Author: Ding Dang, Odaily Planet Daily
Original Title: Bull vs. Bear Debate: Is Stablecoin Leader CRCL Worth Buying? Why Can't High-Growth Earnings Drive the Stock Price?
Recently, the Chinese X community has ignited a fierce debate around "Is Circle (NYSE: CRCL) worth buying?", with the court of public opinion clearly split into two major camps. One side views it as a value stock with significant institutional红利 (red tape/benefits) in the stablecoin赛道 (track/sector), while the other frequently questions the fragility of its profit model and potential cyclical risks. The交锋 (clash/exchange) of views reflects the vastly different judgment logics and expectation levels the current market holds for innovative projects.
Odaily Planet Daily, based on extensive public discussion and rational analysis within the community,梳理 (sorts out/compiles) the core arguments and reasoning paths of both sides, attempting to present readers with the deeper disagreements behind the controversy, beyond emotions and stances.
Background Brief
Circle (NYSE: CRCL) has experienced a typical "narrative-driven asset" price curve since its listing on the New York Stock Exchange on June 5, 2025: rising from an IPO price of $64 to a阶段性 (phase/period) high of $298.9 in a short time, then gradually falling back to near the IPO price around November 20, 2025, touching a low of $64.9, and recently rebounding to around $83.9.
On November 12, 2025, CRCL released its first full quarterly (Q3) earnings report since the IPO: total revenue was $740 million, a year-on-year increase of 66%; net profit was $214 million, with EPS of $0.64, significantly exceeding market expectations. The most critical driving factor came from the surge in USDC circulation from $35.5 billion in the same period last year to $73.7 billion (+108%), as well as the increase in reserve asset yields in a high-interest-rate environment.
However, the stock price fell 11.4% on the first day after the earnings release and累计 (accumulatively) fell 20% over the week. Key pain points included high distribution fees ($448 million, 60% of revenue), operating expenses eroding profits, a high proportion of non-recurring income (71% from fair value changes in investments), and selling pressure from the lock-up expiration. According to SEC filings, the IPO lock-up period ended after the Q3 earnings report, with a huge number of potential unlocked shares starting from November 14th.
Regarding these facts, Odaily Planet Daily has compiled the differing views from @0xNing0x, Jiang Zhuo'er, @Phyrex_Ni, @BTCdayu, @qinbafrank, and others for readers to compare and analyze.
I. Is the Profit Model Sustainable: Is CRCL a Bank or Financial Infrastructure?
Jiang Zhuo'er believes that CRCL's profit source is essentially "earning interest rate spreads": users exchange money for USDC, Circle allocates these funds to low-risk assets like U.S. Treasuries, earns interest income, and then deducts operating costs and channel profit sharing.
But the problem is that CRCL's profit distribution structure is extremely unfavorable to itself. According to the agreement, about 61% of the profits must be shared with Coinbase, and Coinbase also holds 22% of the USDC share, with 100% of this portion's收益 (收益/收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益收益极低。
More critically, in a rate-cutting cycle, the fragility of this "interest rate spread" model will be infinitely magnified. When U.S. Treasury rates fall back to around 2% long-term, and operating costs are close to 1%, after deducting channel profit sharing, CRCL might even enter a loss-making state.
He believes that CRCL's current profit structure does not stem from商业效率 (business efficiency), but from the regulatory arrangement of policies "prohibiting issuers from directly paying Treasury interest to users." This model is essentially a寄生型 (parasitic) structure. Once policies relax, or competitors bypass the restrictions through rewards, rebates, staking, etc., to indirectly share profits, CRCL's profit margin will be directly hollowed out.
@0xNing0x provided a more精细 (detailed/fine) breakdown of CRCL's profit structure. CRCL's net profit is highly correlated with three core variables—the scale of USDC issuance, the Fed's benchmark interest rate, and the cost of distribution channels.
Based on historical financial data, the elasticity coefficients of these three factors on profit are not the same: the scale factor's elasticity is about 2.1, the interest rate factor's is about 1.9, and the channel cost factor is about 1.3. This means that changes in USDC scale have the greatest impact on profit. According to calculations, every $10 billion increase in USDC scale could theoretically bring about $114 million in incremental profit, corresponding to an放大效应 (amplification effect) of about 21% profit elasticity.
Both of them believe that CRCL is类似 (similar to) a bank dressed in tech clothing, but the market prices it with a tech stock or even a "tech + bank" hybrid valuation logic, which is a clear mispricing, and the stock price will eventually回归现实 (return to reality).
In contrast is the understanding of BTCdayu and qinbafrank. They do not agree with the "CRCL is a bank" analogy. They believe that simply understanding CRCL as an interest-rate-spread-earning bank is a very superficial observation.
In their view, CRCL is doing a typical "lose money first, monopolize later" business. Sharing out profits is not被迫 (forced), but a strategic choice. The essence is not to make money in the short term, but to exchange it for规模 (scale), network effects, and the irreversible accumulation of user mindshare.
They draw analogies to companies like Amazon, Pinduoduo, and JD.com: these companies all lost money for years and were even considered to have problematic business models, but later proved that these losses were the cost of "buying the market," not structural defects. If you衡量 (measure) these companies by current profits, you can only conclude that they "should have gone bankrupt long ago."
In their view, the stablecoin market is a highly likely "winner-takes-all"赛道 (track/sector). Once USDC forms an irreversible advantage in compliance and scale, the seemingly heavy profit-sharing costs of today will be transformed into pricing power tomorrow. The state of "begging others to use it" will become "others begging to接入 (access/connect to) it."
II. Will the Rate-Cutting Cycle Breach the Profit Model?
Jiang Zhuo'er and some cautious parties are very clear: interest rates are CRCL's lifeline.
Because Circle's revenue is highly dependent on U.S. Treasury yields, as long as the interest rate trend is downward, CRCL's revenue ceiling will be systematically compressed. Even if the USDC scale grows, in their view, it will be difficult to fully offset the negative impact brought by the interest rate cycle.
They are more inclined to view CRCL as a "financial spread instrument" highly sensitive to macro interest rates, rather than a tech company with endogenous growth power.
The judgment of BTCdayu and qinbafrank is: the interest rate is not the key variable, scale is.
They believe that rate cuts will be gradual, not a one-time collapse. At the same time, the real explosion period for stablecoins has not yet arrived. Once stablecoin legislation is passed, and more traditional financial institutions and corporate users start using stablecoins compliantly, the issuance scale of USDC could rise from the current less than trillion-dollar level to the $2–3 trillion range within a few years, or even higher.
They are not纠结 (obsessed) with精细 (fine) questions like "whether next year's interest rate will be 3% or 2.5%". In their view, as long as the growth rate of the issuance scale is far greater than the magnitude of the interest rate decline, the overall revenue scale will still expand.
They tend to believe that the current market过度盯住 (over-focuses on) the "interest rate"这个显性 (this obvious) variable, but underestimates the "compliance-driven scale migration"这个更隐蔽但更强大 (this more hidden but more powerful) force.
More importantly, the Coinbase profit-sharing agreement is a "result of business negotiation," not eternally immutable. When CRCL's market position shifts from "begging for distribution" to "being relied upon," bargaining power will naturally tilt.
III. The Stablecoin War: Will CRCL Be Crushed by Giants?
Jiang Zhuo'er's judgment on the competitive landscape is pessimistic.
He believes that once traditional financial giants like JPMorgan Chase fully enter the field, a company of CRCL's size will find it difficult to cope in terms of credit endorsement, channel resources, and regulatory influence. More importantly, giants are fully capable of using subsidies, profit concessions, or even losing money to grab market share.
In his view, CRCL does not have the anti-censorship attributes of USDT, nor is it irreplaceable. Once traditional institutions' stablecoins begin to roll out, CRCL could be marginalized.
@BTCdayu emphasizes that the essence of stablecoin competition is a war for user mindshare. USDC has already formed an隐形护城河 (invisible moat) through compliance, licenses, partners, and long-term accumulation. In the future, most funds may still flow to the safest and most recognized USDC. CRCL's strategic alliances with Coinbase, BlackRock, JPMorgan, etc., and the即将获得 (imminent acquisition of) the first U.S. stablecoin bank charter, further consolidate its market position.
BTCdayu and qinbafrank emphasize that this is a misjudgment of the logic of stablecoin competition.
They believe that stablecoins are not单纯的 (simply) financial products, but typical "network products." The real moat is not capital strength, but user mindshare, security consensus, and switching costs.
They point out that JPMorgan is already doing stablecoin-like products, but these are more like "deposit tokens" for internal institutional circulation, belonging to a closed system, more like corporate version Q coins, not an open network like USDC.
In their view, big bank stablecoins serve their own business systems more, rather than building a global open clearing network. What truly competes with USDC is an equally open, compliant, and composable stablecoin system, not a bank's own closed assets.
IV. Is Compliance a Moat or a Hidden Risk?
Jiang Zhuo'er believes that CRCL's profit model is built on the institutional advantages brought by a regulatory vacuum. Once the rules change, the advantages may become shackles.
The judgment of BTCdayu and qinbafrank is completely opposite.
They believe that the stablecoin path will eventually move towards a "co-opted" stage. Whoever completes compliance first can become part of the national infrastructure.
In their logic, compliance is a clearing mechanism, not a binding mechanism. After the gray space is gradually squeezed out, it反而有利于 (instead benefits) players like USDC that have already deeply布局 (laid out) compliance.
V. Short-Term Trading Aspect: Unlock, Selling Pressure, and Timing
Phyrex_Ni's perspective is more偏向 (biased towards) trading.
His core focus is not long-term logic, but short-term supply and demand structure. He specifically noted that CRCL has entered a large-scale unlock window, with lock-up periods for executives, founders, employees, and early investors陆续结束 (sequentially ending).
He does not believe these shares will necessarily be sold off集中 (sold off集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中集中极低。
He is not willing to bear the "time cost + opportunity cost" and would rather wait for the uncertainty to be released before making a judgment.
VI. Payment Reality Obstacle: Structural Limitations of USDC in the U.S.
Phyrex_Ni raised a rarely discussed but, in his opinion, very crucial issue: tax attributes.
He pointed out that under the U.S. tax code system, USDC is not treated as "cash" but is regarded as "property." This means that every payment made with USDC may trigger capital gains tax calculation obligations.
This makes USDC inherently difficult to enter the U.S. retail payment scene. Even if the regulatory path is smooth, as long as the tax law remains unchanged, large-scale C-end payments are almost impossible to achieve.
In his view, this will limit the payment ceiling for USDC in the U.S. domestic market, making it more likely to remain in B2B, cross-border清算 (clearing/settlement), and financial backends, rather than becoming true "digital cash."
VII. Long-Term Space: Cyclical Play or Structural Opportunity?
Qinbafrank is a typical long-cycle bull.
His logic is not complicated: stablecoins are a very large赛道 (sector), and the ceiling is far from being reached. Going from the current few trillion dollars to tens of trillions of dollars in the future is not pie in the sky.
He believes that in a market with tenfold space, leading and quasi-leading companies naturally enjoy a premium. CRCL, although not absolutely first, is the one that is most compliant and most easily accepted by the institutional system.
From his perspective, what the market should really do is not worry about short-term fluctuations, but identify which companies in such a structural赛道 (sector) have the qualifications to participate in the "last round of centralized红利 (红利/benefits)."
Summary
The cheaper the price, the more seriously one should research, not more easily否定 (dismiss/negate). Current bears see short-term structural risks: excessively high distribution costs, path dependence on interest rates, supply pressure from unlocks, and potential impacts from marginal changes in tax systems and regulation; bulls are betting on structural红利 (benefits) over a longer time dimension: the migration of global settlement demand, the institutionalization process of compliant stablecoins, and the "quasi-infrastructure属性 (attributes)" once network products are established.
It is undeniable that for a long time to come, Circle may find it difficult to defeat Tether, but similarly, new competitors will find it extremely difficult to replicate the compliance path, channel network, and institutional trust accumulation that Circle has already completed in a short time.
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