Before Second Attempt to List on HKEX, Performance of Semiconductor 'Little Giant' Suddenly Deteriorates

marsbitPublicado a 2026-07-17Actualizado a 2026-07-17

Resumen

Shenzhen Vanguard Semiconductor, a state-level "little giant" specializing in power semiconductor devices, has once again filed for a listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange main board, with GF Securities as the sole sponsor. This is its second attempt this year. Backed by prominent investors like Intel Asia-Pacific, OPPO, Xiaomi, and CATL, the company's post-investment valuation soared over 500% to approximately RMB 2.9 billion in just two and a half years. However, a month before its application, China's securities regulator raised six inquiries, focusing on the fairness of share prices for recent new shareholders and potential conflicts of interest related to two employee incentive platforms, suggesting concerns over improper benefit transfers. Financially, the company's performance shifted in the first five months of 2026, recording a net loss of RMB 510,000 compared to a profit of RMB 26.53 million a year earlier. Its overall gross margin also dropped from 22.4% to 17.9%. This was attributed to a decline in revenue share from its high-margin WLCSP products, driven by conservative smartphone maker procurement plans amid market adjustments, leading to a situation of increased revenue but decreased profitability. Furthermore, Vanguard Semiconductor's distribution network underwent a significant overhaul, with the number of authorized distributors plummeting from 658 to 103 within three years, mostly terminated for failing performance metrics. Sales remain heavily reliant...

Shenzhen Vanguard Semiconductor Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Vanguard Semiconductor"), a power semiconductor device supplier crowned as a National-Level Specialized, Refined, Distinctive, and Innovative "Little Giant," recently submitted another listing application to the main board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, with GF Securities as the sole sponsor.

This marks the company's second attempt to list in Hong Kong this year. Its first prospectus, submitted on January 12, 2026, automatically lapsed after six months.

Since its establishment, Vanguard Semiconductor has completed multiple rounds of financing, with a star-studded shareholder list—industrial capital from Intel Asia-Pacific, OPPO Guangdong, Hubei Xiaomi, and CATL New Energy is prominently featured. Its post-investment valuation surged over 500% in just two and a half years to approximately RMB 2.9 billion.

One month before the listing application, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), in its supplementary materials request for overseas issuance listing filing, required Vanguard Semiconductor to provide a clear, conclusive opinion on whether the share price for new shareholders added within the last 12 months was fair and reasonable and whether there was any benefit transfer, pushing this "Little Giant" into the spotlight of public opinion.

A chairman of a marketing consulting firm who has long followed the semiconductor industry chain told Phoenix WEEKLY Finance that the prospectus did not disclose any direct relationship between the top five customers and the company's shareholders. However, it is noteworthy that Moqin Intelligent (under Huaqin Technology) holds a 2.12% stake. As a global leading ODM (Original Design Manufacturer) provider, whether Huaqin Technology's affiliation extends to the customer level may require further clarification from the company.

Industry Pains, High-Margin 'Ace' Slows Down

In the first half of 2026, the global semiconductor industry was still in the throes of inventory adjustment. Operating in the mid- to low-voltage MOSFET (Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor Field-Effect Transistor) segment of the power semiconductor track, Vanguard Semiconductor was not immune.

The prospectus shows that in the first five months of 2026, the company's net profit turned from profit to loss, recording a loss of RMB 510,000, compared to a profit of RMB 26.529 million in the same period last year. Simultaneously, Vanguard Semiconductor's overall gross profit margin decreased from 22.4% in the first five months of 2025 to 17.9% in the same period of 2026. The prospectus attributed the decline to "market-driven pricing adjustments."

However, a deeper reason might lie in the passive shift in product mix. In the first five months of 2026, the revenue contribution of the company's high-margin WLCSP (Wafer-Level Chip Scale Packaging) products dropped from 46.3% to 27.4%. The prospectus attributed the decline in WLCSP revenue to smartphone manufacturers adopting more conservative production and procurement plans—rising memory chip prices increased overall unit costs, terminal consumption recovery was slower than expected, and customer inventory adjustments combined with industry price competition.

Data shows that during the same period, revenue from Vanguard Semiconductor's non-WLCSP products grew by 52.6% to RMB 246 million, but the product gross margin was only 16.6%. As the company's revenue structure shifts from high-margin WLCSP products towards lower-margin traditional packaging products, the scenario of "increased revenue without increased profit" has emerged.

Regulatory "Six Questions," Pointing Directly to Suspicion of Benefit Transfer

In June 2026, the CSRC raised six inquiries in its supplementary materials request for the overseas issuance listing filing submitted by Vanguard Semiconductor.

Among them, the two most critical inquiries directly pointed to suspicions of benefit transfer: First, requiring an explanation of the reasonableness of the share price for new shareholders added within the last 12 months, the reasons for price differences among different shareholders, and providing a clear, conclusive opinion on whether there was any benefit transfer. Second, requiring an explanation of the reasons and rationality for the significant differences in the grant prices of the two equity incentive plans, "Wei Zhu Ye Xin" and "Zhoushan Jicheng," and verifying whether the incentive recipients have any relationship with the company's shareholders, directors, supervisors, and senior management.

Phoenix WEEKLY Finance notes that before the IPO, Li Weicong is the founder, executive director, chairman, and general manager of Vanguard Semiconductor. He directly holds 39.19% of Vanguard Semiconductor's shares and indirectly controls 13.06% and 9.53% of the company's shares through the entities Zhoushan Tuowei and Zhoushan Jicheng, which he controls. Combined, Li Weicong holds approximately 61.78% of Vanguard Semiconductor's shares, possessing absolute control.

It is noteworthy that Zhoushan Jicheng is a platform controlled by Li Weicong as the general partner, primarily serving the core management and early backbones, while Wei Zhu Ye Xin is an employee shareholding platform with broader coverage.

"This implies a risk that the granting and implementation of certain equity incentives could be influenced through these platforms, which might also be one of the reasons why the CSRC questioned the huge price difference between the two equity incentive grants," said a chairman of a marketing consulting firm who has long followed the semiconductor industry chain to Phoenix WEEKLY Finance. From the available information, Zhoushan Jicheng has a control relationship with Li Weicong, while Wei Zhu Ye Xin, as an employee platform, needs verification regarding whether it includes related parties. The CSRC's requirement for a legal opinion on this matter is precisely to ensure the objectivity of the selection criteria and procedural compliance for incentive recipients.

Regarding issues such as the reasonableness of the pricing for new shareholders, Phoenix WEEKLY Finance sent a written interview request to Vanguard Semiconductor's board of directors. As of the time of publication, no response has been received from the company.

Simultaneously, the CSRC requested a description of the complete and specific content and termination clauses of the company's special shareholder rights arrangements; an explanation of whether the business involves areas restricted by the Negative List for Foreign Investment; verification of whether the shares held by shareholders intending to participate in the "Full Circulation" have any defects such as pledges or freezes; and a detailed itemized breakdown of the specific amounts and proportions of the raised funds to be used for domestic and foreign investment projects.

As of the time of publication, Vanguard Semiconductor has not publicly responded to the CSRC's inquiries.

Major "Cleansing" of Distributors, Reduction of 80% in Three Years

The prospectus shows that from 2023 to the first five months of 2026, Vanguard Semiconductor appointed 33, 33, 30, and 7 new distributors respectively; during the same periods, it terminated partnerships with 17, 539, 47, and 39 distributors respectively. Looking at the number of distributors at the period-end, by the end of May 2026, Vanguard Semiconductor's distributors had decreased from 658 to 103 over three years.

Regarding the specific reasons for terminating cooperation with over 500 distributors that disappeared within two years, the company stated in the prospectus that "most were due to their failure to meet performance assessment standards, and a small portion was due to breaches of contract terms and regional sales restrictions, engaging in sales beyond the designated geographic area without authorization." The company also stated that the inventory levels of terminated distributors were generally low.

In fact, Vanguard Semiconductor's sales are highly dependent on the distributor channel. The prospectus shows that from 2023 to the first five months of 2026, sales achieved through distributors were RMB 524 million, RMB 507 million, approximately RMB 697 million, and RMB 297 million, accounting for 91.0%, 81.3%, 85.7%, and 84.1% of the respective period's revenue.

The company admitted in the prospectus, "Any decline in sales from distributors or the loss of distributors could adversely affect the Company's business, financial condition, and operating results."

While the sales channels underwent drastic adjustments, Vanguard Semiconductor's customer concentration continued to climb. From 2023 to the first five months of 2026, the revenue contribution from the top five customers accounted for 48.7%, 53.8%, 57.6%, and 67.9% respectively. Among them, the largest customer's revenue share rose from 13.8% in 2023 to 29.7% in the first five months of 2026.

Supplier concentration also remains high. From 2023 to 2025, Vanguard Semiconductor's purchases from the top five suppliers accounted for 80.5%, 81.1%, and 72.6% of total purchases, respectively, and still reached 70.1% in the first five months of 2026. This "dual concentration" structure in both upstream and downstream may subject the company to higher transmission risks during industry cyclical fluctuations.

"In reality, increasing customer concentration is common in the semiconductor industry. Gaining key customers often means products enter the mainstream supply chain," the aforementioned chairman of the marketing consulting firm told Phoenix WEEKLY Finance. From the characteristics of the semiconductor industry, customers for power semiconductors are mostly brand manufacturers or OEMs in the consumer electronics and automotive electronics fields, belonging to different segments of the industry chain than shareholders, making direct affiliation less likely.

However, he also emphasized that attention is needed regarding Moqin Intelligent (under Huaqin Technology) holding a 2.12% stake in Vanguard Semiconductor. As a global leading ODM provider, whether Huaqin Technology's affiliation extends to the customer level requires further clarification from the company.

This article is from the WeChat public account "Phoenix WEEKLY Finance," author: Xu Mengyi

Preguntas relacionadas

QWhy did Weicha Semiconductor's profitability decline significantly in the first five months of 2026 compared to the same period in 2025?

AThe company's profitability declined mainly due to a decrease in the contribution of its high-margin WLCSP (Wafer-Level Chip Scale Packaging) products, whose revenue share dropped from 46.3% to 27.4%. This shift towards lower-margin, traditional packaging products led to an overall drop in gross profit margin from 22.4% to 17.9%, resulting in a net loss.

QWhat are the core concerns raised by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) regarding Weicha Semiconductor's recent capital and equity incentive activities?

AThe CSRC's core concerns focused on potential unfair benefit transfer. Specifically, it questioned the fairness of share prices for new shareholders added within the last 12 months and the significant price differences between two separate employee equity incentive plans ('Wei Zhu Yexin' and 'Zhoushan Jicheng'), requesting clarification on whether these involved improper benefits for related parties.

QHow has Weicha Semiconductor's dealer network changed from 2023 to May 2026, and what potential risk does this pose?

AThe company's number of dealers drastically decreased from 658 at the end of 2023 to only 103 by the end of May 2026, a reduction of over 80%. This poses a significant risk as dealer channels contributed over 80% of the company's revenue during this period. The loss of dealers could adversely impact sales, business, and financial performance.

QWhat is the potential conflict of interest highlighted regarding shareholder 'Moqin Intelligent'?

AMoqin Intelligent, which holds a 2.12% stake in Weicha Semiconductor, is a subsidiary of Huaqin Technology, a leading global ODM (Original Design Manufacturer). The concern is whether this shareholding relationship extends to the customer level, meaning if Huaqin Technology or its affiliates are also major clients of Weicha Semiconductor, which could raise questions about transaction fairness and independence.

QWho is the controlling shareholder of Weicha Semiconductor and what is the extent of their control?

ALi Weicong is the controlling shareholder. He is the founder, executive director, chairman, and general manager. He directly holds 39.19% of the shares and indirectly controls another 22.59% through two entities he controls (Zhoushan Tuowei and Zhoushan Jicheng), giving him a combined total control of approximately 61.78% of the company's shares.

Lecturas Relacionadas

Live-Action Short Series Forced onto the Big Screen by AI

Live-action short dramas, originally a popular online format, are now attempting to enter the cinema. Several top IPs like "What a Good Girl" and "One Family, Same Class" have received approval for film adaptations. This shift is driven by several pressures within the short drama industry. After rapid growth fueled by low costs and platform support, the sector now faces a slowdown with fewer hits and reduced investment. A major disruptor is the explosive rise of AI-generated short dramas, which dominate new releases and challenge the traditional model with their speed and low cost. Platform policy changes, such as adjustments to revenue guarantees, have further squeezed producers. In this context, film adaptation is seen as a potential new growth path. It offers a chance to extend a short-lived online hit into a longer-lasting IP asset, moving beyond the "fast production, fast consumption" cycle. Established short dramas bring pre-validated stories and emotional appeal to the table, potentially lowering the risk for film investors. However, significant challenges remain. Translating a fast-paced, fragmented viewing experience designed for phones into a compelling cinematic narrative is difficult. Past attempts by popular TV shows and variety programs to make films have often failed due to weak content. A short drama's massive online viewership does not guarantee box office success, as cinema requires a higher commitment of time and money from audiences. Ultimately, the success of these adaptations will depend not on their original popularity, but on their ability to tell complete, emotionally resonant stories that meet the standards of the theatrical market.

marsbitHace 1 hora(s)

Live-Action Short Series Forced onto the Big Screen by AI

marsbitHace 1 hora(s)

Asymmetry of Algorithmic Agency: When AI Makes Decisions for You, You Don't Even Have the Right to Oppose

As AI increasingly makes decisions on our behalf, a critical asymmetry emerges: the entities deploying these systems understand and refine their algorithms, while individuals merely endure the consequences. This article explores the three layers of this "algorithmic agency asymmetry." First, opacity shields system goals, incentives, and flaws, creating a "black box fallacy" where outputs seem objective. Second, algorithms amplify historical biases, repackaging past inequalities in a seemingly neutral, computational form. Third, recursive systems lead to "algorithmic drift," where users train the system and are simultaneously trained by it, shaping their own choices and behaviors. This asymmetry has profound implications, extending into hiring, education, policing, and daily life. Users adapt to what the system rewards, but only see the end result—a score, recommendation, or price—without understanding the underlying logic or manipulated conditions. To rebalance this power dynamic, the article proposes policy interventions: 1) Meaningful transparency and explainability for users affected by AI decisions. 2) Enforceable impact assessments before deploying high-risk systems. 3) Genuine human oversight with the power to challenge outputs. 4) Mandatory post-deployment monitoring and auditing. 5) Outright bans on manipulative or exploitative systems. Finally, fostering widespread "algorithmic literacy" is essential public infrastructure. Ultimately, this asymmetry is a structural power imbalance. Good policy cannot eliminate it but can narrow the gap by making automated influence visible, contestable, auditable, and governable.

marsbitHace 1 hora(s)

Asymmetry of Algorithmic Agency: When AI Makes Decisions for You, You Don't Even Have the Right to Oppose

marsbitHace 1 hora(s)

From StepFun to Galaxy Robots: The Capital Migration Path Behind WAIC Exhibiting Companies

From Stellar Steps to Galactic Generals: The Capital Migration Route Behind WAIC 2026 Exhibiting Enterprises The 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) in Shanghai showcased over 1100 exhibitors. Analyzing their financing activities over the past 18 months reveals key capital trends in China's AI industry, with the total raised exceeding 100 billion RMB. **Large Language Models: IPO Window Opens, Capital Concentrates on Leaders** This sector attracted the most capital. Companies like Zhipu and MiniMax have completed Hong Kong IPOs, setting exit benchmarks. StepFun (Stellar Steps), a star example, saw its valuation soar to an estimated $12B through rapid, escalating funding rounds—from millions in 2023 to a $2.5B Pre-IPO round in mid-2026 led by industrial players like ZTE. The trend shows a shift: IPO paths are clear, industrial capital is entering for strategic deployment, and large, concentrated funding rounds favor commercially viable leaders. **Embodied AI: Hyper-Compressed Financing Cycles** This field entered a capital explosion phase. Companies like Galbot (Galactic General) epitomize the trend, raising over 7B RMB across 5 rounds in under 2 years. Early VC backing quickly gave way to investments from industrial giants (Meituan, CATL, SAIC) and finally "national team" funds, signaling its status as a strategic industry. The compressed fundraising pace, as seen with other leaders, indicates high consensus on the sector's potential and intense competition. **AI Chips: Domestic Substitution Enters Deep Waters** Represented by companies like Moore Threads (which completed an 8B RMB IPO as the "first domestic GPU stock"), this sector differs. It faces longer R&D cycles, higher capital thresholds, and stronger policy reliance. Funding often involves state-backed capital and telecom operators, with lower VC participation compared to other AI sectors, reflecting the industry's inherent challenges. **Capital Flow Panorama: Five Key Trends** 1. **Winner-Takes-Most:** Funding is highly concentrated in top players within each sector. 2. **Embodied AI as a New Growth Pole:** It attracts rapid, large-scale funding from industrial chains, akin to the automotive sector. 3. **Industrial Capital Ascendancy:** Strategic investors like ZTE and SAIC are replacing pure financial VCs for technology synergy. 4. **"National Team" Prominence:** State-guided investment funds are actively co-investing, aligning AI with national strategy. 5. **Diversified Exit Paths:** Beyond IPOs, options like M&A and strategic investment are increasing. **Conclusion: Capital is Not Omnipotent** While massive capital influx signals strong market confidence in China's AI outlook, it brings risks: reduced ecosystem diversity due to concentration, potential compromise of corporate independence, and valuation bubble concerns amidst compressed financing. The investor's motive behind a company often reveals more than its technical specs.

marsbitHace 1 hora(s)

From StepFun to Galaxy Robots: The Capital Migration Path Behind WAIC Exhibiting Companies

marsbitHace 1 hora(s)

Trading

Spot
活动图片