The Rise of Prediction Markets: Why Is This Trillion-Dollar Industry Making U.S. Regulators 'Sit on Pins and Needles'?

marsbitPublicado a 2026-06-15Actualizado a 2026-06-15

Resumen

The article, "The Rise of Prediction Markets: Why Is the Trillion-Dollar Trend Making US Regulators Uneasy?", explores the rapid growth of prediction markets and the regulatory pushback they face. It argues that platforms like Polymarket and Kalshi, where users trade contracts on real-world outcomes, create highly efficient information aggregates. Their monthly trading volume has surpassed $24 billion, with projections pointing toward a trillion-dollar annual market by 2030. A core example is the 2026 Iran conflict, where prediction market signals accurately foreshadowed the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz and an oil price spike hours before official announcements, outperforming traditional analysts. The piece contends US regulators' primary motivation is not public protection but self-preservation and control. It cites a court ruling against the CFTC, which found the agency's concerns over market manipulation "speculative" and lacking concrete evidence. At the state level, the driving force is framed as lost tax revenue from traditional gambling, not documented social harm. Citing economist Friedrich Hayek, the article concludes that prediction markets excel by crowdsourcing decentralized, "local knowledge" into a dynamic, continuous price signal, offering a real-time reality check against official narratives and static forecasts.

Author: Long Yue

Source: Wall Street News

When a decentralized crowd can predict wars, policies, and market trends more accurately than U.S. federal agencies, American regulators can no longer sit still.

Prediction markets are experiencing rapid expansion. The Mises Institute recently published a lengthy article by Angelo Monaco, which outlines the operational logic of prediction markets, their explosive growth trajectory, and the reasons behind the U.S. government's urgency to impose controls on them.

The article argues that the underlying motive for U.S. regulators to suppress prediction markets is ostensibly to 'protect the public' but essentially to 'protect themselves.' What regulatory agencies truly fear is not that these markets will fail, but that they function too well—so well that they publicly expose the limitations of the regulators' own predictive capabilities.

The logic of prediction markets is not complex. Platforms like Polymarket and Kalshi are essentially financial exchanges: users buy and sell contracts based on the outcomes of real-world events. Contract prices fluctuate between 1 cent and 99 cents, directly reflecting the market's collective judgment on the probability of an event occurring. If the event happens, the contract settles at $1; accurate predictors profit, while those who are wrong incur losses. This mechanism forces every participant to back their judgment with real money.

Currently, the monthly trading volume of prediction markets has exceeded $24 billion. Analysts predict the overall market size will surpass $240 billion and is poised to achieve an annual trading volume exceeding $1 trillion before 2030. This growth rate is exceptional within the financial industry.

The Iran War: Prediction Markets Were Several Hours Ahead of the Pentagon Press Conference

The article uses the Iran conflict in early 2026 as a core case study to illustrate the practical value of prediction markets.

From late 2025 to January 2026, when local unrest in Iran first began, mainstream analysis institutions and media generally predicted that energy markets would remain stable, with the forecast range for the annual average price of Brent crude oil being $55 to $60 per barrel. However, during the same period, a clear divergence signal emerged in crude oil options markets and decentralized geopolitical event contracts—while analysts on television were telling the public 'not to panic,' traders betting with real money were already significantly increasing the probability priced in for 'worst-case scenarios.'

The market began pricing in the structural vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz weeks before the U.S.-led coalition launched airstrikes in February.

In March, when Iran blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting about 20% of global oil supply, prediction markets on platforms like Polymarket and IMF PortWatch had already provided clear judgments hours before the Pentagon held its press conference. They did so by integrating satellite tracking data, signals from surging insurance rates, and data from regional shipping companies.

The article points out that if you relied solely on traditional energy forecasts in January, you would have been told that a sharp rise in oil prices was a 'low-probability event.'

The Court Has Already Said: The U.S. CFTC's Concerns 'Lack Specific Evidence'

Does the regulators' logic hold water? The article suggests the answer is no.

The most representative legal case is Kalshi v. CFTC. The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) had sought to ban contracts related to congressional elections in federal court, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit explicitly rejected the government's motion for a stay. The court's wording was direct: the CFTC's concerns about market manipulation and threats to election integrity were 'speculative and lacking in specific evidentiary support.'

The court further found that the CFTC had exceeded its statutory authority and failed to demonstrate that political outcome trading would cause immediate harm to the public interest. This ruling directly paved the way for the legalization of commercial election event contracts in the United States.

The most significant 'national security threat' case cited by the CFTC involved a U.S. Army soldier who, in April 2026, used classified information about operations in Venezuela to profit over $404,000 on a prediction market. This case was heavily promoted by the federal government. However, the article notes that this remains the only major case involving national security to date. Using an isolated incident to argue for systemic harm is logically untenable.

The Real Motive of U.S. States: Not Protecting the Public, But Protecting Tax Revenue

If the federal-level crackdown is more about 'narrative control,' the motives at the state level are more straightforward—money.

The article cites data from the American Gaming Association's commercial gaming revenue tracker: since early 2025, prediction market platforms have cost state governments approximately $950 million in potential gaming tax revenue.

The reason lies in a regulatory arbitrage loophole: traditional sports betting operators must pay high Gross Gaming Revenue (GGR) taxes to state gaming commissions, while prediction market platforms define themselves as 'financial instruments,' thus only paying standard corporate income tax and completely bypassing the state-level gaming tax system.

Taking Minnesota as an example, when the state passed a prediction market ban, the core argument in the legislative debate was not 'social harm' but market share and tax revenue loss. The article's assessment is that the 'harm' pointed to by states is often projected tax losses and threats to traditional gaming monopolies, rather than documented social problems.

Hayek Already Talked About This

In arguing for the informational value of prediction markets, the article cites the classic argument by economist Friedrich Hayek.

Hayek pointed out that the decentralized price mechanism is the only tool capable of coordinating the 'local knowledge' scattered across the globe. No single expert, federal agency, or algorithm can master the fragmented information dispersed worldwide. Prediction markets essentially do one thing: crowdsource global wisdom.

In contrast, public opinion polls and regulatory reports are static snapshots—often outdated by the time they are released. Prediction markets are dynamic and continuous. When a geopolitical event occurs or economic data is leaked, the instantaneous fluctuation in contract prices tells you how important that piece of information is faster than any editor rushing to publish.

The article also mentions an everyday scenario: if a cable TV host is shouting that a certain piece of legislation 'will definitely pass,' but the corresponding prediction market contract price is only 12 cents, you immediately know the gap between rhetoric and reality. It's a real-time 'reality check.'

Preguntas relacionadas

QWhat is the core reason that U.S. regulators feel uneasy about the rise of prediction markets according to the article?

AThe article argues that U.S. regulators are uneasy not because prediction markets are problematic, but because they function too effectively. Their true fear is that these markets can publicly outperform and contradict the predictive abilities and narratives of government agencies.

QHow does the article use the 2026 Iran conflict scenario to illustrate the value of prediction markets?

AThe article uses the 2026 Iran conflict to show a predictive divergence. While mainstream analysts and media predicted stable energy markets, crude oil options and decentralized geopolitical event contracts signaled rising probabilities of a worst-case scenario weeks before the U.S.-led coalition's strike and hours before official Pentagon briefings, by integrating data like satellite tracking and surging insurance rates.

QWhat was a key finding in the Kalshi vs. CFTC legal case mentioned in the article?

AThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected the CFTC's attempt to ban election contracts, stating that the CFTC's concerns about market manipulation and threats to election integrity were 'speculative and lacked concrete evidentiary support.' The court found the CFTC had exceeded its statutory authority.

QWhat economic motive do U.S. states have for opposing prediction markets, as per the article?

AThe primary state-level motive is financial. Prediction markets, classified as 'financial instruments,' avoid paying high state gambling taxes (GGR tax) that traditional sports betting operators must pay. The article cites an estimated $950 million in potential gambling tax revenue lost by states since early 2025.

QWhich economic thinker's concept does the article reference to explain the informational value of prediction markets?

AThe article references economist Friedrich Hayek's concept of the price system as a tool for coordinating 'local knowledge' dispersed globally. It argues prediction markets act as a mechanism to crowdsource this global wisdom into a dynamic, continuous price, providing a real-time 'reality check' compared to static reports or rhetoric.

Lecturas Relacionadas

From Gold to Bitcoin: Fixed Supply + Institutional Frenzy, Might It Repeat the 'Explosive' Price Trend?

"From Gold to Bitcoin: Fixed Supply and Institutional Frenzy May Lead to 'Explosive' Price Rally Analysts suggest Bitcoin's price action could mirror gold's over the past two decades, following the launch of spot Bitcoin ETFs. Gold ETFs, introduced in 2004, drove gold's price surge to a current market cap near $28 trillion. Both gold and Bitcoin are non-yielding stores of value, with prices driven purely by investor sentiment rather than cash flows or credit. Gold ETFs experienced dramatic cycles: explosive growth, painful drawdowns, and slow recoveries, with each cycle reaching higher peaks. Bitcoin ETFs, approved in early 2024, saw rapid institutional adoption but are now facing similar volatility. Recent warnings highlight the risk of significant ETF outflows disrupting the current rebound. BlackRock's IBIT, a leading Bitcoin ETF, has sold nearly 100,000 BTC to meet redemptions while still holding over 733,000. The core parallel is fixed supply: when demand surges, prices explode, but demand is often volatile and wave-like, not steady. Institutional interest, through ETFs and corporate adoption, remains a key support pillar, helping to cushion sell-offs. If Bitcoin captures even a fraction of gold's role as a store of value, its upside potential is immense, though the path will be marked by high volatility. For investors, focusing on long-term trends and managing risk is crucial as this 'price explosion' narrative unfolds."

Foresight NewsHace 2 min(s)

From Gold to Bitcoin: Fixed Supply + Institutional Frenzy, Might It Repeat the 'Explosive' Price Trend?

Foresight NewsHace 2 min(s)

Why Is AI Agent Shopping Hard to Popularize?

The article argues that the popular narrative of "AI agent shopping" – equipping AI with a wallet to autonomously handle purchases – is fundamentally flawed and oversimplifies the complexity of shopping. It deconstructs shopping into two core actions: **information retrieval** (standardized, easily automated) and **value judgment** (deeply subjective and human-centric). The narrative mistakenly assumes AI can fully handle both. Value judgment itself has two layers: **evaluation** (assessing options against criteria) and **demand definition** (setting the criteria, weights, and values). The latter is inherently human and dynamic, as preferences are not fixed but constructed during the decision-making process ("constructive preferences"). The real dividing line for automation is not product standardization, but whether the **act of choosing** itself holds experiential value. For mundane purchases (e.g., printer paper), full AI delegation works. For experiential goods (e.g., wine, furniture), the joy of selection is core to consumption, so AI should act as an assistant that narrows options, leaving the final choice to humans. The "AI wallet" concept confuses three separate elements: decision-making, execution, and fund custody. Current payment industry solutions (e.g., from Stripe, Mastercard, Google, Visa) show that limited, scoped payment authorization tokens are sufficient for most consumer scenarios, not full fund custody. The true use case for autonomous AI wallets is in **B2B procurement** and **machine-to-machine (M2M) settlements** for standardized, high-frequency, low-value transactions. The real bottlenecks for AI shopping are not payment technology, but **1) the lack of trusted data sources** (e.g., fake reviews, counterfeit goods) and **2) the impossibility of automating human demand definition**. The conclusion is that the focus should be on safely automating the assessment and filtering process while reserving for humans the rights to define their criteria and enjoy the final act of choice. For experiential goods, the platform's competitive advantage shifts to providing a superior selection experience.

Foresight NewsHace 59 min(s)

Why Is AI Agent Shopping Hard to Popularize?

Foresight NewsHace 59 min(s)

After Nine Months of Shorting, a Full Turn to Long: Renowned Trader Opens Bitcoin Positions Around 64K, Crypto Market Long-Short Divergence Intensifies

After nine months of being short, prominent crypto trader Doctor Profit has closed all his bearish positions and started buying Bitcoin near $64,000, signaling a complete bullish reversal. He argues that structural market changes—such as impending U.S. regulation (CLARITY Act) and institutional adoption via securities tokenization—are rewriting the traditional four-year cycle script, potentially bringing the market bottom forward from the widely expected September/October timeframe. This view finds some technical support from on-chain analyst gumsays, who notes a bullish divergence on Bitcoin's weekly chart has persisted for 147 days, nearing the 161-day duration seen before the 2022 cycle low. However, cycle researcher Jake Pahor presents a counter-argument based on historical data. Analyzing patterns since 2014, he identifies three common features of past bear market bottoms: a ~12-month duration from peak to trough, a sustained period of extreme fear (with a proprietary risk score below 20), and the price falling below Bitcoin's realized price (~$53,000 currently). The current cycle, only nine months from its October 2025 peak, meets none of these conditions. The debate highlights a market torn between "front-running" a potential early bottom driven by new fundamentals and waiting for confirmation through traditional on-chain and sentiment metrics. While Doctor Profit opts for aggressive buying, Pahor maintains a disciplined, tiered accumulation strategy, continuing weekly buys at current risk levels but reserving larger orders for if more extreme fear emerges.

marsbitHace 1 hora(s)

After Nine Months of Shorting, a Full Turn to Long: Renowned Trader Opens Bitcoin Positions Around 64K, Crypto Market Long-Short Divergence Intensifies

marsbitHace 1 hora(s)

Senior Trader's Confession: How to Trade Market's False Expectations?

Veteran trader's case study: trading the market's "wrong expectations". This trade centered on a textbook "expectation error" after a weak CPI report. While the market initially priced in broad monetary easing (sending Nasdaq to 30,060), the crucial 30-year real yield hit a 20-year high. This signaled a fractured transmission mechanism: short-term rates eased, but long-term funding costs (vital for tech valuations) refused to fall. The trader executed five short positions on the Nasdaq (NQ) as it fell from 30,060 to 28,768. The core methodology: don't just trade the data, but analyze the market's implied causal chain and identify where it breaks. In this case, the chain was: Weak CPI → Policy Easing → Lower Long-Term Funding Costs → NQ Valuation Expansion. The break occurred between policy easing and long-term rates. The "veto variable" – long-term real yields – refused to confirm the bullish narrative. Trades were structured around "fast variables" (price) temporarily repairing while "slow variables" (funding conditions) remained broken. The article outlines a repeatable framework: 1) Map the market's implied causal chain. 2) Identify the veto variable. 3) Observe if it rejects the narrative. 4) Enter when price still follows the old script. 5) Choose the cleanest asset expression (e.g., short NQ, not broad S&P). 6) Define both invalidation and fulfillment exit conditions. The key insight: Alpha often comes not from an information edge, but from a "reaction function edge" – recognizing when the market is applying an outdated causal logic to new data. The critical question: What causal chain is the market's first reaction relying on, and is that chain still valid today?

marsbitHace 1 hora(s)

Senior Trader's Confession: How to Trade Market's False Expectations?

marsbitHace 1 hora(s)

Trading

Spot
活动图片