The Midlife Crisis of Crypto GPs: No PMF, No Next Check from LPs

marsbitPublicado a 2026-06-01Actualizado a 2026-06-01

Resumen

The article "The Midlife Crisis of Crypto GPs: No PMF, No Next LP Check" analyzes the shifting crypto fundraising landscape. It argues the era of selling grand visions to LPs is over; GPs must now offer products with clear Product-Market Fit (PMF). The author categorizes crypto fundraising products into three types: Primary (VC funds), Liquid (trading strategies), and CeFi/DeFi Native Yield. This summary focuses on the Primary market. Key points include: * **Market Shift:** LPs are impatient, demand immediate returns, and are skeptical of future promises. The "easy money" narrative has faded. * **GP Value Erosion:** LP learning curves have shortened (aided by AI), reducing the value of a GP's basic "crypto knowledge." Superior judgment is now rare. * **Weakened LP Motivations:** Traditional reasons for LPs to invest in crypto VC funds (capturing industry beta, gaining access, leveraging GP judgment) have weakened due to new products like ETFs and increased LP sophistication. * **Surviving in Primary:** The primary market will likely persist for: 1) large funds in endowment mandates treating it as a lottery ticket, 2) family offices/HNWIs using proprietary capital, 3) a few funds with proven recent outperformance, and 4) funds with strong ecosystem "deal-making" capabilities. * **Conclusion:** For most GPs, rebuilding trust requires starting over in a niche, demonstrating alpha-generating ability, or providing concrete value/services to LPs.

Author: Yi.Pineapple

LPs are no longer buying dreams; GPs must sell products. This article will attempt to categorize current crypto fundraising products into three types: Primary, Liquid, and CeFi / DeFi Native Yield. The first part focuses on Primary: after VC blind pools have lost their appeal, who remains at this table, and who must prove themselves anew? The answer is at the end; you can scroll directly to the bottom.

Note: This article aims to provide a landscape overview of the entire crypto fundraising market. The first part mainly categorizes and explains the current market situation from a product perspective, while the second part will analyze more from the perspective of LPs. As the author is primarily based in the Asian market, this article may have a regional bias.

Market Status

Having lost the grand vision, most Crypto GPs who failed to earn excess returns this cycle must get down to earth and launch a product with PMF. They must either prove they still have the ability to generate excess returns for LPs through some niche market or help LPs/partners solve specific problems in order to survive.

  • For most GPs, this market has long moved from the stage of "buying a future vision" to the stage of "buying a specific product."
  • LPs have lost patience and no longer want to gaze at the stars and the sea; they want to see something that can make money immediately, right away, and with relative certainty.
  • Crypto LPs have lost trust in the market and are no longer willing to easily believe the "next cycle" narrative (this has been discussed too much and will not be elaborated here). Moreover, many did not make easy money this cycle. Once the way to make money becomes difficult, investment actions tend to become more cautious and conservative.
  • Most traditional LPs have also completed a round of learning and moved past the story-listening stage. The 2020/2021 bull market was the time of peak FOMO. Dollar funds were cheap (Treasury yield close to 0), LPs were still making money relatively easily (on the eve of the economic downturn), and Crypto was in an explosive period (there were many wealth creation myths, and there was still a dream to sell). Back then, many people, even with only a vague understanding of crypto, were willing to make impulsive purchases for the dream; or, for strategic reasons, paid to enter and learn.
  • AI and falling labor costs have also changed the positioning of GPs. The costs for LPs to learn, hire, analyze data, trade, and make small direct investments are all declining. The trend of LPs transforming into GPs is significant. If GPs only offer the vague capability of "I understand crypto," their value will become increasingly precarious.
  • As for the storytelling track, unless they are U.S.-based funds with strong brand power, who, based on their past track records, can still tell stories and visions in specific niches (e.g., a16z leveraging its advantage in the AI sector to talk about crypto * AI, Dragonfly leveraging its investments in Ethena/Polymarket to talk about internet capital markets), there is still an opportunity. In Asia, this positioning is already difficult. After all, to some extent, in both crypto projects and funds, the opportunity to tell stories often goes to those with a "white paper" (a play on words implying Western or native English speakers have an advantage).

Product Overview

This article categorizes crypto fundraising products into three major types for discussion: Primary, Liquid, and CeFi / DeFi Native Yield (Note: This categorization is not entirely precise; there are some blurred lines between the three). (*This time, only Primary is covered)

Primary VC:

In terms of transparency, they can be roughly divided into blind pools and those with clear pipelines.

In terms of liquidity, they can be roughly divided into primary and primary-secondary.

Liquid:

In terms of source of returns, roughly divided into alpha-focused (buying GP's personal ability) and beta-focused (buying industry trends).

In terms of directionality, roughly divided into directional (buying cycle judgments) and market neutral (buying market inefficiencies in immature markets).

There are many ways to categorize; this is just to provide an idea

CeFi/DeFi Native Yield:

In theory, CeFi/DeFi Native Yield can be viewed as a type of return source within or spanning the crypto primary market and liquid market. The reason for listing it separately is mainly because, from the perspective of TradFi investors, they usually use the framework of traditional financial markets to understand crypto: for example, crypto VC can be understood as a sub-sector under the VC category, and staking/lending yield can be analogized to fixed income or cash management products.

However, crypto indeed contains some玩法 (play/mechanisms) and return mechanisms not entirely corresponding to traditional financial markets, such as mine-trade-sell, points/airdrop farming, protocol incentives, on-chain liquidity mining, etc. These are more like crypto-native issuance, user acquisition, and incentive mechanisms, warranting separate discussion.

Secondly, for many Crypto Native Investors, their earliest entry point and understanding of financial markets were not the traditional equity/bond market, but rather crypto-native scenarios like exchange wealth management products, staking, DeFi lending, LP, points/airdrop farming, basis trade, etc. Therefore, when they look at this part of the yield, they may not necessarily translate it into TradFi's fixed income, cash management, or alternative yield first. Instead, they more naturally understand it from the perspectives of protocol incentives, liquidity provision, token emission, on-chain risk, counterparty risk, and capital efficiency.

For Crypto Native LPs, accessing this part of the yield does not require a GP; at most, they might need a reliable key account manager.

For TradFi LPs, there are now some institutions packaging this part of the yield into fund forms to sell to TradFi LPs.

Primary Market

From the perspective of the entire primary market, crypto VC is just a sub-sector under the VC category. 2021 was a crazy year; whether crypto or non-crypto, the real returns of that vintage are not good. As a cruel fact, LPs have learnt their lessons, tired of any products with ultra-long lock-up periods (traditional VC typically 10 years, crypto VC also often 5-10 years). Because without a hard lock-up, they at least have the chance to withdraw part of their money if circumstances change.

In a sense, crypto is even worse off than traditional VC because the entire vision has collapsed. It is not a new industrial revolution; at most, it's a revolution in financial infrastructure. This judgment is not to disparage crypto—a revolution in financial infrastructure is still very important—but it's not as grand as many imagined in the last bull market. Worse, the market was too immature back then, and many projects were invested in without sufficient due diligence and legal protection. Many failed projects are a combination of investment failure and founders running away. There are already too many articles in the industry discussing the current dire situation; it will not be elaborated here.

Investing in VC is like VC investing in projects—a power-law business, a lottery-like business. As long as there are people willing to buy lottery tickets, this table will not disappear.

Why LPs invested in crypto VC back then, and why these reasons have weakened now

1. Invest to capture the beta of the industry

This reason was especially valid for tradfi LPs. It was true in the early days because market choices were few. For outsiders, on-ramping, buying tokens, going on-chain, using CEXs, and managing wallets were all difficult. They worried about losing private keys and CEXs running away. Investing in VC seemed like a more reliable access point then.

But today, when a traditional LP enters crypto, they have a whole set of choices before them: BTC ETF, ETH ETF, crypto ETP, DAT, custody accounts, SMAs, structured products. More importantly, these products do not require them to learn on-chain operations; they can trade just like they used to buy stocks.

According to CoinShares, the AUM of global digital asset investment products it covered reached about $156.9B in mid-May 2026. This number is not the total industry AUM, only the ETF/ETP/trust/closed-end funds and other listed or quotable products. But it's enough to show that gaining crypto exposure no longer requires investing in VC blind pools.

However, for long-term capital with clear mandates (e.g., endowment, etc.), this reason still applies. For them, to position in an industry often requires allocating to a basket of assets, so there is still likely a 1~2% allocation to Crypto VC.

2. Invest for accessibility

This usually happened to crypto LPs and some tradfi LPs with strategic positioning visions. At that time, many such LPs did not have the energy/time/ability to build their own investment teams, so they gave money to GPs, hoping to get good deal access.

But they later found this reason unstable too. When the market is good, GPs themselves don't have enough allocation, and it's hard for LPs to get truly good access. When the market is bad, competition is not fierce, and if you are willing to engage, getting allocation is not that difficult.

For traditional LPs, access had another meaning: they knew nothing at the time but hoped to enter the ecosystem and gain insider information by investing in crypto-native GPs. This was a strategic investment when there was no clear strategic target. Now the situation has changed. Many traditional LPs have either left for hotter industries like AI or have developed their own internal teams. AI and cheap researchers have narrowed the knowledge gap. New learners still exist, but their learning speed is accelerating, and their paths are multiplying; investing in the primary market with ultra-long lock-ups may not be the optimal choice for them.

3. Invest for judgment

This is the trickiest part. In a market developing extremely fast, unless GPs can continuously self-iterate, the judgment premium will disappear quickly. The rules of the game change every cycle, but it's not easy for people to change themselves (is this another version of "old habits die hard"?).

We must face a cruel reality: most GPs did not prove to LPs in the last cycle that they had superior judgment.

For traditional LPs, part of the purpose of investing in crypto-native GPs back then was to educate themselves and learn the industry through the GP's judgment. This typically happened to two types: one was companies hoping to strategically enter web3, such as large internet companies; the other was sophisticated tradfi investors, such as traditional GPs or family offices, who wanted to do their own web3 direct investment in the future. The learning period is now over, and only a small number of GPs who have truly proven they have superior judgment can remain on their investment lists.
For crypto LPs, they found that rather than betting on a GP's judgment, it's better to lose money themselves. Losing money themselves at least has emotional value, and they don't have to pay management fees.

4. Invest for deal-making ability

From an investment return perspective, deal-making ability mainly manifests as whether it can achieve a good exit for the project ultimately. Ideally, it would be best to help the project achieve healthy growth and ultimately obtain good returns in the secondary market. Otherwise, having the ability to organize the next round of financing is also important (essentially the difference between relying on retail investors or large investors to take over).

However, as a form of financial innovation, Crypto sometimes resembles a large-scale capital game. Sometimes, investment is just a way of exchanging interests, ensuring everyone has aligned interests and can make money together relatively assuredly.

5. Invest for reputation

For some large LPs, the money invested in a single VC is only about 1% of their overall portfolio, negligible. Sometimes they invest in a GP just to be cool (like investing in A16Z). However, most GPs are not in this category.

Who can still stay at the primary table

From a pure capital source perspective, the players most likely to continue staying at the primary table are:

Funds large enough to enter the mandates of endowments/other similar long-term patient capital. These institutions buy crypto VC as lottery tickets, without short-term funding pressure.

FOs, companies, HNW proprietary primary crypto investments using their own money. FOs/HNWs are more likely to do accelerator-like, very early funds; companies are more likely to do direct strategic investments/acquisitions.

The few funds that really made bets/accumulated BTC this cycle and actually generated excess returns for LPs. LPs believe they can win next time.

Funds with clear deal-making ability, possessing ecosystem resources that can be exchanged for interests with LPs.

For other players, if trust has been lost, it might be better to mentally start over and rebuild trust. Prove the ability to generate excess returns for investors again in a niche sector, or provide some specific service/value, and then scale up based on that.

Preguntas relacionadas

QAccording to the article, what is the main reason why most crypto GPs are now forced to develop a product with Product-Market Fit (PMF)?

AThe main reason is that LPs have lost patience and are no longer willing to invest based on future visions or 'the next cycle' narrative. They now demand immediate, relatively certain profit opportunities or specific problem-solving capabilities. The market has shifted from 'buying a future vision' to 'buying a specific product.'

QInto which three broad categories does the article classify crypto fundraising products?

AThe article classifies crypto fundraising products into three categories: 1. Primary (like VC funds), 2. Liquid (trading-focused products), and 3. CeFi / DeFi Native Yield (products based on staking, lending, airdrop farming, etc.).

QWhat was a key reason for traditional LPs to invest in crypto native GPs in the past that has now significantly weakened?

AA key past reason was 'Invest for accessibility'—LPs lacked the knowledge, team, or operational ability to enter crypto directly and used GPs to access deals and insider information. This has weakened as learning resources improved, internal teams were built, and easier access products (like ETFs) emerged, reducing the necessity of a VC blind pool for exposure.

QWhat does the article identify as 'the most tricky part' regarding the 'Invest for judgement' reason for backing a GP?

AThe most tricky part is that the 'judgement premium' of a GP can disappear quickly in the fast-evolving crypto market unless the GP can continuously self-iterate. The article states the harsh reality that most GPs failed to prove they had superior judgement in the last cycle, eroding LP trust.

QBased on the article, which types of players are most likely to remain at the 'primary' investment table?

A1. Large funds that fit into the mandate of long-term, patient capital like endowments. 2. Family Offices, companies, and High-Net-Worth individuals investing their own money. 3. A few funds that delivered outsized returns in this cycle. 4. Funds with clear ecosystem resources and deal-making ('攒局') capabilities for利益置换 (interest exchange).

Lecturas Relacionadas

AI Relay Stations Spark Heated Debate on Zhihu: Behind Cheap Tokens, What Are Users Really Worried About?

A discussion on Zhihu about "AI relay stations" shifted the niche developer topic of "cheap tokens" into broader user awareness. Users moved beyond simply questioning the legitimacy of these services to focus on practical concerns: Where do cheap tokens truly come from? Is the model being accessed the real one? Can relay stations see prompts, code, and API keys? For occasional users, are the risks worth it? The core debate centered less on price and more on trust. A primary worry is model authenticity—the risk of "model swapping," where users paying for a premium model might be routed to a cheaper one, creating an information asymmetry. Others argued that cost comparisons matter; while cheaper than official pay-as-you-go APIs, relay stations may not be the lowest-cost option versus subscriptions, domestic models, or free tiers, making user needs assessment crucial. Speculation about token sources ranged from legitimate bulk discounts to gray-area methods like account sharing or exploiting regional pricing. This opacity makes risk assessment difficult for users. Data security emerged as a critical concern, especially for enterprise use. When processing sensitive information like code, contracts, or client data, the inability to verify a relay station's data handling, retention, or access policies poses significant compliance and confidentiality risks. The evolving consensus suggests relay stations can be used cautiously for low-sensitivity, disposable tasks (e.g., summarizing public info, simple translation). However, they should not be the default for sensitive, professional, or production workflows involving proprietary data, Agents, or automated systems. Recommendations include avoiding large prepayments, not relying on a single service, using test prompts to monitor quality, anonymizing data where possible, and keeping official channels as backups. Ultimately, the discussion framed tokens not just as a billing unit but as a measure of real cost encompassing price, model integrity, data security, and service stability. The popularity of relay stations highlights user demand for affordable access, but the debate underscores a key trade-off: the savings from cheap tokens may come at the price of trust, transparency, and control over one's data and AI experience.

marsbitHace 20 min(s)

AI Relay Stations Spark Heated Debate on Zhihu: Behind Cheap Tokens, What Are Users Really Worried About?

marsbitHace 20 min(s)

In-Depth Research Report on TradFi: The Convergence Wave of Crypto and Traditional Finance

In 2026, the crypto industry is undergoing a profound infrastructure-level transformation—TradFi assets are migrating on-chain at an unprecedented pace. According to CoinGecko's Q1 2026 report, the total value locked (TVL) of tokenized real-world assets (RWA) has surpassed $31 billion, a nearly 4x increase from $7.8 billion at the beginning of 2025, with the sector’s aggregate market capitalization reaching $19.3 billion. Among these, the market cap of tokenized stocks surged from $2 million to $486 million, with Q1 spot trading volume reaching $15.1 billion—a single quarter already surpassing the entire second half of 2025. RWA perpetual contract Q1 trading volume reached a staggering $524.8 billion, far exceeding the $313 billion for all of 2025. Meanwhile, BlackRock's BUIDL fund has reached $2.3 billion in scale and has filed for two new tokenized funds, signaling that the world's largest asset manager's tokenization strategy is evolving from pilot to product suite expansion. HTX, as a core participant in the crypto exchange sector, officially launched TradFi perpetual futures products including NVDA, AAPL, MSFT, META, and SPY in 2026, enabling crypto users to gain 24/7 trading access to core U.S. equities. Boston Consulting Group predicts that global tokenized asset scale could reach $16 trillion by 2030, while McKinsey offers a conservative estimate of approximately $2 trillion. The on-chain migration of TradFi assets is no longer a "future narrative" but a structural transformation unfolding in real time, as crypto exchanges evolve from single crypto asset trading platforms toward "multi-asset-class trading infrastructure."

HTX LearnHace 22 min(s)

In-Depth Research Report on TradFi: The Convergence Wave of Crypto and Traditional Finance

HTX LearnHace 22 min(s)

Blocked Its Own Treasure, WeChat AI Steps Up

Tencent's stock surged over 10% on June 2nd amid reports that WeChat, with 1.43 billion monthly users, is finalizing tests for a native AI Agent. The reported feature, accessible by swiping right from the main interface, allows users to issue commands in natural language. The AI then decomposes tasks and automatically calls upon relevant Mini Programs within WeChat to complete actions like ordering food, booking tickets, or making payments, creating a closed-loop service execution system. This strategic shift follows the internal conflict and subsequent "blocking" of Tencent's standalone AI app, Yuanbao, by WeChat for violating sharing rules during a 2026 Spring Festival promotion. The incident highlighted a lack of internal consensus and exposed the weakness of competing in the standalone AI assistant arena against rivals like ByteDance's Doubao (345M MAU) and Alibaba's Qianwen. The new WeChat AI Agent aims to leverage WeChat's unique assets—its massive user base, standardized Mini Program APIs, WeChat Pay, and identity system—to move from simple content generation to actual task execution. Analysts note this changes the competitive landscape from model benchmarks to which AI can connect to more real-world services. However, success depends on key variables: the capability of Tencent's underlying Hunyuan model, managing massive inference costs, and redesigning incentives for Mini Program developers whose traffic might be bypassed. The move is seen as an attempt to keep user service intent within WeChat's ecosystem as AI begins to redefine how users access services.

marsbitHace 1 hora(s)

Blocked Its Own Treasure, WeChat AI Steps Up

marsbitHace 1 hora(s)

ByteDance Adopts Arm CPUs, Jensen Huang: So Sad I Didn't Buy Arm

**Summary:** At Computex 2026, Arm CEO Rene Haas announced that ByteDance and Oracle have adopted Arm's self-designed Arm AGI data center CPU. The company expects significant revenue growth from this product, projecting $20 billion in demand for the 2027/2028 fiscal years. Haas noted that restricting AI-capable CPUs from the US to China is nearly impossible due to their widespread applications. Arm's stock has surged dramatically this year, notably rising 16% after NVIDIA's Arm-based Vera CPU and RTX Spark announcements. A highlight was the informal, humorous on-stage conversation between Haas and NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang. Huang joked about NVIDIA's failed attempt to acquire Arm and playfully lamented selling his Arm shares. Both executives showed a clear sense of camaraderie and shared regret over the missed merger. Key technical topics were discussed: 1. **AI PC Design:** Huang explained NVIDIA's RTX Spark superchip (with a 20-core Arm CPU) is designed for future AI agents that will autonomously run and use tools on PCs, blending local and cloud processing. 2. **Agent vs. OS:** Huang emphasized the operating system remains crucial, as AI agents rely on its APIs and tools to function. 3. **Growth Constraints:** He identified the shift to "useful AI" that generates profitable tokens as a primary driver for immense, almost limitless, computational demand. Haas outlined Arm's strategy across PC and data centers. For PCs, Arm collaborates with partners like NVIDIA and MediaTek, offering its compute subsystem (CSS) for custom SoCs. In data centers, its Arm AGI CPU (built on TSMC's 3nm process) has gained major partners including OpenAI, Meta, and now ByteDance and Oracle. Arm presented a multi-year roadmap for its in-house CPU line. The article concludes that while GPUs dominated the AI training race, the explosion of AI agents is shifting significant focus to CPUs for inference, state management, and tool orchestration. The industry is trending towards vertical integration, with companies like cloud providers designing chips and chip/IP firms offering full solutions, all competing to deliver more efficient computing per watt.

marsbitHace 1 hora(s)

ByteDance Adopts Arm CPUs, Jensen Huang: So Sad I Didn't Buy Arm

marsbitHace 1 hora(s)

Trading

Spot
Futuros

Artículos destacados

Cómo comprar CHECK

¡Bienvenido a HTX.com! Hemos hecho que comprar Checkmate (CHECK) sea simple y conveniente. Sigue nuestra guía paso a paso para iniciar tu viaje de criptos.Paso 1: crea tu cuenta HTXUtiliza tu correo electrónico o número de teléfono para registrarte y obtener una cuenta gratuita en HTX. Experimenta un proceso de registro sin complicaciones y desbloquea todas las funciones.Obtener mi cuentaPaso 2: ve a Comprar cripto y elige tu método de pagoTarjeta de crédito/débito: usa tu Visa o Mastercard para comprar Checkmate (CHECK) al instante.Saldo: utiliza fondos del saldo de tu cuenta HTX para tradear sin problemas.Terceros: hemos agregado métodos de pago populares como Google Pay y Apple Pay para mejorar la comodidad.P2P: tradear directamente con otros usuarios en HTX.Over-the-Counter (OTC): ofrecemos servicios personalizados y tipos de cambio competitivos para los traders.Paso 3: guarda tu Checkmate (CHECK)Después de comprar tu Checkmate (CHECK), guárdalo en tu cuenta HTX. Alternativamente, puedes enviarlo a otro lugar mediante transferencia blockchain o utilizarlo para tradear otras criptomonedas.Paso 4: tradear Checkmate (CHECK)Tradear fácilmente con Checkmate (CHECK) en HTX's mercado spot. Simplemente accede a tu cuenta, selecciona tu par de trading, ejecuta tus trades y monitorea en tiempo real. Ofrecemos una experiencia fácil de usar tanto para principiantes como para traders experimentados.

590 Vistas totalesPublicado en 2026.01.19Actualizado en 2026.06.02

Cómo comprar CHECK

Discusiones

Bienvenido a la comunidad de HTX. Aquí puedes mantenerte informado sobre los últimos desarrollos de la plataforma y acceder a análisis profesionales del mercado. A continuación se presentan las opiniones de los usuarios sobre el precio de CHECK (CHECK).

活动图片