Crypto Market Makers Collectively Seek Transformation as Money Becomes Increasingly Difficult to Earn

链捕手Publicado a 2026-06-12Actualizado a 2026-06-12

Resumen

Major crypto market makers like GSR are collectively pivoting as profitability declines in their traditional business. GSR has pursued an aggressive "Web3 investment bank" strategy through acquisitions and partnerships, including buying a US SEC-registered broker-dealer, acquiring token advisory firms, launching an ETF, and securing strategic investment from Standard Chartered's SC Ventures. This transformation aims to integrate fragmented services—token design, fundraising, listing, liquidity provision, and asset management—into a unified platform. Other leading market makers, such as Keyrock, B2C2, Wintermute, and DWF Labs, are following a similar path: strengthening regulatory compliance, expanding into institutional OTC services, and diversifying into areas like asset management, tokenized assets, and complex financial products. Key drivers for this shift include shrinking project budgets, increased competition for fewer viable tokens, and smarter, more demanding clients. Regulatory pressures (e.g., MiCA in the EU) and market volatility are raising the stakes, forcing firms to build systemic risk controls. The industry is evolving from a high-margin, volatility-driven trading model toward a more institutional, compliance-heavy, and service-integrated structure.

Author: momo, ChainCatcher

This year, the veteran crypto market maker GSR has been taking frequent actions.

Recently, GSR announced the completion of its acquisition of SEC-registered broker Equilibrium Capital Services and renamed it GSR Securities. This means that GSR has obtained a U.S. FINRA-regulated broker-dealer license, allowing it to participate in the trading and brokerage of securities-class digital assets under the U.S. regulatory framework.

Prior to this, it had already completed a series of key moves:3 In March, it acquired two token consulting firms; in April, it co-launched a crypto ETF on Nasdaq and invested in the tokenization platform Libeara; and in May, it secured strategic investment from Standard Chartered's SC Ventures.

GSR's flurry of actions begs the question: what game is it playing? And what other collective moves have other crypto market makers made?

From Crypto Market Making to “ Web3 Investment Bank ”

As early as 2025, GSR CEO Xin Song positioned the company as a "crypto capital markets platform," and repeatedly mentioned its evolution into a "Web3 Investment Bank."

He also explained the motivation behind this transformation. In his view, the problems of crypto projects are never just at one single stage; the entire chain is fragmented. For instance, processes like token design, financing, listing, and liquidity arrangements require interfacing with different institutions, whose goals often conflict, resulting in high coordination costs. Therefore, their goal is to consolidate as many services around the token lifecycle as possible into a single system.

Since last year or even earlier, GSR has been building out its capabilities through licensing, acquisitions, and investments around this direction.

2025 In early 2025, GSR obtained registration with the UK FCA, entering the regulated system. Subsequently, it acquired U.S. FINRA-registered broker-dealer Equilibrium Capital Services, and, after completing regulatory approvals this year, renamed it GSR Securities. This move wasn't just about gaining another compliant identity; it equipped GSR with the ability to interface with traditional capital markets.

Beyond licenses, GSR also began moving its services upstream to earlier stages of the issuance process.

In March, it acquired Autonomous and Architech for $57 million; the former focuses on foundation operations and financing coordination, while the latter specializes in token economic design and liquidity strategy.

After the merger, the entire chain—from token design and financing to listing and market making—began to be integrated. Previously, these stages were often handled by different institutions, but they are now gradually being consolidated into a unified service system.

However, a more significant change is the expansion of services from "how to issue tokens" to "how to manage assets."

GSR mentioned in public interviews that many foundations and protocols hold large amounts of their own tokens early on, but lack mature financial systems to manage these assets. The result is highly concentrated assets with extreme volatility, making it difficult to form stable funding sources. Therefore, they are gradually expanding into asset management.

In addition to helping crypto companies build crypto treasuries last year, GSR also began launching ETF funds this year.

In April, GSR launched its first ETF, the GSR Crypto Core3 ETF, which combines Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Solana into a unified portfolio and generates yield through staking mechanisms.

Simultaneously, GSR is also betting on the tokenization direction.

This year, it invested in Libeara, incubated by Standard Chartered's SC Ventures. This platform has already facilitated over $10 billion in on-chain asset issuance and holds relevant licenses from Singapore's MAS. Interestingly, shortly after this, SC Ventures made a reverse investment into GSR, becoming its first external strategic shareholder since its founding in 2013.

This cross-shareholding strengthened the relationship from business cooperation to capital alignment, giving GSR more direct access to banking systems, institutional networks, and compliant channels.

According to public information, GSR has also been approached with tokenization demands for various assets, including film studios, farmland, real estate, and accounts receivable.

From licensing and compliance capabilities to consulting, issuance, market making, asset management, and secondary liquidity, GSR is attempting to gradually complete the "web3 investment bank" puzzle.

The Collective Transformation of Crypto Market Makers

GSR is not an isolated case of transformation; it is a microcosm of the collective changes sought by crypto market makers.

Over the past year, the actions of leading market makers have shown significant convergence. On one hand, they continue to strengthen compliance and licensing systems; on the other, they are continuously expanding beyond pure market making.

For example, Keyrock , while entering the U.S. market and establishing a New York office, is also advancing compliance under the EU's MiCA framework and entering the asset management business through the acquisition of a fund management company; B2C2 has received MiCA authorization, expanding its business to more complex institutional OTC and stablecoin exchange scenarios. Wintermute , besides strengthening institutional trading capabilities, has begun venturing into new areas such as prediction markets, DeFi treasury curation, and tokenized gold trading; DWF Labs is also trying to extend from liquidity provision into real-world asset directions, including gold trading and physical delivery.

Crypto market makers seem to have formed a similar path: first, enter mainstream regulatory systems through licensing and geographical expansion; then, use OTC and institutional liquidity as core businesses to penetrate the institutional market; and finally, gradually extend into asset management, tokenized assets, and more complex financial products.

The underlying driving force is likely that the crypto market making industry is transitioning from high profitability to a state of high competition and low tolerance for error.

First, there's "less money." With the decline of altcoins and the bear market, project budgets for market making have also significantly decreased. Project owners themselves have become smarter. After experiencing multiple cycles, they have a better understanding of market making mechanisms and profit margins.

Moreover, "too many monks, too little gruel"—the number of projects with market making value has decreased, but the number of market makers has increased. As a result, quality liquidity is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few top-tier teams, while a large number of long-tail projects are neither profitable nor have growth potential. Many market makers are competing for limited returns within an increasingly narrow range, with marginal space being squeezed thin.

Meanwhile, competition is expanding outward. New tracks like on-chain market making, derivatives, and tokenized assets are constantly emerging, causing the landscape of crypto market makers to diversify as the number of tracks increases. Market makers are also being required to possess more systematic capabilities.

More importantly, pressure from compliance and risk events is hard to ignore. Regulations are tightening rapidly. After the U.S. and EU MiCA frameworks are gradually implemented, licensing and auditing become basic requirements, not just value-adds. Adding to this are extreme market conditions like those on October 11 last year, which reinforced the perception that teams without systematic risk control capabilities will eventually be washed out.

Overall, the way to make money in the crypto market making business has changed. The role of crypto market makers seems to be evolving from a trading industry reliant on information asymmetry and volatility into an institutionalized industry reshaped by compliance, client structure, and asset forms.

Preguntas relacionadas

QWhat is the core strategic transformation direction for the traditional crypto market maker GSR, and what key moves have they made to achieve this?

AGSR is transforming from a traditional crypto market maker into a 'Web3 Investment Bank' or 'crypto capital markets platform'. Their goal is to integrate services across the entire token lifecycle, from issuance to liquidity. Key moves to achieve this include: acquiring an SEC-registered broker-dealer (Equilibrium Capital Services) to operate compliantly in the US; acquiring token consulting firms (Autonomous and Architech) to provide early-stage design and financing services; launching a crypto ETF on Nasdaq; investing in the tokenization platform Libeara; and securing strategic investment from Standard Chartered's SC Ventures to deepen ties with the traditional financial system.

QAccording to the article, why are many leading crypto market makers collectively seeking change? What are the main pressures they face?

ACrypto market makers are collectively seeking change primarily because 'money is getting harder to make.' The main pressures they face are: 1) Decreased profitability due to lower budgets from projects, especially with the decline of altcoins and bear markets. 2) Increased competition for a shrinking pool of viable projects. 3) Expansion of competitive arenas into new areas like on-chain market making and tokenized assets, demanding more systematic capabilities. 4) Intensified regulatory pressure (e.g., MiCA in the EU) and compliance costs, making licenses a baseline requirement. 5) Risk of extreme market volatility, which can expose and eliminate teams without robust risk controls.

QHow did GSR expand its service scope beyond just market making and token issuance into the realm of asset management?

AGSR expanded into asset management by moving its service focus from 'how to issue a token' to 'how to manage assets.' They began helping crypto enterprises build and manage their crypto treasuries. In April of the mentioned year, they launched their first ETF product, the 'GSR Crypto Core3 ETF,' which bundles Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Solana and incorporates a staking mechanism for yield. This allows them to offer structured asset management products to institutional and retail clients.

QWhat is the significance of GSR's strategic partnership with Standard Chartered's SC Ventures, and how was the relationship structured?

AThe partnership with SC Ventures is highly strategic for GSR, providing a direct bridge to the traditional banking system, institutional networks, and regulated channels. Its significance lies in enhancing credibility, regulatory access, and facilitating real-world asset (RWA) tokenization deals. The relationship was structured as a two-way capital tie: first, GSR invested in Libeara, a tokenization platform incubated by SC Ventures. Shortly after, SC Ventures made a strategic investment in GSR, becoming its first external strategic shareholder since its founding in 2013.

QWhat are some common trends in the transformation paths of other major crypto market makers like Keyrock, B2C2, Wintermute, and DWF Labs, as mentioned in the article?

AThe transformation paths of other major market makers show common trends: 1) Strengthening compliance and securing licenses (e.g., Keyrock under MiCA, B2C2's MiCA authorization). 2) Expanding into new markets, particularly the US and EU. 3) Broadening business scope beyond pure market making into areas like Over-the-Counter (OTC) trading for institutions, asset management (Keyrock), and more complex financial products (Wintermute's prediction markets, DWF Labs' gold trading). 4) Diversifying into new asset classes, especially tokenized real-world assets (RWAs) and DeFi products. The core shift is from a niche trading service to a more diversified, institutionalized financial services provider.

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