Фишинговые атаки в августе нанесли пользователь ущерб на сумму $12,17 млн

cryptonews.ruPublicado em 2025-09-25Última atualização em 2025-09-25

По данным отчета ScamSniffer за август 2025 года, объем средств, похищенных с помощью фишинговых атак, составил $12,17 млн. Всего зафиксировано 15,23 тыс. пострадавших пользователей. По сравнению с июлем рост оказался резким — убытки увеличились на 72%, а число жертв выросло на 67%. Такая динамика показывает масштабное усиление активности злоумышленников.

Основным фактором роста потерь стали новые схемы, связанные с EIP-7702 batch-signature. Эти атаки позволяли киберпреступникам использовать массовые подписи для упрощенных транзакций. Кроме того, наблюдались многочисленные прямые переводы криптовалют на адреса фишинговых контрактов. Это говорит о том, что пользователи не распознали угрозу и подтвердили транзакции вручную.

Отдельное внимание в отчете уделяется случаям с инвесторами. Три атаки на крупных держателей активов привели к потерям $5,62 млн, что составляет 46% от общего объема хищений. Подобные инциденты подтверждают: злоумышленники активно нацеливаются на так называемых «китов», чтобы максимизировать прибыль.

При этом в ScamSniffer аналитики, что реальные суммы ущерба могут быть выше. В отчете подчеркивается: из-за отсутствия корректной оценки стоимости LP-токенов и ряда сложных сценариев, часть убытков могла остаться вне статистики. Это значит, что фактические потери криптоинвесторов способны превысить официальные $12,17 млн.

Резкий рост атак указывает на необходимость усиления мер защиты. Эксперты рекомендуют проверять каждую транзакцию, избегать подписания неизвестных контрактов и использовать многоуровневые системы безопасности. Отдельно подчеркивается важность работы с надежными кошельками и сервисами мониторинга.

ScamSniffer продолжает развивать собственные решения на стыке on-chain и off-chain аналитики. Целью является создание более эффективных систем предотвращения атак в режиме реального времени. Платформа уже внедряет механизмы отслеживания подозрительных адресов и уведомления пользователей до того, как средства будут переведены.

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