彭博锐评FTX:借牛市实现“全额赔付”,可惜SBF没撑到这一天

Odaily星球日报Publicado a 2024-05-09Actualizado a 2024-05-09

Resumen

债权人难蚌:FTX想按照破产声明日期的价格来偿还债务。

原文《FTX Found the Money》,由Odaily星球日报 jk 编译。

原文作者:Matt Levine 是一位负责金融报道的彭博观点专栏作家。他曾是 Dealbreaker 的编辑,曾在高盛的投行部任职,担任 Wachtell、Lipton、Rosen & Katz 的并购律师,并在美国第三巡回上诉法院担任助理法官。

彭博锐评FTX:借牛市实现“全额赔付”,可惜SBF没撑到这一天

今天的情况是 FTX……资不抵债但仍有偿债能力?这真令人震惊:

加密货币交易所 FTX 已经积累了比其 2022 年 11 月崩溃时损失的客户资金多出数十亿美元,这使得客户能够得到全额赔偿,外加利息,这在美国破产程序中是非常罕见的结果。

低级债权人通常只能获得其持有资产的一小部分,但 FTX 得益于包括 Solana 在内的加密货币的强劲反弹。该公司还出售了许多其他资产,包括各种风险投资项目,如在人工智能公司 Anthropic 的股份。

FTX 现首席执行官 John Ray 表示:“在任何破产案件中,这都是难以置信的结果。”他在公司崩溃时接管了该公司。

昨天,Ray 的重组团队提交了最新的破产计划草案和披露声明,估计“客户和数字资产贷款债权人将恢复其请愿日期索赔价值的 118% 至 142% 。” 对 FTX 的极度简化但直观有用的总结将是:

  • 当 FTX 在 2022 年 11 月破产时,其平台上的客户共有价值大约 80 亿美元的现金和加密货币。与此同时,它的资产主要由许多加密代币组成,这些代币与 FTX 和 Bankman-Fried 有关,这些代币在两周前还非常有价值,但随后价值暴跌。出售所有这些代币无法收回足够的资金来偿还客户,而客户则希望立即拿回他们的钱。

  • 申请破产阻止了客户立即取回他们的资金。这就是破产的目的。破产前的 FTX 是一个加密货币交易所,名义上允许客户按需提取资金。破产将所有客户的需求存款转变为长期贷款:你不能按需取出你的资金,而必须等待破产程序结束。这个过程仍在进行中。因此,FTX 有大约一年半的时间使用客户资金,而不必满足提款需求。

  • 长期资金比短期资金更有价值。例如:在 2022 年 11 月,FTX 持有大量 Solana 代币。Solana 在 2022 年 4 月的交易价格约为每个 136 美元,但到了 11 月中旬,价格约为每个 12 美元。这些 Solana 代币已不足以偿还所有客户的债务,尤其是如果你必须一次性抛售它们的话。但如果你等待到了 2024 年 3 月,Solana 的价格达到了 200 美元。

  • FTX 确实等待了,部分可能是出于战略原因,但也因为破产进程本就缓慢。一个新的、不特别擅长加密货币的管理团队接管了 FTX。他们进行了一次长时间的调查,以掌握公司情况并找到 FTX 的所有代币。最终它决定出售这些代币,但需要法院批准才能这么做。直到 2023 年 9 月,即破产申请后 10 个月,它才获得了批准。然后,它聘请了一位投资经理来“出售、对冲和抵押”其加密代币。这个策略效果不错:截至 3 月 31 日,FTX 通过出售代币筹集了约 50 亿美元,并预计在接下来的几个月内再筹集 44 亿美元。通过将一切——资产、负债——冻结一年左右,FTX 为其加密代币获得了比 2022 年 11 月必须为满足客户提款而抛售时更多的资金。

这还不是全部故事:FTX 还通过出售企业、出售部分风险投资组合、没收 SBF 和其他人购买的房地产和 Robinhood Markets Inc.的股票、追回捐款和投资等方式回收了资金。但基本的形式是,“FTX 用客户的资金进行了长期投资,这是愚蠢的,这些投资损失了价值,客户要求退还他们的资金,所以 FTX 宣布破产并进入了为期一年的冬眠,之后这些投资获得了足够的回报来偿还客户”,这一总结看起来基本上是正确的。

确实,FTX 的情况对客户而言是一种挑战:他们原本认为可以随时提取的资金,实际上可能被锁定了两到三年。FTX 对这一抱怨表示同情,并希望为客户支付利息。利率定为 9% ,这大约是如何得出 118% 或 127% 的恢复率的依据,这是一个两到三年的破产过程中的计算结果。通常,破产并不是这样运作的,但 FTX 资金充足。从披露声明中可以看出:

债务人并不具备偿债能力,而破产法通常会阻止向客户和其他无担保债权人支付申请后的利息。然而,债务人认识到这些第 11 章案件自 2022 年 11 月以来剥夺了债权人的资金,而且这种状况将持续到支付分配为止。实际上,债务人的所有客户和债权人在这些第 11 章案件期间被迫向债务人提供贷款,并且在联合董事会看来,他们应得到公平的回报率。

这是一个积极的措施。如果不支付利息,这笔钱将去向何处呢?显而易见的答案是“如果在支付破产中所有债权后还有剩余资金,它将归股东所有”,但在经历了这一切后,FTX 的股东(最大股东可能仍然是 SBF)获得任何资金回报都会显得有些不妥。

这里的情况并非问题所在:除了客户索赔外,还有数十亿美元的有些模糊的税务和罚款索赔,来自美国国内税收服务局和商品期货交易委员会。他们实际上是这里的剩余索赔人:如果在偿还客户后还有剩余资金,美国政府将找到方法来获取这些资金。FTX 联系了政府,礼貌地询问是否也可以向客户支付利息,政府表示同意。

此外,就加密货币交易所而言,这对客户来说确实很艰难。如果你在 2022 年 11 月在你的 FTX 账户中有 100 美元,你的钱被锁定了两到三年,但最终你将得到大约 118 美元,这算是一些回报。但如果你在 FTX 申请破产时账户中有 10 个 Solana 代币,它们当时的价值约为 143 美元,你将得到大约 170 美元。与此同时,今天 10 个 Solana 代币的价值约为 1, 480 美元。如果你在 FTX 拥有一个比特币,你将得到大约 19, 600 美元;而现在一个比特币的价值超过 62, 000 美元。FTX 获得足够资金偿还客户的方式部分是通过在 2022 年 11 月 14 日,加密市场的低点,冻结其负债,同时让其资产增值。加密市场恢复后,资产价值上升,而负债则保持冻结。

我不确定这是多大的问题;SBF 在 FTX 的最后一次会计报告中列出了大约 89 亿美元的负债,其中约 60 亿美元以美元、欧元或 USDT(美元 Tether 稳定币)计价,这些确实将获得 118 美分以上的回报。但至少有 20 亿美元的以太坊和比特币负债,以这些货币计量时,将获得远低于这一水平的回报。

这正是破产的运作方式;从披露声明中可以看到:

该计划根据《破产法》的要求,按照各债权人在请愿日期的债权相对价值来分配价值。以这种方式在债权人之间分配并非债务人的自由裁量权,而是破产法的基石,这一点得到了破产法庭和巴哈马最高法院以及特设委员会、官方委员会和巴哈马 JOLs 的认可。在 FTX 案例的事实背景下,没有其他方式分享回收的投资是公平的。

虽然有些债权人可能持有不同意见,但确实很难提出另一种系统。FTX 并没有恰好拥有足够的 Solana/比特币/其他资产来偿还所有的 Solana/比特币/其他索赔人的债权——这正是破产的关键所在!因此,出售所有资产并按美元分配收益可能是最好的做法。

确实,情况完全有可能朝相反方向发展。在 2022 年 11 月,随着 FTX 的崩溃,人们觉得与 FTX 相关的所有加密投资——甚至可能是整个加密市场——都有可能归零。如果你在 2022 年 11 月得知你的资金将在 FTX 被锁定两到三年,并且取回任何资金都依赖于加密货币价格的反弹,你可能会合理地放弃希望。彭博社指出,在破产之后不久,许多 FTX 的“债权以低至每美元三分钱的价格交易”。

然而,这难道不像是一种交易吗?对于一个加密货币交易所来说,破产(1)将你所有的客户存款按照当日价格转换成美元,(2)给你几年时间偿还。如果你认为加密货币价格是周期性的、非常波动的,但总体上随时间上升,那么这种选择似乎非常有价值。加密价格下跌,你就说“哎呀,我们破产了”,你冻结客户的美元存款,然后你有两年时间看看价格是否会恢复。如果价格恢复,你就卖掉你的加密货币,偿还所有人,然后保留剩余的部分。对 FTX 来说,这不是一个选择,但在十年前的 Mt. Gox 破产案中,这是一种可能性。最终,会有人想出如何做到这一点。不被逮捕是这种交易的一个重要组成部分,到目前为止还没有人能够做到。

最后,关于 Sam Bankman-Fried 的情况如何呢?他因为导致 FTX 客户损失数十亿美元而被判处 25 年监禁。他以没有造成损失为由主张减刑,这在事实上(比特币客户损失了资金)和法律上(如果你拿客户的钱给自己买房子,然后破产财产收回房子,你仍然不应该拿走钱)都是错误的。但更广泛地,他从 FTX 崩溃的那一刻起就辩称,FTX 面临的是流动性问题而非偿债能力问题,如果大家能给他再多一两周时间解决问题,那里有足够的资金来偿还所有客户。他们没有给他时间。但 John Ray 有另外 18 个月的时间找到资金,他做到了。

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