为什么 Hyperliquid 越火 ,Arbitrum 就越能「闷声发大财」?

marsbitPublicado em 2025-12-03Última atualização em 2025-12-04

最近, @HyperliquidX HIP3协议爆火,股票Perp、黄金Perp,甚至Pokémon卡片、CS饰品皮肤等都能上线交易了,这让Hyperliquid一时风光无两,但很多人却忽略了, @arbitrum_cn 的流动性也在过去实现了大暴涨。

没错,Hyperliquid 越火 ,Arbitrum 就越能“闷声发大财”?为什么这么说?

1)一个基本事实,Hyperliquid持有的USDC,大部分都要从Arbitrum桥接过来,每当Hyperliquid上线一个TSLA股票合约、一个黄金perp,背后都是海量USDC从Arbitrum涌入。这种关联不是“顺带”,而是结构性依赖。

这些桥接活动,直接贡献了Arbitrum的日交易量和生态活性,推动Arbitrum持续稳坐layer2 第一把交椅;


2)当然,会有人说,Arbitrum只是Hyperliquid资金的跳板,只是资金过一道就走,那为什么Hyperliquid不选择Solana,不选择 Base,而是深度绑定了Arbitrum?原因如下:

1、技术适配成本最低:Hyperliquid需要一个EVM兼容性好的流动入口来安全承接稳定币,而Arbitrum的Nitro架构能让桥接延迟控制在1分钟内,且Gas费不足0.01美元,用户几乎感受不到摩擦成本;

2、流动性深度无可替代:Arbitrum原生USDC流通量达到了80.6亿美元,为所有layer2中最高。而且Arbitrum上有GMX、Gains等成熟协议已经形成了完整的借贷、交易、衍生品、收益聚合等闭环,本质上,Hyperliquid选择Arbitrum,不止是一个桥接通道,而是一个成熟流动性网络;

3、生态协同效应不可复制:HIP3新上线的一些股票Perp、黄金perp甚至国债代币等,在Arbitrum上早就以RWA资产的形式存在,并通过Morpho、Pendle、Euler等DeFi协议实现了借贷和farming等操作。这样一来,用户可以在Arbitrum上质押RWA资产作为抵押品,借出USDC,然后桥接到Hyperliquid开5倍甚至10倍杠杆交易股票perp。这不是资金过一道就走,而是跨生态的流动性聚合。


3)在我看来,Hyperliquid和Arbitrum之间绝非简单的流动性“寄生关系”,而是战略互补。

Hyperliquid作为Perp Dex的应用链持续激发交易活性,而Arbitrum则提供持续性的流动性输血,对于Arbitrum而言,也需要Hyperliquid这样的现象级应用来打破以太坊生态在产品张力上的不足。

这让我想起,当初Arbitrum在推Orbit layer3的框架时,主打的就是“通用layer2+专业化应用链”这张牌,Orbit允许任何团队快速部署自己的Layer3应用链,既能享受Arbitrum的安全性和流动性,又能根据业务需求定制化性能参数。

Hyperliquid虽然选择了自建layer1 +深度绑定Arbitrum的路径,看起来跟直接部署layer3不是一回事。但如果你仔细分析HIP-3生态和Arbitrum之间的关系,会发现一个有趣的结论:HIP3生某种程度上已经成了Arbitrum事实上的Layer3应用链。

毕竟,所谓layer3的核心逻辑就是,在保持自身性能优势的同时,把安全性和流动性外包给Layer2。显然,Hyperliquid暂时给不了HIP3生态的流动性优势,但Arbitrum可以。


这不就是一类变种layer3运作模式吗?

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