctions Implications for Shipping Companies
For the global shipping industry, Iran's crypto toll presents significant compliance risks. Iran is subject to comprehensive U.S. sanctions, meaning U.S. persons and entities are prohibited from engaging in almost all transactions involving the Iranian government, its agencies, and instrumentalities. Shipping companies seeking passage through the Strait of Hormuz that make payments to Iran, whether in cryptocurrency or any other form, could face severe penalties. Furthermore, in the fragile ceasefire context, not all oil companies, shippers, and other multinational corporations may be ready to transport and insure cargo through the Strait.
Typically, businesses need to apply for specific licenses or approvals from the U.S. Treasury Department to conduct transactions with sanctioned entities or engage in trade activities within sanctioned jurisdictions. Paying cryptocurrency to entities associated with the Iranian state without such authorization would likely constitute a sanctions violation, exposing companies to enforcement actions, fines, and reputational damage, as it could provide material support usable for funding Iran's war efforts and its proxy groups throughout the region.
The fact that these payments are denominated in cryptocurrency rather than traditional fiat currency does not change the underlying sanctions implications. However, unlike traditional payment channels, the inherent transparency of blockchain allows regulators and compliance teams to track fund flows almost in real-time. This facilitates the identification of entities interacting directly or indirectly with sanctioned wallets.
Looking Ahead: Opportunities for Interdiction
The ongoing public identification and verification of IRGC wallet addresses remain crucial. Each additional sanctions designation and seizure list entry further enriches the on-chain map of the regime's financial infrastructure, making it increasingly difficult for the regime to access mainstream liquidity.
Opportunities for interdiction span the public and private sectors:
- Stablecoin issuers can technically freeze assets in wallets identified as controlled by or associated with the IRGC or other sanctioned entities. If, as we suspect, the Iranian regime indeed uses stablecoins for collecting Strait of Hormuz tolls, this would represent a direct node for intervention.
- Law enforcement agencies can use blockchain intelligence to trace backwards through the IRGC's money laundering infrastructure that processes toll payments, potentially identifying new nodes and cash-out points within the network.
- Regulators should continue to publicly identify and verify IRGC wallet addresses, expanding the known boundaries of the regime's on-chain activity.
- Compliance teams at exchanges, financial institutions, and shipping companies should continuously monitor exposure to Iranian services and IRGC-linked wallets, especially considering that this new fee mechanism could introduce new types of fund flows into the mainstream crypto ecosystem.
As Iran continues to integrate cryptocurrency into its state fiscal operations—from oil sales and proxy financing to maritime transit tolls—blockchain analysis is essential for maintaining visibility into these fund flows and enabling the international community to mitigate risks and generate actionable leads.
